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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Unfortunately, what would appear to be a deceptively simplistic question, ‘who is 
the carrier?’, has resulted in close to a century of complex and idiosyncratic law and 
jurisprudence. This notion of a single Hague Rules carrier, has spawned a multitude of 
bill of lading clauses and judicial doctrines, such that one is left with the impression that 
there must be a simpler solution.  Arguably, many of the difficulties faced with regard to 
litigation concerning parties involved in the carriage of goods, would be resolved by 
holding such parties to be jointly and severally liable as carriers. Yet this solution, 
although employed intermittently in several jurisdictions, remains an unpopular choice 
when considering multiple defendants in cargo claims.    
 
 Interestingly enough, when one examines the legislative process that gave rise to 
the uniform law regulating shipper and carrier interests, it becomes evident that the 
current single-carrier view of the Hague Rules is perhaps not the approach that was 
envisioned by the drafters of the Rules. Secondly, when the simplicity with which 
performing parties are dealt with under an expansive view of “carrier” is contrasted with 
the legal difficulties that arise as a result of a restrictive view of “carrier” one is left 
wondering whether we are giving effect to the reasonable expectations of parties engaged 
in carriage. By virtue of propagating a single carrier view, the law has had not only to 
adapt to finding “the carrier” amongst multiple performing parties, but also to 
accommodate multiple causes of action both within and outside the Hague Rules regime. 
A pluralistic or expansive notion of “carrier” is evidently desired when one canvasses 
more recent attempts at uniform carriage law. The domestic law of many nations also 
evidences the desire for such an approach. Judicial reform in the law of carriage is not a 
novel concept, with the prime example being the validation of the Himalaya clause 
despite the doctrine of privity. Nevertheless, when faced with the opportunity to hold 
both the shipowner and the charter to be “carriers”, the bench has often declined. One is 
left questioning why is it that there is such a resistance to the notion of ‘carriers’ or of 
multiple parties comprising ‘the carrier’?  
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 2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ‘CARRIER’ AND UNIFORM LAW 
 An examination of the winding path that eventually led to the Hague Rules is in 
order. Understanding the sequence of events that led to the creation and the adoption of 
uniform law governing the relationship between the carrier and the cargo owner or 
shipper, allows one to better comprehend the aims of the Rules, and as such, the violence 
that is done to them when circumvented by the very parties whose activities they had 
aimed to regulate. Prior to uniform law in carriage, the shipping industry has in essence 
passed through two phases. In earlier times, carriers bore strict liability and were subject 
to onerous duties. When shipping first modernized with the advent of steel and steam, the 
pendulum swung and carriers bore almost no responsibility by virtue of expansive 
exclusion clauses.1 Uniform law first and foremost sought to strike a balance between the 
competing interests of cargo owners and shipowners. A second important point to note is 
the development of the definition of “carrier”. The Hague Rules notion of “carrier” can 
be contextualized not only by examining the conferences that resulted in the Rules, but 
also by considering the statutory instruments that informed the drafters of the Rules.   
  
 In earliest times, prior to the development of more complex commercial 
relationships, those wishing to transport their goods simply bought or hired a vessel,2 and 
traveled with their property.3 “The contract of carriage, when used, was often a mere oral 
agreement between the merchant and the carrier, who was usually the ship’s master.”4 In 
Roman law, the carrier was liable under action de recepto, or praetorian action, to cargo 
                                                 
1 See Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, 
who describes the history of international liability regimes in terms of “the pendulum of liability” at pp. 
485-494.  
2 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 7 - 8. 
3 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 374, notes 
that from the earliest trading days “either the merchant went to the port of shipment, and personally saw 
and bought his goods there and risked the sea-passage to the distant market, or he traveled with his goods to 
the port of delivery and personally offered his goods there to the local buyers.” 
4 Mankabady, S. “Comments on the Hamburg Rules” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, 
London, at p. 28.  
 2
interests for any loss or damage to goods, excluding force majeur.5 In time however, “as 
a result of the expansion of the Roman Empire and its ports in the eleventh century, 
overseas trade grew, and it became less the practice for the merchant to transport good 
himself in response to orders from different places.”6 Thereafter the owner of the cargo 
tended to stay behind and entrusted the cargo to a carrier, but often a “super cargo” was 
placed on board to look after the goods and arrange for their sale.7 As trade began to 
flourish throughout the northern Italian cities around the thirteenth century, the ship was 
required to keep a book with all the shipments and the name of their owners, and an 
extract from the book was issued to cargo owners.8 As commerce became more complex, 
so did the law. By the late 17th century in England, the jurisdiction of the courts of 
common law had been extended to include maritime litigation.9 The English courts, “by 
adopting the common carrier’s liability by land as the origin of the custom at common 
law, obliged carrier’s to deliver goods in the same state as that in which they had received 
them.”10 The reasoning behind imposing strict liability on the carrier was that “[a]t 
common law it was believed that a cargo owner who shipped his goods by a marine 
carrier should be afforded special protection; he was prevented, by geographic 
remoteness, from closely supervising the passage of his goods and he was particularly 
                                                 
5 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 8-9.  
6 Ibid, at p. 8.  
7 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport 
of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 512. 
8 Mankabady, S. “Comments on the Hamburg Rules” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, 
London, at p. 28, but “this document was considered only as a receipt and the cargo-owner had to send a 
representative with the goods.” Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime 
Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at 
p. 10, notes that as a result of trade growth between Northern Europe and the Meditaranian because of the 
Crusades, carriage expanded and the bill as a receipt appeared.  
9 Gorton, L. The Concept of the Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law (1971) Gothenburg, at p. 94.  
10 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 11, although Karan has argued that 
the English courts “imposed strict liability on all of [the ocean carriers] regardless of whether they were 
common carriers or not.” Interestingly enough, “in maritime law, there is no good reason for distinguishing 
between a common carrier, who is a person not having any right to refuse to carry goods, and a private 
carrier, who is one reserving the right to accept cargo interests offers, because both of them are carriers 
undertaking to transport cargo by sea, this separation belongs to land transport rather than sea carriage.” 
(Ibid, at p. 11, f.n. 15). The distinction, however, has taken on meaning over time. Essentially, all 
shipowners who “offer their ships as general ships for the transit of the goods of any shipper” are common 
carriers. (Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, at p. 200). Where a ship is chartered to one shipper and contains an express stipulation in the 
contract of affreightment, the law does not consider him to be a common carrier (Boyd, ibid, at p. 201).   
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susceptible to collusion between dishonest carriers and thieves.”11 This level of strict 
liability imposed on the carrier was not unique to England, rather this approach was 
adopted in other common law nations, including the United States,12 as well as civilian 
nations.13 In France, the droit commun places the carrier under a very strict obligation de 
résultat, meaning he is liable for any loss or damage to the goods unless he falls within 
the narrow range of exonerating circumstances that amount to forces majeures or cas 
fortuits.14 In essence, the law regarding carriage by sea was arguably well in favour of 
cargo interests.  
 
 Carriers objected to the sometimes harsh imposition of liability in instances 
beyond their control.15 In the mid 18th century, carriers had attempted to escape the 
severe common law and civil law liability through contractual exemptions, however, the 
adverse reactions from cargo interests restricted this practice.16 By the 19th century 
                                                 
11 Sturley, M. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, at p. 
2-1.  This is essentially a restatement of the original justification for the liability of common carriers. Lord 
Holt in Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 2 Ld.Raym. 909 (K.B.) at p. 918 opined that the reason for the common 
carrier’s liability is to avoid “collusion whereby the carrier may contrive to be robbed on purpose and share 
the spoil.” Best CJ in Riley v. Horne (1828) 130 ER 1044 (Com Pleas), at p. 1045 held that the carrier is 
liable as “an insurer” with the rationale being, “In a state of society such as that we live in – in which we 
are supplied with the necessaries and conveniences of life by an interchange of the produce of the soil and 
industry of every part of the world – so much property must be entrusted to carriers, that is of great 
importance that the laws relating to the carriage of goods should be rendered simple and intelligible; and 
that they should be such as to provide for the safe conveyance of property…”. 
12 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 12. 
13 Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 4.  
14 Song, S. A Comparative Study on Maritime Cargo Carrier’s Liability in Anglo-American and French 
Laws (1970) PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Ann Arbor, Michigan, at p. 124.  
15 Shipowners had no opportunity to prevent loss or damage to goods as a result of the master’s actions. 
That era has been characterized as the “days of wooden ships and iron men”, where “cargo was carried in 
wooden sailing ships whose course was subject to the winds, reliable charts were few, navigational aids 
could not yet cope with cloudy weather and uncharted shoals, and shipowners could not communicate with 
ships at sea.” (Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness – Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 
24 JMLC 75, at p. 104).   
16 Todd, P. Modern Bills of Lading, 2nd Ed. (1990) Blackwell Law, Oxford, at p. 136. The only exemption 
the shipowner was able to secure in the 18th century was for liability as a result of “dangers of the sea.” 
(Karan, The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and 
Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 13.) As a result of a 1795 case, Smith v. 
Sheppard, wherein the strict liability of carriers was exemplified, the shipowners became so alarmed that, 
according to Lord Tenterden, they attempted to have a bill passed that would limit their common law 
liability. The bill passed the Commons but was thrown out by the Lords, and thus the shipowners were left 
attempting to alter their liability by contract. (Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th 
Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 208).  
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however, shipping and the shipping industry had fundamentally changed.17 The financial 
position of the shipowner was greatly improved by technological advancements in 
shipping,18 and as the shipowner’s bargaining power increased, the scope of his liability 
to cargo interests decreased. “The rapid development of ocean steamers, built of iron and 
steel, with Scotch boilers, reciprocating engines and screw propellers, in the decades 
following the Civil War, resulted in a great expansion of safe and rapid ocean trade, 
accompanied by an elaboration of shipping documents, banker’s drafts, bills of lading, 
insurance policies, and devices for the assertion of subrogated tort and contract claims for 
losses and damages and for avoiding or defending such claims.”19 By virtue of the 
superior bargaining power of the ship owners, extensive exculpatory clauses were 
inserted into the bills of lading resulting in virtually little or no liability on the part of the 
carriers.20 The exemption clauses became all encompassing, so much so that it inspired 
one commentator to remark that “there seems to be no other obligation on a ship owner 
than to receive the freight.”21 By the later half of the 19th century, the balance of 
liabilities had therefore swung entirely in favour of the carrier.  
 
 The repercussions of the changes in shipping were not only amongst the parties to 
the bills of lading, but became a concern amongst certain governments at the time as 
shippers began to lobby for their governments to intervene. This was particularly the case 
in the United States. In the mid 19th century, the American owned fleet began to decrease 
in size as wealthy investors found more profitable alternatives in railroads and factories.22 
What did remain of the American flag merchant fleet was all but destroyed by the Civil 
                                                 
17 Regular liner service in the North Atlantic had begun in the second decade of the 19th century, and by the 
mid 19th century large iron and steel steam-powered vessels with greater and greater carrying capacity were 
plying the trade (Sweeney, J. “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 548).  
18 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 13.  
19 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 119.   
20 Sturley, M, et al. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, at 
p. 2-1 to 2-2. Knauth, ibid, at p 116, has noted that a shipowner was able to carry goods “when he liked, as 
he liked, and wherever he liked.”   
21 Scutton, T. Charterparties and Bill of Lading (1984) at p. 210, as cited in Lee, S & Kim, S. “A Carrier’s 
Liability for Commercial Default and Default in Navigation or Management of the Vessel.” (2000) 27 
Transp. L.J. 205, at p. 209. 
22 Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 549.  
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War several years later.23 Conversely, Great Britain’s merchant fleet, supported by the 
Royal Navy, “ruled the waves”.24 By the late 19th century, cargo owning and shipping 
interests were lobbying the United States government to alter the balance that had 
become so heavily weighted in favour of the British shipowners,25 although it should be 
noted that American cargo interests were not alone in their distress.26 French shippers 
were not pleased with the situation either, but had managed to obtain a few measures of 
protection through legislation.27 The American legislature sought to remedy the situation 
when it became apparent that the British parliament and the British courts were 
unconcerned with the plight of cargo owners.28 The British courts were willing to enforce 
the exemption clauses on the basis of freedom of contract,29 while the Supreme Court of 
the United States in a unanimous decision had invalidated such clauses on the grounds of 
public policy.30 In effect, these clauses became valid on one side of the Atlantic and 
                                                 
23 The American Civil War began in 1861 and lasted until 1865. Sweeney, ibid, at p. 551.  
24 Sweeney, ibid, at p. 551. By 1900, it has been estimated that 52% of the world’s shipping was carried by 
the British merchant marine (Howarth, Sovereign of the Seas, at cited by Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday 
Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary” (1993) 24 JMLC 1, at p. 9, f.n. 39). It has 
also been estimated that at the time, that nearly all of the American export trade was carried by 20 British 
liner companies (Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, 
at p. 120).  
25 Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules”, (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 10.  
26 US cargo interests, however, were not the only ones lobbying their government. In 1890, the Glasgow 
Corn Trade Association complained to the British Prime Minister that “carrier’s bills of lading are so 
unreasonable and unjust in their terms as to exempt [the carriers] from almost every conceivable risk and 
responsibility.” (Sturley, ibid, at p. 10). French cargo interests shared the same concerns as well (Ibid). 
27 The position of the shippers was recognized in art. 353 of the code commercial which allowed insurance 
against the negligence or faults of the master and crew, which is significant given that French public policy 
was opposed to allowing insurance against negligence. As well, the shipper had the benefit of arts. 221 and 
222 of the code commercial which imposed heavy personal responsibility on the master where there was 
loss or damage to cargo. (Song, S. A Comparative Study on Maritime Cargo Carrier’s Liability in Anglo-
American and French Laws (1970) PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Ann Arbor, Michigan, at p. 220) 
28 Sturley, M, et al. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, 
at p. 2-3.  
29 See The Ferro [1893] P. 38, enforcing and applying such a clause, as well as Tattersall v. National 
Steamship Co. (1884) 12 Q.B. Div. 297. See also Lord Justice Scrutton opining on the acceptability of such 
defences in the 19th cen. English courts in Gosse, Millerd, Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine 
(1927) 29 Ll. L. Rep. 190 at pp. 190-191 (H.L.). 
30 Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889). In this instance 
cargo, shipped in a British ship from New York to Liverpool, was lost due to the negligent actions of the 
crew in grounding the vessel near Holyhead, Wales. The bill of lading contained a clause exempting the 
shipowner from “negligence, default, or error in judgment of the master, mariners, engineers, or others of 
the crew…” (Ibid. at p. 438). Justice Gray wrote “…the ordinary contract of a carrier does involve an 
obligation on his part to use due care and skill in navigating the vessel and carrying the goods; and as it is 
everywhere held, an exception, in the bill of lading, of perils of the sea or other specified perils does not 
excusing him from that obligation, or exempt him from liability for loss or damage from one of those perils 
to which the negligence of himself or his servants has contributed…It [is] against the public policy of the 
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invalid on the other. One author describes the resulting Harter Act as “originally 
conceived as an instrument of international trade war.”31
  
 The Harter Act was in essence the true precursor to uniform carriage law. “It was 
the first national statute which established a compromise between carriers’ and shippers’ 
interests by mitigating the strict nature of the common law, limiting the long list of 
exemption clauses, and nullifying unreasonable clauses in the list.”32 This compromise 
bore itself out in the wording of s.3 of the Harter Act.33 The original bill submitted to the 
House by Congressman Harter had been drafted strongly in favour of cargo interests by 
providing such obligations as an absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy ship, 34 however, 
there were concerns that the bill may impede the ability of US shipowners to compete 
with the English carriers and therefore when the bill reached the Senate Commerce 
Committee many sections were amended.35 In the Senate debates, exemptions were 
added,36 and the absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy ship was reduced to a due diligence 
                                                                                                                                                 
law to allow stipulations which will relieve [the carrier] from the exercise of care or diligence, or which, in 
other words, will excuse it for negligence in the performance of its duty, the company remains liable for 
such negligence.” (Ibid at p. 438 and 441). It should be noted though that the U.S. Federal Courts had been 
invalidating such clauses on the grounds of public policy for decades prior to the Supreme Court judgment. 
See Niagara v. Cordes, 62 US 7 (1858), as well as The Branthford City, 29 F 373 (1886).  
31 Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading (1962) Louisiana State University Press, 
Louisiana, at p. 46.  
32 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 19. The Harter Act was not however 
the first attempt to reach a compromise between cargo owners and carriers. In 1882, a committee 
established by the International Law Association, consisting of Liverpool merchants, shipowners, 
underwriters and lawyers prepared a model bill of lading that could be adopted voluntarily by shipping 
interests that included a similar compromise, however, the International Law Association’s efforts in the 
end were unsuccessful, as a final agreement was never reached (Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and 
the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 6-7).   
33 46 U.S.C. § 192; Section 3 entitled “Limitation of Liability for Errors of Navigation, Dangers of the Sea 
and Acts of God” stipulates: “If the owner of vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any 
port in the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all respects 
seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or 
charterers, shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in 
navigation or in the management of said vessel…” 
34 Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 12.  
35 Sturley, ibid, at p. 13.  
36 Such as the exemption for errors in navigation or in management of the vessel. Congressman Lind, 
speaking to the House on the Senate amendments to the Bill that was to become the Harter Act, explained 
the rationale behind adding an exception for errors in navigation: “Now, after a master, owner, or charterer 
has taken every precaution that human ingenuity can suggest in equipping, manning, and in furnishing his 
vessel, nevertheless, if out on the high seas in stress of weather or in storms, when every man is worn out 
with watching, if a man falls asleep on the watch or commits any fault of navigation whereby injury results, 
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obligation.37 It was viewed that the resulting bill “was a more balanced compromise 
between cargo and carrier interests.”38 The general compromise between cargo and 
carrier interests were not the only significant changes made by the Senate. The original 
House bill commenced in section 1 by stating: “It shall not be lawful for any common 
carrier or the manager, agent, master or owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or 
property…”.39 Whereas the version as amended by Senate stipulates: “It shall not be 
lawful for the manager, agent, master or owner of any vessel…”.40 Inherent in the first 
version therefore is the notion a carrier separate from the shipowner. The reason for the 
amendment is unknown as “these [Senate committee on commerce] proceedings were 
officially unreported, [thus] a veil has been drawn over the most crucial part of the 
legislative process.”41 The final bill passed and was signed on the 13th of February, 
1893,42 leading one commentator to note that “[i]n the economic warefare between cargo 
and carrier a truce of sorts had been achieved in the United States in the 1893 
legislation.”43 The Harter Act proved to be an influence on other nations, and just over a 
decade later, similar legislation had been enacted in several countries.44 Australia,45 New 
Zealand,46 Canada,47 and Morocco,48 all adopted legislation styled after Harter.49 Many 
                                                                                                                                                 
the master, owner, or charterer is held responsible under the law. To this extent the bill relieves domestic 
shipping from those burdens.” (Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday, Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on 
its 100th Anniversary” (1993) 24 JMLC 1, at p. 12, f.n. 49). 
37 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 20. 
38 Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 13.  
39 Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday, Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary” (1993) 
24 JMLC 1, at p. 12, footnote 50.  
40 46 U.S.C. § 190; Section 1. 
41 Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday, Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary” (1993) 
24 JMLC 1, at p. 11.  
42 Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 14; Sweeney, J. 
“Happy Birthday, Harter”, (1993) 24 JMLC 1, at p. 12-13. 
43 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part I)” (1976) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 70.  
44 Sweeney, J. “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 555; Knauth, supra note , at p. 122; 
Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 20; Sturley, M. “The History of 
COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 15-18.  
45 Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 3 Commonwealth Acts 37 (1904).  
46 Shipping and Seaman Act, Acts No. 96, (1903).  
47 Water Carriage of Goods Act, 9&10 Edw. , ch. 61 (1910) 
48 Code de Commerce Maritime (Maritime Commercial Code), 1919.  
49 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 448; 
Sweeney, J. “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 555; Knauth, A. The American Law of 
Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 122; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under 
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other nations, such as Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
South Africa, Spain and Sweden, had contemplated introducing legislation modelled after 
Harter,50 while Holland had already introduced a Bill embodying the provisions of the 
Harter Act.51 The Harter Act was not simply copied; rather several nations did alter the 
provisions to a certain extent,52 in most cases rendering them more onerous on the 
carrier.53 This was not the case, however, with respect to the Canadian Act.  
 
The Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, although inspired by the Harter Act, 
differed in certain respects. Its more modern conception, would ultimately serve as the 
principal model for the Hague Rules.54 The Canadian Act, unlike the Australian Act, 
altered the benefits for both cargo interests and carriers.55 With regard to cargo interests, 
forum selection clauses that lessened the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts were 
prohibited,56 and a specific package limitation was added in order to prevent carriers 
from inserting clauses in the bill of lading limiting his liability to a lower amount.57 
While on the other hand, the carriers benefited from an expanded list of exemption 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen 
Press, Lewiston, NY; Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 
15-18. 
50 Comite Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Anterpen, Belgium, at p. 23; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International 
Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, 
Lewiston, NY, at p. 20; Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at 
p. 17-18.  
51 Comite Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires, at p. 23-24.  
52 The Dominion Acts, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, were not uniform in their provisions, thus 
giving rise to difficulties. (Maclachlan, D. Treatise on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 7th Ed. (1932) Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, at p. 364).  
53 Australia’s Act was more generous to cargo interests in several respects: it removed the due diligence 
qualification to the seaworthiness obligation, in essence rendering it “absolute” and  it prohibited choice of 
law clauses that avoided the application of Australian law for shipments outbound shipments from 
Australia (Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1,at p. 15). New 
Zealand followed Australia’s example and essentially copied the Australian Act directly (Sturley, ibid).  
54 Sturley, ibid, at p. 17.  
55 See footnote 53 above, noting Australia’s cargo friendly amendments.  
56 Water Carriage of Goods Act, section 5.   
57 Water Carriage of Goods Act, section 8. See Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International 
Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, 
Lewiston, NY, at p. 21.   
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clauses.58 It was this formula found in the Canadian Act, that ultimately formed for the 
basis for the balancing of interests in the Hague Rules. Where the Canadian Act also 
differed from the Harter Act, is the addition of a definition section. Unlike the Hague 
Rules, however, Section 2 of the Canadian Act defines “goods”, “ship” and “port”, but 
does not define the carrier.59 The Harter Act does not address or mention “the charterer”, 
however the Canadian Act expressly governs the responsibilities and liabilities of the 
charterer as well as the owner of the vessel. Section 4(a) referring to exculpatory clauses 
for negligence covers “the owner, charterer, master or agent of any ship”, while Section 
4(b) stipulates that any clause whereby: “any obligations of the owner or charterer of any 
ship to exercise due diligence to properly man, equip, and supply the ship, and make and 
keep the ship seaworthy, and make and keep the ship’s hold, refrigerating and cool 
chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their 
reception, carriage and preservation, are in any wise lessened, weakened or 
avoided…such clause…shall be illegal…”. Section 8 stipulates: “The ship, the owner, the 
charterer, master or agent shall not be liable for loss or damage to or in connection with 
goods for a greater amount than one hundred dollars…”. Recall that article IV(5) of the 
Hague Rules provides: “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event become liable 
for any loss or damage to or in connection with goods in an amount exceeding 100 
pounds sterling per package…”. The Canadian Act therefore demonstrated a very clear 
intention to include, regulate and protect all parties involved in the performance of the 
carriage of goods, with the exception of servants who are not protected by the act.60 
Despite the fact servants are not protected, their actions are nevertheless regulated in 
other provisions.61 The Canadian Act also envisions the division of responsibility 
between several parties acting as carriers by the fact that the shipowner is responsible for 
exercising due diligence, but the charter may be responsible for acts that would be 
                                                 
58 Water Carriage of Goods Act, section 6 and 7. The list now included: latent defects, fire, any reasonable 
deviation, strikes, and losses arising without the carrier’s actual fault or privity or without the fault or 
neglect of his agents, servants or employees.  
59 Water Carriage of Goods Act. 
60 The servants of the shipowner and charterer, were not protected by either section 7 which lists the 
exemptions, or section 8 which provides the limits of liability. 
61 See section 4(c) concerning clauses relieving parties from the obligations of the master, officers, agents 
or servants to carefully stow, handle and care for goods, and section 7 exempting parties for loss without 
the fault or neglect of their agents, servants or employees.  
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viewed as errors in navigation or management of the vessel: “[Section] 6. If the owner of 
any ship transporting merchandise or property from any port in Canada exercises due 
diligence to make the ship in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped and 
supplied, neither the ship nor the owner, agent or charterer shall become or be held 
responsible for loss or damage resulting from faults or errors in navigation or on the 
management of the ship.”62 While, the Hague Rules impose the duty to exercise due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy in Article III(1)(a) on “the carrier”, and exempt “the 
carrier” for nautical fault in Article IV(2)(a).  The fact that the Canadian specifically 
governs, regulates and protects shipowners, charterers, their agents, and the master, 
appears to be neglected, and in certain instances misrepresented, by most authors 
discussing the role of the Act in the drafting of the Hague Rules.63 Nevertheless, the 
Canadian Act clearly demonstrates the intent to protect and regulate the shipowners and 
charterers. Was the Canadian conception of a regime governing multiple parties 
performing the carriage of goods lost in the drafting of the Hague Rules? Or rather did 
the drafters simply use the term “carrier” for simplicity of drafting instead of listing all 
the parties?   
                                                 
62 Water Carriage of Goods Act. 
63 Those that refer to the Canadian Act and its role in the creation of the Hague Rules either fail to address 
that distinction (See Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, at p. 448; Sweeney, J. “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543), or worse, misrepresent the 
Act. See for example, Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The 
Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 21, who refers 
to sections 6 and 7 as expanding the exemption clauses to include…losses arising without the carrier’s 
actual fault or privity,” when in fact the Act refers to the fault or privity of the owner, charterer, agent or 
master. See also Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 16, 
footnote 121, who quotes the Canadian Act, section 6 and 7 as follows: “Section 6 and 7 expanded the list 
of the carrier’s statutory exceptions to include latent defects, fire, any reasonable deviation, strikes, and 
losses “arising without [the carrier’s] actual fault or privity or without the fault or neglect of [the carrier’s] 
agents, servants or employees”.”  
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 3. THE HAGUE AND HAGUE-VISBY RULES: “CARRIER” 
 After the First World War, it has become apparent that uniformity in bills of 
lading terms and in the legal regimes governing them were desirable in order to facilitate 
international trade.64 The impetus for Hague Rules, however, came from England, where 
the overseas dominions65 were pressuring the Imperial Government to create a uniform 
regime throughout the entire British Empire.66 In 1921, the Imperial Shipping 
Committee, appointed by the Imperial Government, issued a report concluding that “there 
should be uniform legislation throughout the Empire on the lines of the existing Acts 
dealing with shipowners’ liability, but based more precisely on the Canadian Water 
Carriage of Goods Act, 1910…and not the Harter Act which it closely 
resembles…because it embodies the latest experience.”67 England, however, had become 
concerned that domestic legislation might result in its shipowners being placed at a 
disadvantage with regard to international competition,68 as well the shipowners agreed 
and preferred to have uniform regulation rather than simply regulation at their home 
port.69 An appeal was therefore made to the International Law Association (ILA) to 
tackle the issue through an international conference.70 In 1921, a draft based on the 
Canadian Act was prepared by the Maritime Law Committee of the ILA, and was 
adopted at the ILA’s Conference at The Hague later that year.71 As a matter of substance, 
the Committee’s draft included the compromise between cargo and carrier interests 
                                                 
64 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 448.  
65 Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where cargo interests and importers were politically powerful 
(Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 18).  
66 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 448; 
Sturley, ibid, at p. 18; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The 
Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 22; 
Maclachlan, D. Treatise on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 7th Ed. (1932) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 
364.   
67 Imperial Shipping Committee, “Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on the Limitation of 
Shipowners’ Liability by Clauses in Bills of Lading and on Certain Other Matters Relating to Bills of 
Lading,” Report issued February 25th, 1921, sections of which are reproduced in Comite Maritime 
International, The Travaux Preparatoires, at p. 18-21.  
68 Diamond, A.“The Hague-Visby Rules” [1978] LMCLQ 225.  
69 Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 19.  
70 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 125; 
Sturley, ibid, at p. 19. 
71 Knauth, ibid, at p. 125-126; Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, at p. 448; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: 
The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 23.  
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following section 6 of the Canadian Act.72 The draft, however, contained a definition of 
the carrier, and had eliminated the pluralistic style of drafting of the Canadian Act that 
had ensured all parties came under the Act. The draft, entitled the “Hague Rules of 1921” 
was subsequently amended by the Comite Maritime International (CMI), and then during 
the Diplomatic Conferences held at Brussels in 1922, 1923 and 1924.73 The resulting 
document became the Hague Rules of August 25th, 1924.  
  
3.1. Travaux Preparatoires 
 During the Brussels Conferences which resulted in the Hague Rules of 1924, 
there was almost no discussion with regard to the definition of the carrier. Ironically, the 
small discussion concerning that provision over the three years of preparation, resulted in 
the correction of what was viewed to be an error, yet may have resolved the difficulties 
that arise as a result of the notion the the single Hague Rules carrier. The International 
Law Association, ILA, submitted their draft entitled “Hague Rules of 1921” to the 1921 
Hague Conference, with a provision that read, “(a) “Carrier” includes the owner and the 
charterer, who enters into a contract of carriage with the shipper.”74 The Chairman stated 
that there must be an error, and asked if he could alter “and” to read “or” as a literal error, 
and the Committee gave their consent.75 Interestingly enough, the notion of the owner 
and the charterer, would have paved the way for joint and several liability. The amended 
article was submitted to the CMI London Conference in 1922, and was further amended 
to read “(a) “Carrier” means the owner…”.76 The final text as amended and adopted at 
the Brussels Conference in 1924, returned to the wording “includes” although no 
explanation is provided as to why the change was made.77 It appears therefore that 
deliberation with regard to the definition was extremely limited. Interestingly enough, 
                                                 
72 Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 21.  
73 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 448. 
74 Comite Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Anterpen, Belgium, at p. 87.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, at p. 88. The article was amended with no discussion as to the amendment or meaning thereof found 
in the traveaux preparatoires.  
77 Ibid, at p, 87. 
 13
what presumably appeared clear to the drafters, has caused 80 years of interpretive 
difficulties.  
  
3.2. Textual Interpretation 
 Article I of the Hague and Hague Visby Rules defines ‘carrier’ in the following 
manner:  “Carrier” includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of 
carriage with the shipper. Despite the fact that one would have hoped that given the 
international character of the Hague Rules such provisions would have a fair degree of 
uniform interpretation,78 this has proven not to be the case. From the perspective of the 
text of the provision, a diversity of interpretations have arisen. Generally, they center 
around two issues. The first being whether the “or” is disjunctive or conjunctive, with the 
distinction being between the notion of a single carrier and the possibility of multiple 
carriers. The second issue revolves around the word ‘includes’, thus raising the question 
whether a carrier is only a charterer or a shipowner, or whether the provision is not so 
restricted. The word “includes” has also been used to argue that the provision envisages 
multiple parties performing the carriage as carriers. Regardless, it is generally viewed that 
the definition is in fact ambiguous,79 therefore lending itself to several different 
interpretations. 
 
 Those favoring a more restrictive interpretation tend to reason as follows. The 
focus will often be on the contracting carrier.  “The safer view is thus that the term 
[“carrier”] should be limited to the contracting carrier himself.”80 “Given that the term 
“carrier” is restricted to the contracting carrier, notwithstanding its inclusive definition in 
article I, it is fair to say that the Rules do not apply to – nor are they available to – the 
                                                 
78 Lord Macmillan expressed the aim that the Rules would be interpreted uniformly several years after their 
creation: “It is important to remember that the Act of 1924, was the outcome of an International Conference 
and that the rules in the Schedule have an international currency. As these rules must come under the 
consideration of foreign Courts, it is desirable in the interests of uniformity that their interpretation should 
not be rigidly controlled by domestic precedents of antecedent date, but rather that the language of the rules 
should be construed on broad principles of general acceptance.” Stag Line v. Foscolo, Mango & Co. (1931) 
Ll. L. Rep. 165 (H.L.), at p. 174.  
79 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 384. 
80 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 26.  
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actual carrier (if not the contracting carrier).”81 “From [the wording of article 1(a)] it can 
be concluded that the Hague Rules recognize that the carrier can be either the shipowner 
or the charterer.”82 Interesting enough, Scrutton allows for a wider interpretation of the 
types of parties included in the definition, but nonetheless restricts it to a single 
contracting carrier; “The use of the word [includes] suggests that the definition is not 
exhaustive, and if so, the term ‘carrier’ might include a freight agent or a forwarding 
agent or carriage contractor…At all events, it does not extend beyond the person who is 
contracting as carrier under the relevant contract of carriage.”83 It has nevertheless been 
noted, “the expression ‘includes’ is ambiguous, for it leaves in doubt whether the carrier 
can be only the charterer or only the shipowner, or whether it can be some other party.”84
 
 On the other hand, the interpretation of the article through the prism of the word 
‘includes’ results in a view of the carrier that is more expansive. “Article I(a) states that 
the carrier includes the owner or the charterer, but is not so resticted. The carrier might be 
a freight agent, or carriage contractor, but the term does not include stevedores.”85 One 
author argues that because “includes” was substituted for the word “means” during the 
drafting of the rules, the provision should be given a wider interpretation: “It is not 
fanciful to suppose that the word ‘includes’ was substituted for ‘means’ because it bore a 
different and, as far as the delegates were concerned, more appropriate meaning. 
[Includes]…suggests a wider operation for the rights and immunities thrown up by reason 
of the carrier’s contract…It is reasonable to suppose that other parties performing the 
contract of carriage might have the benefit of the Rules.” 86 In commentary on the 
definition of ‘carrier’, it has been described as “not a particularly clear or exhaustive 
definition. Under this definition the “carrier” could be the owner or the charterer or both. 
The word “includes” also implies the carrier could be some other person who is neither 
                                                 
81 Ping-fat, ibid, at p. 25.  
82 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 384. 
83 Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at 
p. 422.  
84 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 384. 
85 Kindred, H. et al. The Future of Canadian Carriage of Goods by Water Law (1982) Dalhousie Ocean 
Studies, Halifax, at p. 7.  
86 Newell, R. “Privity Fundamentalism and the Circular Indemnity Clause” [1992] LMCLQ 97, at p. 107.  
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owner or charterer.”87 Regardless, it is clear that the definition of ‘carrier’ in article 1(a) 
of the Hague Rules has received a myriad of interpretations.  
 
3.3. Uniformity and Harmonization Achieved?  
The Hague Rules came into force on June 2nd, 1931. The Rules were a success, 
and the desired uniformity of the law of carriage of goods had generally been achieved. 
“[T]he Rules had redressed the imbalance which had formerly existed as between ship 
and cargo as regards the risk of loss or damage occurring to the goods in the course of a 
sea transit. In place of wide exceptions clauses exempting shipowners for almost every 
conceivable loss or damage occurring in the course of a sea voyage, the Rules had 
produced a more or less balanced division of risk as between ship and cargo.”88 By the 
time of the 1968 Visby Protocol, there were 73 states who were parties to the Hague 
Convention, including most of the major maritime nations of world, as well, many 
nations had introduced the Hague Rules into their domestic law without actually ratifying 
the Convention.89 Of the nations that did not ratify the Hague Rules, many of them 
adopted the rules into special statutes, for example Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts,90 or 
incorporated them into provisions of commercial codes that were already in force.91 The 
popularity of the Hague regime has continued to grow, as by 1995 there were 83 state 
                                                 
87 Giaschi, C. “Who is Carrier? Shipowner or Charterer” (1994) Paper presented January 20, 1994 at the 
Canadian Maritime Law Association Meeting, Toronto. Available online at: 
www.admiraltylaw.com/papers/carrier.htm.  
88 Diamond, A. “The Hague-Visby Rules” [1978] LMCLQ 225, at p. 226.  
89 Comite Maritime International, “Uniformity of the Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea” in CMI Yearbook 
1995, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 107.  Canada, for example, had domestically 
implemented the Hague Rules in the Carriage of Goods by Water Act 1936, but had never actually ratified 
the Hague Convention.  
90 For example, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa (Knauth, A. The American 
Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 457). Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts 
were also enacted in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Portugal, Japan, although these nations 
did formally adhere to the convention, while Yugoslavia, Liberia, Tunis and the Republic of Ireland, never 
formally adhered to the convention but passed acts based on it  (Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses in 
Ocean Bills of Lading (1962) Louisiana State University Press, Louisianna, at p. 56-57 for further 
information on the domestic statutes of these nations).  
91 Indonesia and Greece, although not adhering to the Convention, inserted the Hague Rules into their codes 
in substance and in form, while Soviet Russia, Syria, and Lebanon, not parties inserted provisions echoing 
the principles of the Convention. Conversely, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Turkey gave 
force of law to the Hague Rules by inserting them into their commercial codes. See Yiannopolous, ibid, at 
p. 58-59 detailing the codal amendments of the above nations.  
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parties to the Convention,92 and in the year 2004, 93 state parties had ratified the 
Convention.93 Of the major trading nations, the vast majority operate under the Hague 
and Hague-Visby system, for example in 2004, 46.27% of Canada’s waterborne trade 
was conducted with Hague-Visby Rules countries, 19.87% with Hague Rules countries, 
and 2.65% with Hamburg Rules nations.94 Depending on the source, it has been 
estimated that today 75% to 85% of the world’s trade is conducted under the Hague and 
Hague-Visby Rules.95 Despite the fact that uniformity is currently breaking down,96 one 
cannot help but think that the general uniformity achieved and the impact made by the 
Hague Rules has far exceeded the intentions of its drafters.97 Despite this glowing report 
on the success of the Rules generally, one notable area has proved to be largely resistant 
to international uniformity. This is the law with respect to multiple parties to the carriage 
endeavor. Where there is more than one ‘carrier’, uniformity breaks down internationally. 
Arguably, regulating carrier and cargo owner relations was one of the fundamental aims 
of the Hague Rules, and unfortunately this is where the regime is most dysfunctional. As 
the following sections will demonstrate, where there are “carriers” often the Rules will 
not apply to more than one carrier, thus either preventing the unfortunate cargo claimant 
from pursuing the party who actually carried their goods, or allowing an opportunistic 
claimant to circumvent the limitations and exemptions in the Rules. As the Rules have 
failed to bring uniformity in the regulation of carrier – shipper relations in this respect 
then arguably they have failed in one of their fundamental aims. As the chairman of the 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 Comite Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 2004, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerp, Belgium, at p. 
463-469, giving the statue of ratifications to the Hague Rules. Note that this number includes nations that 
have since denounced the Hague Rules in favor of Hague-Visby, Hamburg, or domestic legislation.  
94 Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability for the Carriage of Goods by Water” (2004) 
Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, Doc. TP 14307E, at 
p. 8. Available online from the Canadian Maritime Law Association website at: 
www.cmla.org/papers/2004/TransportReport-Oct.4,%202004.pdf. See also Thornton, “An Optimal Model 
for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, 
at p. 53, noting that the vast majority of Australia’s trading partners fall under the Hague-Visby regime.  
95 Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.” (2003) 28 
Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 9, providing the figure of 75%. Hare, J. “The Pendulum of Liability: Harter, Hague, 
Hamburg to UNCITRAL Draft”, Lecture at University of Cape Town, South Africa (August 10, 2005), 
providing the figure of 85%.   
96 See section 12, infra addressing the breakdown in uniformity and the response by UNCITRAL with the 
new draft convention. 
97 Especially given the fact that, according to Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of 
Lading (1962) Louisiana State University Press, Louisianna, at p. 6, “the Brussels Convention was not 
conceived as a comprehensive and self-sufficient code regulating the carriage of goods by sea.” 
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United States Bill of Lading Committee stated in 1927, “uniformity is the one important 
thing. It does not matter so much precisely where you draw the line dividing the 
responsibilities of the shipper and his underwriter from the responsibility of the carrier 
and his underwriter. The all-important question is that you draw the line somewhere and 
that that line be drawn in the same place for all countries and for all importers.”98 Sadly, 
where multiple parties are involved in the carriage of goods, this bright line division of 
responsibility is lost. 
                                                 
98 Statement of Charles S. Haight before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign relations, 
70th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1927), as quoted by Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, at p. 557.  
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 4. THE CARRIERS: THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY SOLUTION 
 There has been a fair amount of doctrinal support for rendering multiple parties 
performing the carriage joint and severally liable. The basis is the notion that there is not 
a single carrier, but that rather “carriers” or multiple performing parties are liable under 
the Hague regime.  It is therefore argued by some that these carriers must then be jointly 
and severally liable. ‘Joint and several liability’ is defined as: “Liability that may be 
apportioned either among two or more parties or to only one or a few select members of 
the group, at the adversary’s discretion. Thus, each liable party is individually responsible 
for the entire obligation, but a paying party may have a right of contribution and 
indemnity from non-paying parties.”99 The term ‘solidary liability’ is the civilian 
equivalent,100 while Scottish lawyers employ the term ‘conjunct and several liability’.101  
 
Tetley has argued: “Carriage of goods by sea can be characterized as a joint 
venture between the owners and the charterers, because they share the responsibilities of 
a carrier under the Hague/Visby Rules which cannot be contracted out of by virtue of 
article 3(8). As a result of the shared responsibilities, the carrier and the charterer should 
be held jointly and severally responsible as carriers.”102 This notion of a carriage as a 
joint venture has received some support, with one commentator noting “the time charter 
                                                 
99 Garner, B. ed. Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. (1999) West Group, St. Paul, Minn., at p. 926.  
100 Solidary liability is defined as: “Solidary liability. Civil law. The liability of any one debtor among two 
or more joint debtors to pay the entire debt if the creditor so chooses. This is the equivalent to joint and 
several liability in the common law. Also termed liability in solido.” (Garner, B. ed. Black’s Law 
Dictionary 7th Ed. (1999) West Group, St. Paul, Minn., at p. 926.). This term is used in Louisiana, Puerto 
Rico and civil law countries (Garner, B. ed. A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 2nd Ed. (1995) Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, at p. 479). The term is also used in the Quebec Civil Code, for example in article 
1480: Where several persons have jointly taken part in a wrongful act which has resulted in injury…they 
are solidarily liable for the reparation thereof.” 
101 Garner, B. ed. A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 2nd Ed. (1995) Oxford University Press, Oxford, at 
p. 479 
102 Tetley, W. “Case Note: The Starsin” (2004) 35 JMLC 121, at p. 123. See also Tetley, W. “Chapter 10: 
Whom to Sue” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Online at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime, at p. 17, 
asserting “carriage of goods is effectively a joint venture of owners and charterers (except in the case of a 
bareboat charter) and, consequently, they should be held jointly and severally (or solidarily) liable as 
carriers.” Tetley has in essence championed the cause of joint and several liability for carriers for well over 
three decades (see Tetley, W. “Identity of the Carrier – The Hague Rules, Visby Rules, UNCITRAL” 
[1977] LMCLQ 519). More recently the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada has commented on the above 
quote, noting that treating owners and charterers alike had “merits from the policy point of view.” (Lantic 
Sugar Ltd. v. Blue Tower (1993) 163 N.R. 191 (Fed. C.A. Can.), at p. 194).  
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is undoubtedly a joint venture in the sense that it is composed of acts and operations of 
both the shipowner and the charterer, who exploit the vessel for their joint benefit .”103 
The nature of the relationship does appear to coincide with the modern definition of a 
joint venture.104 Arguably, to characterize the carriage of goods by sea in relation to a 
joint venture is appropriate given the evolution of carriage. The notion of a joint venture 
has its roots deep in the history of carriage. In past centuries, wooden sailing ships were 
small town and family based operations often where cargoes were owned partly by the 
shipowner and the ship was partly owned by cargo owners.105 “Theory and reality united 
in the description of a voyage as a common venture and the shipment of cargoes as a joint 
venture of cargo owners and shipowners.”106 Although the focus now is on charterers and 
shipowners, as opposed to cargo owners, the principle remains fundamentally the same as 
in both instances joint venture refers to those who provide the vessel and perform the 
carriage. Conversely, some authors who nevertheless support a multiple carrier approach 
have rejected the description of owners and charterers as involved in a joint venture.107  
  
 The characterization of such parties as carriers, need not rest on a joint venture 
notion, rather it can simply be justified by article III(8), as also mentioned by Tetley 
above. It has been noted by one commentator that the Rules, by virtue of article III(8), 
                                                 
103 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 383, where Pejovic goes on to state: “The shipowner has the duty to 
navigate the vessel during the contract period while the charterer is bound to find customers, contract with 
them, and take care in handling their cargo. The shipowner and the charterer share duties and liabilities for 
loss of or damage to the cargo.” 
104 Joint venture is defined as, “a business undertaking by two or more persons engaged in a single defined 
project. The necessary elements are: 1) an express or implied agreement, 2) a common purpose that the 
group intends to carry out, 3) shared profits and losses, 4) each member’s equal voice in controlling the 
project.” (Garner, B. ed. Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Ed. (1999) West Group, St. Paul, Minn., at p. 843). 
Where perhaps the joint venture analysis may fall short in view of Black’s definition is the notion of equal 
voice, although in practice many joint ventures and partnerships are not completely egalitarian, and 
disproportionate responsibility can be allocated by agreement.   
105 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 512. 
106 Sweeney, ibid, at p. 512.  
107 Marler, D. “The Treatment, by the Federal Court of Canada, of Demise and Equivalent Identity of 
Carrier Clauses in Liner Bills of Lading” (2002) 26 Tul. Mar. L.J. 597, at p. 607 noting the fact that the 
notion of a joint venture had been referred to and stating that “the ‘view’ he is referring to is Professor 
Tetley’s suggestion, a suggestion which in my view is unnecessary and wrong, that there is, in such 
circumstances, some form of joint venture involved between a charterer and a shipowner.” 
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prevent “carriers, be they owners, charterers or others” from escaping liability.108 
Although the article III(8) is utilized in the U.S. as a justification,109 this is not 
necessarily needed. Popular in the United States is simply the notion that on 
interpretation of the term ‘includes’ in the definition of carrier, the term ‘carrier’ 
therefore includes “all owners and charterers involved in the carriage of the goods at 
issue.”110 This has been termed “the practical approach” on the basis that such parties are 
considered to be carriers on the grounds that they have performed a portion of the carriers 
duties.111 This approach has been justified in the following manner: “The doctrine that all 
parties involved in the carriage of goods are COGSA carriers eliminates the initial 
skirmishing over the identity of the carrier issue and brings all relevant parties before the 
court where the ultimate allocation of responsibility for the loss can be ascertained. If 
COGSA liability is found, the loss can be apportioned among those found to be 
carriers…Clauses in a charterparty that identify the carrier or that apportion the losses 
incurred to third parties, should not control the ability of the third party to recover, but 
there is no reason why they should not be given effect as between the charterer and the 
owner. When it is found that one party or another – the shipowner or charterer is liable 
for damages to cargo, the court will examine the charterparty to determine who had the 
responsibility for the matter in question. Thus where the charterer is held liable for the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel – something the charterer has no control over – indemnity 
should be allowed. This way of handing the identity of the carrier issue protects the 
shipper yet apportions liability fairly between the responsible parties. ”112 In some 
instances, despite supporting the principle, caution in certain respects has been suggested; 
“The principle of joint and several liability for the different “members of the family of 
carriers” may be desirable to protect the interests of the shipper. However in my view this 
                                                 
108 Marler, ibid, at p. 601.  
109 See discussion below for jurisprudential examples, particularly Epstein v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 740 
(S.D.N.Y. 1949). 
110 Joo Seng Hong Kong v. S.S. Unibulkfir, 483 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), at p. 46.  
111 See Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 817-818. Tetley, 
at p. 818 likens the ‘practical approach’ to his theory: “In effect, the American “practical approach” is what 
has been called my “joint venture theory” of carriage of goods…”.  For an analysis and application of the 
“practical approach” see Commercial Metals Co. v. M/V Luckyman, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17484 (E.D. 
Penn. 1993), where the court characterizes the notion as “if a party has actual and factual responsibility for 
running the ship and handling the cargo, they should incur legal responsibility.” 
112 Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law: Practitioner’s Ed. (1987) West Publishing, Minn, at p. 
314.  
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should go no further than is necessary to achieve this aim, since a multiplication of carrier 
liabilities will involve a multiplication of liability insurance premiums.”113  
 
Unfortunately in practice, rendering several ‘carriers’ joint and severally liable is 
a comparatively rare event. Judiciaries in certain nations have nevertheless proved 
receptive to it, notably the U.S., Canada, France and Belgium. There are many nations 
who have legislatively instituted joint and several liability for parties performing the 
carriage, however, this is discussed below in another section.114 In this instance we are 
examining instances where judiciaries under a Hague or Hague-Visby type regime have 
interpreted the Rules to allow for multiple carriers and joint and several liability.  
 
4.1. Application of Principles of Joint and Several Liability to “Carriers” 
 By far the dominant example of joint and several liability of carriers is American 
jurisprudence. Interestingly enough, one cannot speak of American law in this respect as 
one can Canadian, English or French law due to the fact that various districts have 
interpreted ‘carrier’ differently. The most notable distinction is between the Circuits that 
require privity, as exemplified by the approach of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, and 
those that do not, as exemplified by the district courts of New York and New Jersey. 
Although, in both instances the courts allow both the charterer and the shipowner to be 
‘carriers’ and defendants, the distinction between them is that in the privity based line of 
reasoning, the shipowner, charterer, and other entities must be found to be parties to the 
contract to become subject to COGSA. It should be noted however, that American courts 
have in a few instances adopted a single carrier approach.115
 
Where privity is required, the U.S. courts still interpret who is a party to the 
contract in an expansive manner. In The M/V Gloria, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the time charterer had entered into a contract of carriage by virtue of having 
                                                 
113 Ramburg, J. “The Vanishing Bill of Lading & The Hamburg Rules Carrier” (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 
391, at p. 405.  
114 See section 11 entitled “National Solutions: Legislation”. 
115 Glynwed Steels v. Great Lakes and European Lines, 1979 AMC 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1978), where at p. 1291 
the court opined “A simple reading of section 1301(a) indicates that either the owner or the charterer is 
governed, not both. The decisive factor is determining who entered into the contract.” 
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issued bills through its agent and signed by its agent on the payment of freight, while the 
shipowner had been bound to the contract by virtue of the charterer having been 
authorized to sign bills “for the master”.116 Both the shipowner and the time charterer 
were therefore parties to the contract and liable as “carriers”.117 More recently, the 5th 
Circuit affirmed the requirement of privity noting that “the [plaintiffs] rely on cases from 
the Second Circuit to assert a direct claim against the vessel owner under COGSA in the 
absence of privity of contract…However, these cases are distinguishable, and are not 
controlling authority in this Circuit which requires privity of contract of carriage before 
liability under COGSA arises.”118 Therefore both the charterer and the shipowner will be 
liable jointly as parties to the contract where the charterer has signed the bill of lading 
‘for the master’ with the shipowner’s authority to do so.119 The requirement of privity has 
not vastly impeded the rendering of parties to the carriage jointly liable,120 but has 
complicated the judicial analysis and provided a narrower concept of joint liability, 
especially when compared to the more expansive approach discussed below. It would 
also appear that the Courts of Appeal for the 4th Circuit, 1st Circuit, and 9th Circuit adopt a 
similar approach as the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.121  
                                                 
116 Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. The M/V Gloria, 767 F.2d 229 (5 Cir. 1985), at p. 236-237. The 5th 
Circuit stated the rule that “generally, when a bill of lading is signed by the charterer or its agent “for the 
master” with the authority of the shipowner, this binds the shipowner and places the shipowner within the 
provisions of COGSA.” (Ibid, at p. 237).  
117 Ibid, at p. 243. The 5th Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that the shipowner and the time 
charterer were COGSA carriers. The voyage charterer was however not held to be a carrier as he did not 
enter into a contract of carriage with the shipper (ibid, at p. 236).  
118 Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V Kavo Yerakas, 50 F.3d 1349 (5 Cir. 1995), at p. 1353. In this instance, the time 
charterer had already settled, and the 5th Circuit held that the master had in fact bound the shipowner 
defendant to the contract.  
119 Authority to sign the bills of lading, and therefore bind the shipowner, is an issue in many of the cases as 
the “authority” is a prerequisite. The shipowner does not become a party to the contract if the charterer 
signs the bills of lading without the authority of the shipowner (Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. The 
M/V Gloria, 767 F.2d 229 (5 Cir. 1985), at p. 237; Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V Kavo Yerakas, 50 F.3d 1349 (5 
Cir. 1995), at p. 1352; Dempsey & Associates v. S.S. Sea Star, 461 F 2.d 1009 (2 Cir. 1972), at p. 1015). 
120 Steel Coils v Lake Marion, 2001 WL 1518302, 2002 AMC 1680 (E.D. La. Nov. 29 2001), in this 
instance the time charterer and the vessel owners were held jointly and severally liable for the 
unseaworthiness, both enjoying the 500$ per package limitation of COGSA. In re The M/V Floreana, 65 F. 
Supp. 2d 489 (S.D. Tex. 1999) holding that both shipowner and charterer can be liable as co-contractants 
with shippers; Procter & Gamble Co. v. M/T Fort Fraser, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21159 (E.D. La. 1991); 
Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. M/T Iver Champion 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1826 (E.D. La. 1996), 
finding the time charterer and voyage charterer both to be COGSA carriers as they both entered into 
contracts of carriage; Gerber & Co. v. M/V Galini, 1993 WL 185622 (E.D. La. 1993), at para 18, holding 
the shipowner and the charterer liable “jointly and in solido.” 
121 The Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in In re Intercontinental Properties Management, 604 F.2d 254 
(4 Cir. 1979), at p. 258 determined that a shipowner is only a COGSA carrier, in the situation where a time 
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  The analysis in the courts of New York and New Jersey is much more expansive. 
In The Unibulkfir, the court considered whether charterers and owners were carriers, 
opining that “the statutory language of COGSA itself supports a broad definition of the 
term “carrier”. The statute seems to have been deliberately drawn so as not to limit the 
term to a party to the bill of lading or contract of carriage.”122 The approach has been 
described in different ways. In M/V Agia Sophie, the court, in determining whether the 
owners, operators, managers and charterers were carriers, noted that “a ‘practical test’ has 
been developed, which delineates COGSA carriers as those entities (1) involved in the 
transportation of the relevant cargo; and (2) engaged in actions that wound up causing the 
loss of the cargo.”123 This approach has also been referred to as “the multicarrier 
approach” which considers that “in light of the carrier’s statutory obligations with respect 
to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care, and discharge of cargo under 
COGSA, [this approach] endorses treatment of all owners and charterers engaged in the 
carriage of goods under COGSA as COGSA carriers.”124 Regardless of the terminology 
used, the courts have no difficulty finding multiple parties involved in the carriage 
endeavor as “carriers” or as jointly and severally liable under COGSA.125 The 11th 
Circuit has also endorsed the approach.126  
                                                                                                                                                 
charterer has been found to be a COGSA carrier, if the shipowner has entered into a contract of carriage 
with the shipper or has some form of privity of contract with the shipper. The 1st Circuit Court of Appeals, 
when considering a claim involving the vessel owner, time charterer, vessel manager, in EAC Timberlane v. 
Pisces Ltd., 745 F.2d 715 (1 Cir. 1984), at p. 719, referred to and relied upon the authorities of the 4th and 
5th Circuit Courts of Appeal with respect to who may be a COGSA carrier. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeal 
opined in Hasbro Industries v. M/S St. Constantine, 705 F.2d 339 (9 Cir. 1983), at p. 341, that “Under 
COGSA, both shipowners and charterers who enter into a contract of carriage are considered ‘carriers’.” 
122 Joo Seng Hong Kong v. S.S. Unibulkfir, 483 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), at p. 46. The court also noted, 
at p. 46, “obviously then, there can be more than one COGSA carrier of a given shipment. Second, the 
courts have not hesitated to impose liability on charterers or owners who are non-signatories to a bill of 
lading and who cannot in any real sense of the word be said to have issued the bill.” One can therefore the 
more flexible approach of the 2nd Circuit courts who have rejected the exercise of trying to find some form 
of evidence to tie the defendant to the bill of lading as is done in the 5th Circuit.  
123 Tradearbed Inc. v. M/V Agia Sophia, 1997 AMC 2838 (S.D.N.J. 1997), at p. 2840. See also Hyundai 
Corp. M/V Vulca, 800 F. Supp. 124 (D.C. N.J. 1992), at p. 132 also referring to the approach as “the 
practical test”. The Court in M/V Vulca found, at p. 130, that “even if the defendant is not a party to the bill 
of lading, that party may still be a carrier under COGSA if the plaintiff shows that the defendant was 
involved in some way in the issuance of the bill of lading or the loading of cargo.”   
124 Reilly, M. “Identity of the Carrier: Issues Under Slot Charters” (2001) 25 Tul. Mar. L.J. 505, at p. 509. 
125 See Joo Seng Hong Kong v. S.S. Unibulkfir, 483 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Nichimen v. M/V 
Farland, 1972 AMC 1573 (2 Cir. 1972), at p. 1595, the time charterer and the shipowner were held to be 
jointly liable as COGSA carriers; Hyundai Corp. M/V Vulca, 800 F. Supp. 124 (D.C. N.J. 1992); Duferco 
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 It is notable that parties who are not carriers can also be held jointly and severally 
liable with parties found to be carriers. In The President Monroe, the shipowner and the 
shipbuilder were held to be jointly and severally liable where a combination of defective 
hatch covers and negligent ballasting resulted in the wetting of the plaintiff’s cargo.127 
The shipbuilder is not a carrier, however, the court having established that the plaintiff’s 
cargo was wetted by one or both negligent parties, ordered joint and several liability on 
the basis that it could not tell how much water came from which source.128  
 
The Japanese have recently adopted an approach that is in line in certain respects 
with the American approach. In The Camfair, the time charterer and the owner were held 
both to be the carrier.129 Although, the approach is more in line with the reasoning in the 
5th circuit, as the Tokyo district court determined that both parties were “the contractual 
carrier”.130
                                                                                                                                                 
Steel v. M/V Festivity, 1999 AMC 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), at p. 1187 finding a strong statutory support for 
treating all owners and charterers involved in the carriage of goods as COGSA carriers; Samsung America 
v. M/T Fort Producer, 798 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), at p. 187, holding both the shipowner and time 
charterer jointly liable; Jordan International Co. v. M/V Cyclades, 782 F.Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), at p. 
27; Mente & Co. v. Isthmian (The Quarrington Court), 36 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), holding both the 
time charterer and the shipowner jointly liable, although the court held that they were both bound by the 
bills of lading, as this case is prior to the mutlicarrier approach; International Produce Inc. v. S.S. Frances 
Salman [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), at p. 364, holding that the time charterer how issued 
the bill of lading was jointly liable with the shipowner whose master the bill of lading was issued on behalf 
of; Hartford Fire v. Novocargo USA Inc. (M/V Pacific Senator), 257 F.Supp. 2d 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), 
holding a NVOCC and a carrier jointly and severally liable; Blanchard Lumber Co. v. The Anthony II 
[1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), at p. 447 holding both the shipowner and the charterer jointly 
and severally liable as “the relationship between the charterer and the owner does not affect the charterer’s 
liability to the shipper.”; Thyssen Inc. v. S/S Eurounity, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6309 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), 
holding the charterer and shipowner jointly and severally liable for damage to the cargo. 
126 See Hale Container Line v. Houston Sea Packing, 137 F.3d 1455 (11 Cir. 1998), at p. 1465 relying on 
Joo Seng Hong Kong v. S.S. Unibulkfir 483 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) and stating that the shipowner and 
charterer may be jointly and severally liable, but absolving the shipowner from liability at p. 1467 on the 
basis that the time charterer signed the bills without authority to bind the shipowner. See Martin & 
Robertson v. The Steamship Barcelona, 1968 AMC 331 (S.D. Fla. 1967), at p. 336 holding owner, bareboat 
charterer, and time charterer jointly and severally liable.  
127 Sears Roebuck v. American President Lines (The President Monroe) [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 385 (N.D. 
Cal. 1971).  
128 Ibid, at p. 392.  
129 Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 496.  
130 Ibid. The basis for the detemination was that both parties had rights to freight and liens on cargo, as well 
the demise clause, although held invalid  with respect to the shipper or consignor, was evidence that the 
shipowner also voluntarily assumes the carrier’s contractual liability. For further discussion on this 
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  The French courts have been amenable to holding parties involved in the carriage 
endeavor jointly and severally liable. The Cour d’Appel de Paris held: “Que les sociétés 
Ioninan Fortune Marine (opérateur) et Van Vamare (armateur) doivent donc etre 
condamnées in solidum à réparer le prejudice subi par la compagnie d’assurances 
subrogée dans les droits du propriétaire de la cargaison.”131 The Cour d’Appel de 
Rouen, has held similarly with respect to a time charter and a voyage charterer,132 and so 
has the Cour d’Appel d’Aix.133  In Belgium, the courts also appear to have no difficulty 
holding parties jointly and severally liable. The Belgian Court of Appeal has held that a 
time charterer who issued a bill of lading was jointly and severally liable with the vessel 
owner for losses during carriage.134 It has been noted that “la jurisprudence a estimé 
généralement que le propriétaire du navire est solidairement responsible avec le 
transporteur concernant l’action d’avarie.”135 Such joint and several liability is now 
addressed by the Commercial Code of Belgium.136
 
 4.2. The Rise and Fall of Joint Liability and ‘Carriers’ in the Commonwealth 
 The notion of carriers or a multi-carrier approach is still a current feature in the 
law of such nations as the United States and France, unfortunately the same cannot be 
said for Canada. To compound matters, a resurgence in Canadian law of the notion of 
joint and several liability for ‘carriers’ is unlikely given a recent House of Lords decision 
rejecting the notion of holding both the shipowner and the time charter liable under the 
bills of lading.137
 
                                                                                                                                                 
judgment see Section 5 infra entitled “The Contractually Stipulated Carrier: The Demise And Identity of 
The Carrier Clauses”. 
131 Cour d'Appel de Paris, March 2, 1993, (The Eugenia V) DMF 1995, 372, at p. 376. 
132 Cour d'Appel de Rouen, June 14, 1984, DMF 1985, 351, at p. 358, holding the time charterer liable 
“solidairement” with the voyage charterer.  
133 Cour d'Appel d'Aix, September 8, 1994 (The Jessica J), DMF 1995, 52, at p. 52, holding that both the 
time charterer and the voyage charterer “ont la quailité de transporteur.” 
134 Hof Van Beroep Te Brussel March 3, 1972; [1972] E.T.L. 992, as summarized and cited by Tetley, W. 
“Identity of the Carrier – The Hague Rules, Visby Rules, UNCITRAL” [1977] LMCLQ 519, at p. 522., 
where other Belgian case law to the same effect is cited.  
135 Delwaide, L. "Chronique de droit maritime belge II" DMF 1989, 734, at p. 765. 
136 See section 11.5, infra, for further discussion. 
137 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.). See 
discussion of the judgment further on in this section.  
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 Canadian courts were receptive to the concept of joint and several liability for 
parties involved in the performance of carriage and implemented it accordingly. In Grace 
Kennedy v Canada Jamaica Line, a cargo of sugar was wetted and Smith J. determined 
that the charterer and the shipowner would be jointly and severally liable to the 
claimant.138 In The Lara S, the Federal Court of Canada considered the liability of a 
shipowner and a charterer for damage to a cargo of bailer twine where the bill of lading 
was on the charterer’s form, signed for and on behalf of owners, and contained an 
identity of carrier clause.139 Reed J. reasoned: “The logic of holding both the shipowner 
and the charterer liable as carriers seems entirely reasonable under a charter such as that 
which exists in the case. The master will have knowledge of the vessel and any 
particularities which much be taken into account when stowing goods thereon. He 
supervises that stowage. He has responsibility for the conduct of the voyage and 
presumably also has knowledge of the type of weather conditions it would be usual to 
encounter. In such a case it seems entirely appropriate to find the master and therefore, 
his employer, the shipowner jointly liable with the charterer for damage arising out of the 
inadequate stowage.”140 Unfortunately, this high point in Canadian law did not last long. 
Three years later in Union Carbide v. Fednav, Justice Nadon in the Federal Court of 
Canada opined: “Madam Justice Reed seems to have accepted Professor Tetley’s theory 
that where goods are loaded on a time chartered ship the owners of that ship and the time 
charterers are engaged in a joint venture insofar as the carriage of goods is concerned. I 
cannot accept the soundness of that view…The position taken by the learned author 
[Scrutton] appears to be that in circumstances where the charterer is liable on the contract 
of carriage, the shipowner will not. I agree with this point of view. A charterer will issue 
and sign bills on behalf of the master, and is so authorized, the shipowner will be bound 
by the issuance of the bills of lading but not the charterer. Where the charterer issues and 
                                                 
138 Grace Kennedy & Co. v. Canada Jamaica Line [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 336 (Que. S.C.), at p. 340. Smith 
J. determined that as the demise clause was an impediment to liability in contract, the charterer and 
shipowner were held liable in tort (Ibid, at p. 338). In order to render the shipowner liable, Smith J. gave 
effect to the demise clause statement that any other party contracting was doing so as agent of the 
shipowner. The charter was therefore held liable for negligent cargo damage as he was responsible for the 
navigation and operation of the vessel, and the shipowner was held jointly and severally liable due to the 
fact that his duly authorized agent was negligent.  
139 Canastrand Industries v. Lara S [1993] 2 F.C. 553 (Fed. Ct. Can.). 
140 Ibid, at p. 587. Justice Reed concludes at p. 618 by “finding the defendants jointly and severally liable to 
pay the plaintiff damages.” 
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signs bills of lading on his own behalf, he shall be bound by those bills. Consequently, in 
most cases, the word “or” in article 1(a) of the Hague Rules will mean exactly that. The 
carrier shall either be the owner or the charterer, but not both.”141 This Nadon J’s 
reasoning has been criticized by one commentator for his single carrier mentality: “Judge 
Nadon’s conclusions are once again conditioned by his engrained error of believing that 
only one person can be committed to the obligations which arise from the contract.”142 
Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Appeal, soon thereafter considered the issue of 
identity of the carrier, and rejected the joint venture concept, finding rather that “the 
concept has been found unsound by Nadon J…and I entirely agree with his reasons for 
reaching that conclusion. The law, in my view, is clearly stated by Nadon J.”143 The trend 
in the jurisprudence appears to have been set. Recently, it was pleaded that a time 
charterer and shipowner are liable “since they operated under a joint venture”.144 Blais J. 
speaking for the Federal Court rejected the argument based on Tetley’s theory, and held 
only the shipowner liable.145 It would therefore appear that the notion of multiple carriers 
in Canadian law has been soundly rejected. Perhaps, the notion of ‘joint venture’ has 
tainted the underlying issue of liability based on acting and performing as a carrier, 
nevertheless it appears that as the law stands joint liability is out of the question.  
 
 England has never adopted a multicarrier approach, rather English law has always 
viewed the Hague Rules carrier as a single carrier.146 Recently suggestion had been made 
in a dissenting judgment of the English Court of Appeal that perhaps both shipowner and 
charterer were liable where bills were issued that were on the charterer’s form, which 
                                                 
141 Union Carbide v. Fednav Ltd (1997) 131 F.T.R. 241 (Fed. Ct. Can.), at p. 264-265. Nadon, J. 
subsequently found the shipowner to be ‘the carrier’ and due to the fact that only the time charterers were 
defendants, the plaintiff’s action was dismissed with costs (Ibid, at p. 289).  
142 Marler, D. “The Treatment, by the Federal Court of Canada, of Demise and Equivalent Identity of 
Carrier Clauses in Liner Bills of Lading” (2002) 26 Tul. Mar. L.J. 597, at p. 605. Not surprisingly, Tetley, 
W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, devotes three pages to the criticism of 
the decision, noting at p. 837 that Nadon J. failed to consider Article III(8) and the public order nature of 
the rules.  
143 Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A. [1998] 3 F.C. 418 (Fed. C.A. Can.), at p. 430, per Decary J.A. 
144 Voest-Alpine Stahl Linz v. Federal Pacific Ltd. (1999) 174 F.T.R. 69 (Fed. Ct. Can.), at para 40.  
145 Ibid, at para 50.  
146 See Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at pp. 123 
and ff concerning distinguishing between owner’s bills and charterer’s bills, as well as p. 460 for a 
definition of ‘carrier’ under the Hague Rules and an assertion that a performing carrier “is liable only in 
tort”. 
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indicated on the face of the bill that the charterer was ‘the carrer’, but nevertheless had a 
demise and identity of carrier clause on the back.147 Rix L.J. stated: “I raised in argument 
the possibility that there did not have to be a black and white choice between owner’s 
bills and charterer’s bill and that the true analysis in such a case may well be that the 
owners as well as the charterers are liable on the bills.”148 Rix L.J.’s reasoning was 
largely based on agency theory with the shipowner as a undisclosed principle, and he 
suggested that the charterer “created a contract in respect of which both they and their 
principal, the owner, had rights and liabilities.”149 The House of Lords rejected the 
idea.150 Lord Hoffman did so on the basis that no reasonable merchant would imagine 
that there would be more than one carrier.151 While Lord Bingham also rejected the 
notion on the basis of the construction of the bill.152 While American law does not seem 
to take issue with the fact that ‘carrier’ in bills of lading is in the singular,153 this was 
problematic enough for the Lords to discount the possibility of dual liability. The likely 
effect of this judgment, despite the fact that is was based on the construction of this 
                                                 
147 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. 437 (C.A.), at p. 451. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid, at p. 452. Rix L.J. did not however hold on that point as it had not been pleaded before him (Ibid). 
150 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.). Not only 
explicitly, see below, but also implicitly by engaging in the debate of whether the bills were charterer’s 
bills or owner’s bills. See also Girvin, S. “Contracting Carriers, Himalaya Clauses and Tort in the House of 
Lords” [2004] LMCLQ 311, at p. 313, who on the basis of his interpretation of the judgments states that in 
relation to both the charterer and the shipowner being carriers “The House unanimously held that the 
language of the bill itself did not support it.” Although, only Hoffman and Bingham addressed the issue.  
151 The Starsin, ibid, at p. 590, stating: “Mr. Milligan also sumitted that CPS may have contracted for both 
themselves and the shipowners, the latter being unnamed or undisclosed principals…I do not think that any 
reasonable merchant or banker who might be assumed to be the notional reader of this bill of lading would 
imagine that there was more than one carrier or that the carrier was anyone other than CPS.” 
152 Ibid, at p. 577: “Mr. Milligan submitted that on a proper construction of the whole of the bill the 
shipowner should be held to be the contracting party, perhaps by regarding the shipowner as the disclosed 
but unnamed principal of CPS, perhaps by construing the contract as made with the shipowner as well as 
CPS, perhaps because of the description of CPS as carrier was unauthorized by CPS and so ineffective. 
There is in my opinion no evidence that CPS contracted as agent for the shipowner as disclosed but 
unnamed principal, and the terms of the signature are inconsistent with that suggestion. There is, again, 
nothing to suggest dual liability in CPS and the shipowner; the standard conditions are expressed in 
singular throughout, with no provision that the singular shall include the plural…In the present case, the 
suggestion that CPS contracted jointly on its own behalf and on behalf of the shipowner loses credibility 
when one notes that this possibility, although not objectionable in legal principle, first occurred to a 
member of the Court of Appeal during argument.”  
153 See Lord Bingham’s speech above.  
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particular set of bills, is to discourage arguments of based on the notion of multiple 
carriers in England, and likely throughout the Commonwealth.154  
 
4.3. A Problematic Lack of Uniformity: Forum Shopping 
 Unfortunately, the variation with which “carrier” under the Hague Rules is 
interpreted poses very real problems with respect to forum shopping. Consider suit in the 
commercial court in London, England, where in an action against the shipowner and the 
time charterer, one party will likely be absolved of liability under contract. Or consider 
suit also brought in London, but against the time charterer, and should the bills be 
considered ‘owner’s bills’, the potential exists for the defendant to escape liability all 
together. This situation stands in marked contrast to a suit taken in the Southern District 
of New York against a shipowner and charterer, as discussed above.155 In fact, the 
Southern District Court of New York, when faced with a time charterer attempting to 
enforce an exclusive jurisdiction clause for London, invalidated the clause on the basis of 
the difference between English law regarding the liability of time charterers as carriers 
and the law in his district.156 Evidently, the London commercial court would have 
enforced this clause.  A similar case in the Eastern District of Louisiana arose, where 
Justice Fallon ruled that a Japanese forum selection clause could not be enforced, as the 
forum court did not recognize multiple carriers.157 This divide in the law on either side of 
                                                 
154 Although Australia has begun to diverge legally from England on several matters, including privity, 
however, given Australia’s disinterest in a definition of ‘carrier’ that is plural (See section 11.8 entitled 
“Other Nations”), divergence from England on this matter is unlikely. The same can be said of New 
Zealand (See section 11.8 entitled “Other Nations”).  
155 The Southern District of New York, S.D.N.Y., has provided a majority of the case law rendering 
shipowners and charterers jointly and severally liable. See Joo Seng Hong Kong v. S.S. Unibulkfir, 483 F. 
Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Duferco Steel v. M/V Festivity, 1999 AMC 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Samsung 
America v. M/T Fort Producer, 798 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Jordan International Co. v. M/V 
Cyclades, 782 F.Supp. 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Mente & Co. v. Isthmian (The Quarrington Court), 36 F. Supp. 
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). 
156 Central National-Gottesman v. M/V Gertrude Oldendorff, 204 F. Supp. 2d 675 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), at p. 
681, commenting, “the court is of the view that there is a real danger that a London court may not hold 
defendant Olendorff, as time charterer, to the same duties that he would be expected to comply with were 
the action brought in this district under COGSA.” 
157 Kanematsu USA v. M/V Ocean Sunrise, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 11575 (E.D. La. 2003). The District Court 
determined that the defendant vessel owner would not be a ‘carrier’ under Japanese COGSA and that the 
plaintiff would be forced to take action against him in tort and thus be deprived of their rights under 
COGSA. See Nippon Fire & Marine Insurance v M/V Spring Wave, 92 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. La. 2000) at p. 
576, also refusing to enforce a Japanese jurisdiction clause on the same basis. Conversely, see Tradearbed 
Inc. v. M/V Agia Sophia, 1997 AMC 2838 (S.D.N.J. 1997), at p. 2843, finding that a forum selection clause 
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the Atlantic strikes at the heart of what uniform law was attempting to achieve, and 
ironically is reminiscent to a certain extent of the legal situation that gave rise to the 
Harter Act over a century ago.158  
 
4.4. An Issue of Equity and Fairness? 
 Evidently, there is a strong current of equitable protection of the plaintiff running 
through the argumentation for multiple carrier liability. The notion is that one must 
protect the plaintiff from defendants attempting to escape liability, or purporting to 
contractually assign carrier status to a party who in practice is unknown to the plaintiff. In 
many instances, cargo claimants have found themselves without a remedy, and unfairly 
so. When considering the question of equity and fairness, however, the tendency is to 
focus on the position of the plaintiff or cargo claimant faced with a complex ownership 
structure and a limited time for suit. It would be remiss however to advocate on behalf of 
the claimant without due consideration of the defendants in this instance. Arguably, the 
rarity with which the courts hold parties to the carriage endeavor jointly and severally 
liable is as potentially damaging to carrier and charterer interests as it is to cargo 
interests. The bargain or compromise of uniform law was for the benefit and protection of 
all parties to the carriage endeavor. One may argue that it is inequitable and 
fundamentally unfair when parties who are not ‘the carrier’ are then exposed to liability 
through other causes of action unprotected by contractual and mandatory stipulations 
governing the limits of liability, prescription, and exemptions. A shipper’s commercial 
expectations upon entering into the contract of carriage are such that they will be bound 
to the terms of the contract of carriage, and thus to be allowed to circumvent such terms 
in an action against the charterer or shipowner, demonstrates a fundamental inequity in 
the interpretation and application of the Hague rules. The problem is therefore two-fold. 
The first hurdle is the reluctance of courts to conceptualize the parties as ‘carriers’ under 
a more expansive definition. Yet even where a party is not a carrier, the argument has 
been that inequities may be avoided by allowing the third party to benefit from the terms 
                                                                                                                                                 
for Korea will be upheld as “the Korean Commercial Code – although different from COGSA, the Harter 
Act, and the Hague Rules – provides [the plaintiff] with the same, if not greater, protection with respect to 
the issues raised.” 
158 See section 2, supra, for a discussion of the events that gave rise to the Harter Act.  
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of carriage. Where problems arise, therefore is in the instance where a shipowner or 
charterer is viewed as a third party, and then subsequently denied the terms of the Hague 
Rules despite arguments for third party benefits. Third party benefit for entities deemed 
not to be the carrier is discussed further below,159 nevertheless it is sufficient for the 
purposes of this point to simply note that the issue of equity and fairness is one that 
should not simply be viewed from the perspective of the cargo claimant.  
 
                                                 
159 See Section 6 infra, for a discussion on the Himalaya Clause.  
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 5. THE CONTRACTUALLY STIPULATED CARRIER: THE DEMISE AND  
INDENTITY OF THE CARRIER CLAUSES 
 
 Where there is a multicarrier approach, or a judiciary receptive to the notion of 
‘the carriers’, generally the performing parties are carriers. Where there is only one 
carrier, the situation is created where other entities involved in the carriage endeavor will 
want to distance themselves from the regime, or the contract, where it is in their interests. 
The converse is true however, where the regime or the contract offers protection, parties 
will attempt to bring themselves within the regime despite the fact that they are not, 
legally speaking, ‘the carrier’. The former situation has given rise to what are termed 
demise and identity of carrier clauses which are examined below, while the later 
situation, discussed in the following section, has given rise to Himalaya clauses. An 
examination of these clauses, their effect and scope, and the legal complexities they have 
spawned, allows one to better grasp the legal reasoning, and arguably legal gymnastics, 
involved when evaluating ‘who is the carrier’ under a single carrier approach.     
 
The demise clause and the identity of the carrier clause are two constructs of the 
past century, which have in certain respects hindered uniformity in international and even 
national maritime law. The demise clause essentially stipulates that that the bill of lading 
contract will only take effect as a contract between the shipowner or the demise 
charterer.160 The identity of carrier clause is similar, declaring the shipowner to be the 
carrier and characterizing the time and voyage charterers as agents only.161 These clauses 
                                                 
160 The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 185 (Q.B.), at p 187 for an example of such a clause: “If the ship is 
now owned or chartered by demise to the company or line by whom this Bill of Lading is issued (as may be 
the case notwithstanding anything to the contrary) the Bill of Lading shall take effect as a contract with the 
Owner or demise charterer as the case may be as principal made through the agency of the said company or 
line who act as agents only and shall be under no personal liability whatsoever in respect thereof.” The 
wording of the clause is common, as the identical clause appears in Roskill, Lord. “The Demise Clause” 
(1990) 106 L.Q.R. 403, at p. 403; Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) 
Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 558; Marler, D. “The Treatment, by the Federal Court of Canada, of Demise 
and Equivalent Identity of Carrier Clauses in Liner Bills of Lading” (2002) 26 Tul. Mar. L.J. 597; Tetley, 
W. “Chapter 10: Whom to Sue” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 24.  
161 Jian Sheng Co. v. Great Tempo S.A. [1998] 3 F.C. 418 (Fed. C.A. Can.), at p. 434 is an example of a 
identity of carrier clause: “The contract evidenced by this Bill of Lading is between the Merchant and the 
Owner of the vessel named herein (or substitute) and it is therefore agreed that said Shipowner only shall 
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have been the source of much doctrinal criticism and much judicial consternation. Most 
jurisdictions have law both validating and invalidating such clauses. The characterization 
of the clauses by courts and authors, tends to fall within two general categories. The first 
is the argument is that such clauses simply confirm the common law rule that the contract 
is between the shipowner and the shipper,162 or that they indicate that the bills are 
owner’s bills and thus define who the carrier is.163  Secondly, such clauses have been 
viewed as non-responsibility clauses in violation of Art. 3(8) of Hague-Visby,164 or an 
attempt to by the person who has entered into a contract of carriage with the shipper to 
exonerate himself from liability.165 Regardless of which opinion one holds concerning 
the characterization of the clause, the clause would be rendered ineffective or 
unnecessary if one adopts a view of all the performing parties as “carriers”.  
 
5.1. History of the Demise Clause 
 It has been noted that the demise clause came to be included in bills of lading due 
to the fact that the Merchant Shipping Act in the United Kingdom did not provide for 
charterers to limit their liability.166 Lord Roskill, being present at the time the demise 
                                                                                                                                                 
be liable for any damage or loss due to any breach or non-performance of any obligation arising out of the 
contract of carriage, whether or not relating to the vessel’s seaworthiness. If, despite the forgoing, it is 
adjudged that any other is the Carrier and/or the bailee of the goods shipped hereunder, all limitations of 
and exonerations from, liability provided for by law or by this Bill of Lading shall be available to such 
other. It is further understood and agreed that as the Line, Company ot Agents who has executed this Bill of 
Lading for an on behalf of the Master is not a principal in the transaction, said Line, Company or Agents 
shall not be under any liability arising out of the contract of carriage  nor as Carrier nor bailee of the goods.  
162 Cascade Shipping Inc. v. Eka Jaya Agencies (Grace Liberty II) [1993] 1 SLR 980 (C.A. Singapore), at 
p. 993 opining that “the demise clause is really no more than a confirmation of the common law rule that 
the bill of lading issued pursuant to a time-charterparty is intended to be a shipowner’s bill of lading.” 
163 Kaleej International Pty v. Gulf Shipping Lines (The Sun Diamond) [1986] 6 N.S.W.L.R. 569 (C.A.), at 
p. 574, noting that “the demise clause does not relieve the carrier from liability but defines who the carrier 
is.” See also Reynolds, F. “The Demise Clause: The Jalamohan” [1988] LMLCQ 285, at p. 285 noting the 
position of English law as upholding the clause on the basis that it merely identifies the carrier. See also 
The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 185 (Q.B.), where at p. 188, the clause was viewed as stipulating that 
the contract as evidenced by the bill of lading was one between the shipowner and the shipper, and not the 
shipper and the charterer.  
164 Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 812, “in particular, 
article 3(8) of the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules prohibits non-responsibility clauses. Identity-of-carrier 
and demise clauses are not-too-subtle non-responsibility clauses.”  
165 Marler, D. “The Treatment, by the Federal Court of Canada, of Demise and Equivalent Identity of 
Carrier Clauses in Liner Bills of Lading” (2002) 26 Tul. Mar. L.J. 597, at p. 601. See also Canadian 
Klockner Ltd. D/S/ A/S Flint (The Mica) [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 478 (Fed. Ct. Can.).  
166 Kaleej International Pty v. Gulf Shipping Lines (The Sun Diamond) [1986] 6 N.S.W.L.R. 569 (C.A.), at 
p. 574; Cooke, J. et al. Voyage Charters (1993) LLP, London, at p. 381 notes the clause’s purpose is “to 
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clause was conceived explains in detail the events that lead to its creation.167 Lord Roskill 
notes that it was the operation of the Liner Requisition Scheme by the British government 
during the two world wars that led to the demise clause.168 By virtue of the scheme, the 
Crown became the time charterer of all the ships involved and all cargo claims were 
borne ultimately by the crown, in an account between liner companies and the crown.169 
The scheme was utilized during the first world war with no problems, and by 1939, the 
scheme was put into operation again.170 This time “shortage of tonnage was even more 
critical. Switching ships from one service to another became a regular feature of the 
scheme. Tramp ships were frequently switched to liner companies to operate. 
Government owned and requisitioned ships, government chartered ships, whether British 
or foreign, and government requisitioned ships would all from time to time be consigned 
to liner companies for operation.”171 As a result of this practice the limitation problem 
arose, and according to Roskill who was involved at the time, “none of us foresaw it.”172 
The problem was “if a government owned ship or a P & O owned ship was, for example, 
consigned to Cunard for operation and a Cunard bill of lading was issued and disaster 
followed through unseaworthiness (not difficult to establish under wartime conditions of 
restricted repair facilities), Cunard alone would be liable in contract but they could not 
limit. The Crown or P & O who could limit were not liable in contract since neither 
would be a party to the bill of lading and any unlimited liability incurred by Cunard 
would be debited to the Crown in Cunard’s operating accounts with the Ministry.”173 The 
Merchant Shipping Act could not be amended during war time, and thus a clause was 
drafted and generally accepted, much to the relieve of the Treasury as the potential 
                                                                                                                                                 
ensure that the person who is thus liable is entitled to the benefit of statutory limitation of liability, which at 
one time did not extend to charterers.” 
167 Roskill, Lord. “The Demise Clause” (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 403. 
168 Ibid, at p. 403. The scheme, which appeared in 1917, had as its purpose “not merely to bring passenger 
and cargo liners under direct government control by a combination of requisition and time charter, but also 
to bring under the control the entire organization of the great British liner companies, then still at the height 
of their power and fame.” 
169 Ibid, at p. 404.  
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid, at p. 405.  
172 Ibid..  
173 Ibid, at p. 405. Until the law was amended in 1958 only the owner or the demise charterer of a ship 
could limit overall liability under sections 502 and 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Ibid, at p. 403)  
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liability of the Crown was immense.174 Lord Roskill finishes his account of the history of 
the demise clause by noting that the law has changed, “[b]ut as so often happens, once a 
clause appears in a bill of lading there seems to be no rule against perpetuities which 
prevents its continued appearance long after it has ceased to serve any useful purpose.”175 
The argument that the demise clause, from the perspective of the charterer limiting his 
liability, is no longer useful due to the fact that England176 and other commonwealth 
nations177 have amended their legislation is not entirely a valid argument. Certain trading 
nations are not party to the 1976 Limitation Convention,178 and arguably the clause from 
this perspective has not entirely outlived its usefulness. As well, it has been noted that the 
demise clause is desirable for the charterer for many reasons that no longer involve 
limitation.179 It is interesting nonetheless, that the clause arose unconnected with the 
                                                 
174 Ibid, at p. 405. The United States treasury on the other hand was not so fortunate. See Epstein v. United 
States, 86 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), where at p. 743, the Clancy D.J stated that the War Shipping 
Administration was “disingenuous” in trying to use an identity of carrier clause when it had time chartered 
a vessel, and thus found the government liable for damage to cargo. 
175 Roskill, ibid, at p. 405. The 1976 Limitation Convention, rendered applicable in the U.K. by the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995, ss.185 and 185, stipulates in Article 1.2 “The term “shipowner” shall mean 
the owner, charterer, manager or operator of a seagoing ship.” 
176 Roskill, ibid, at p. 405. See Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, noting that “the clause was first devised during the Second World War to ensure that 
claims in respect of ships in North Atlantic convoys were against owners rather than charterers of the 
vessel, because at the time, charterers were not able to rely on overall tonnage limitation. Since this is no 
longer the case, it is uncertain exactly why it and more modern forms of it are still used.” 
177 See Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 842, footnote 185, 
discussing the changes in Canadian law and the implementation of the 1976 Limitation Convention. See 
also the Australian Court of Appeal in Kaleej International Pty v. Gulf Shipping Lines (The Sun Diamond) 
[1986] 6 N.S.W.L.R. 569 (C.A.), at p. 574, discussing the fact that the demise clause is no longer relevant 
based on changes to the British and Australian regimes. See also Meng, T. The Law in Singapore on 
Carriage of Goods by Sea 2nd Ed. (1994) Butterworths, Singapore, at p. 300-301 noting that the demise 
clause has outlived it’s original purpose because the U.K. Merchant Shipping Act was amended in 1958 
and the Singapore Merchant Shipping Act was amended in 1959. 
178 South Africa’s legislation, the Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951, s. 261 stipulates only the “owner 
of a ship” may limit his liability. See Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, 
(1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at pp. 557-558, for a discussion on the usefulness and applicability of the 
demise clause in South African law and s. 261 of the S.A. Merchant Shipping Act governing limitation. In 
the United States, the Limitation of Shipowner’s Liability Act 1851, 46 U.S.C. ss.181-189, does not include 
certain charterers. Only an “owner” may limit his liability, and “owner” is defined in s. 186 to include a 
charterer who actually mans, victuals and navigates the vessel, which has been interpreted to mean demise 
and bareboat charterers but not time or voyage charterers (Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law: 
Practitioner’s Ed. (1987) West Publishing, Minn, at p. 482). In Marine Sulphur Queen Lim. Proc., 1970 
AMC 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), at p. 1036, a time charterer petitioned for limitation, along with the shipowner 
and bareboat charterer, and the court held: “as a time charterer, TGS was not entitled under the Limitation 
of Liability Act to petition for exoneration or limitation, and its petition is therefore dismissed.” 
179 Peter Jones in “The Demise Clause in Bills of Lading” has argued: “To a charterer the demise clause is 
important because of its indirect functioning in the relationship between the charterer and the shipowner.  
Where there is a demise clause in the bill of lading, the cargo claimant will prudently join the owner as a 
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specific liabilities for loss or damage to goods under the Hague Rules regime, and yet has 
since become such a prominent issue with regard to ‘who is the carrier’ in carriage of 
goods litigation.   
 
5.2. Uncertainty Surrounding the Validity of the Demise Clause 
 Unfortunately, the validity of the demise clause, and therefore the identity of the 
carrier clause, is an area of great variability in the law. Not only does its validity vary on 
an international scale between nations, but in some instances it has varied within national 
jurisdictions as well.  
 
Certain American commentators have confidently stated that the demise clause is 
unproblematic in their jurisdiction. “The ‘demise clause’, denounced because of the 
possibility that the shipper would have no rights against the charterer who issued the bill 
of lading and no rights against the shipowner who was not formally the carrier, has not 
caused major problems to cargo owners in the United States since the courts have refused 
to give it effect as against H.R. III(8).”180 This was the case in a 5th Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision, where in referring to a “demise clause in the bills of lading [which] 
shifted liability from the charterer to the vessel owner,” the Court of Appeal noted that 
“such clauses are void under COGSA  46 U.S.C. App. S. 1303(8).”181 A 2nd Circuit Court 
of Appeals decision has equally invalidated such clauses.182 Identity of carrier clauses 
have also been invalidated as exculpatory provisions in contravention of 1303(8) of 
                                                                                                                                                 
party defendant which assures the charterer of certain advantages: (a) the owner will co-operate in the 
defence of the claim by providing informations and making witnesses available; (b) a multiplicity of 
proceedings will be avoided since, as a practical matter, the responsibility of the owner and the charterer 
inter se will be settled in the action brought by the cargo claimant without the necessity of arbitration under 
the charter party; and (c) the claim may be one to be apportioned and the practical way to insure such 
apportionment is to have the owner facing direct responsibility.” (Conference paper presented at 
Conference on Maritime Law at Dalhousie University Law Faculty, Halifax, Canada, 1976, as quoted in 
Tetley, W. “Identity of the Carrier – The Hague Rules, Visby Rules, UNCITRAL” [1977] LMCLQ 519, at 
p. 527).  
180 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part IV)” (1976) 7 
JMLC 615, at p. 630, footnote 193, noting also that COGSA 1303(8) forbids clauses in the bill of lading 
which lessen the liability of the carrier. 
181 Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V Kavo Yerakas, 50 F.3d 1349 (5 Cir. 1995), at p. 1353.  
182 Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v. OOCL Inspiration, 137 F.3d 94 (2 Cir. 1998), where again the 
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated such a clause where it purported to relieve one of the parties to the 
carriage of responsibility, although in this instance the clause sought to define the time charterer as the 
carrier, thus the court held gave the clause no effect in holding the shipowner to be a carrier.  
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COGSA.183 Such clauses have also been disregarded simply on the basis of 
interpretation: “Union steel points to the definitions clause of the bill of lading which 
states that ‘carrier’ means the ‘owner’ or ‘demise charter’. Yukong lines [time charterer] 
was neither the ‘owner’ not the ‘demise charterer’. But the terms of the bill of lading 
must be read in context. The bills are labeled as being Yukong Line’s bills of lading. The 
bills indicate that freight was prepaid to Yukong Line, and Yukong Line signed ‘as 
carrier’. Only excessive formalism could yield any conclusion other than Yukong Lines 
was the entity to which the parties meant to refer by ‘carrier’.”184 In The MV Gertrude 
Oldendoff, the District Court of New York has even gone so far as to decline to enforce a 
forum selection clause on the basis that the London court would uphold the identity of 
carrier clause.185 The identity of carrier clause has however, been validated by courts in 
order to benefit claimants seeking to hold the shipowner liable.186 Despite the blanket 
assertions by certain authors that the demise clause is invalid in the United States, there 
are nonetheless decisions that do not invalidate the clause.187 Nevertheless, it would 
                                                 
183 Epstein v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), where at p. 743, the Clancy D.J. remarked on 
the fraudulent nature of the clause, referring to it as a clear violation of 1303(8). Interestingly enough, this 
case arose in 1949 and the defendant was the War Shipping Administration of the United States, who had 
time chartered the vessel. Clancy D.J. stated that the War Administration was “disingenuous” in trying to 
use an identity of carrier clause (ibid). Evidently, the clause provided no protection to the U.S. 
governement as charterer, unlike its success for the English government.  See also Blanchard Lumber Co. 
v. The Anthony II [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), holding the demise clause invalid under the 
predecessor to COGSA, The Harter Act, for reasons of public policy.  
184 Union Steel America v. M/V Sanko Spruce, 1999 AMC 344 (D. N.J. 1998), at p. 347.  
185 Central National-Gottesman v. M/V Gertrude Oldendorff, 204 F. Supp. 2d 675 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), at p. 
681, comments “the court is of the view that there is a real danger that a London court may not hold 
defendant Olendorff, as time charterer, to the same duties that he would be expected to comply with were 
the action brought in this district under COGSA.” 
186 In Recovery Services Intl. v. S/S Tatiana L, 1986 WL 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), where the shipowner 
argued that he was not a COGSA carrier as the time charterer had issued the bills of lading in their name 
and signed on their behalf. The District Court found at para. 3, that the identity of carrier clause indicated 
that despite the fact the bill was signed by the time charterer, he was doing so as agent for the shipowner. 
The shipowner then proceeded to argue that the identity of carrier clause was void as a matter of law, but 
the Court at para. 3 found that all cases cited invalidating the clause were doing so with respect to time 
charterers attempting to shift their liability to the shipowner, and therefore the court saw no reason why the 
shipper could not rely on the clause to render the shipowner liable.  
187 Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at pp. 814 – 815, and 
Tetley, W. “Chapter 10: Whom to Sue” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at pp. 26 – 27, contain several 
U.S. decisions that apparently uphold the demise clause, but truly do so by not specifically invalidating 
them. Arguably, one of the decisions mentioned, Daval Investors v. M/V Kamtin, 1993 WL 764606 (N.D. 
Fla. 1993), the result is similar to S/S Tatiana L, discussed above where the clause was used by the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that the shipowner should not be relieved of liability. In Daval Investors, the court accepted 
the argument at para 1. and in para. 5 denied the shipowner’s motion for summary judgment on the basis 
that is was not a COGSA carrier. It would appear therefore that the American courts do not always 
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appear that the demise and identity of carrier clause is invalidated where it is being 
utilized by a party as an exculpatory provision to avoid liability as ‘a carrier’.  
 
In English law, Cooke notes that with regard to a demise clause, “such a clause is 
effective, and is probably unaffected by the manner in which the bill of lading is 
signed.”188 The clause is viewed by some English commentators as central to the 
contract, despite the fact that it has been argued to be ‘unreasonable’ by cargo 
interests.189 The demise clause has a long and strong history of being upheld in English 
law.190 Although there have been a few instances where the clause has not been given 
effect.191 Nevertheless, due to a recent House of Lords decision,192 this generally 
unshakable confidence in the enforcement of demise clauses appears to have been 
shaken. In The Starsin, a bill of lading was issued on the time charter’s form, Continental 
Pacific Shipping, with the signature box on the face of the bill of lading containing “As 
agent for Continental Pacific Shipping (carrier)”, but contained both an identity of carrier 
                                                                                                                                                 
invalidate the clause in ever respect, but only do so where it acts as an exculpatory provision for a party 
attempting to avoid liability.  
188 Cooke, J. et al. Voyage Charters (1993) LLP, London, at p. 381. 
189 Reynolds, F. “The Demise Clause: The Jalamohan” [1988] LMLCQ 285, at p. 286.  
190 The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 185 (Q.B.); W.R. Fletcher v. Sigurd Haavik Aksjeselskap (The 
Vikfrost) [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 560 (C.A.); Kenya Railways v, Antares Co. (The Antares) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 424 (C.A.); NGO Chew Hong Edible Oil v. Scindia Steam Navigation (The Jalamohan) [1988] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 443 (Q.B.); M.B. Pyramid Sound v. Briese Schiffahrts (The Ines) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 144 
(Q.B.); Fetim B.V. v. Oceanspeed (The Flecha) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 612 (Q.B.).  
191 Although there are instances where the clause is not given effect. See Sunrise Maritime v. Uvisco Ltd. 
(The Hector) [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 287 (Q.B.), where the front of the bill of lading identified the time 
charterer as “carrier” and the back of the bill of lading contained a demise clause, Rix J. determined that the 
bill was a charterer’s bill based on the stipulation on the face of the bill of lading “Carrier: U.S. Express 
lines”. For further discussion on The Hector see Waldron, A. “Owner’s or Charterer’s Bill of Lading? The 
Mystery Deepens” [1999] LMCLQ 1, at p. 1 noting that the judgment is an “exception to the general rule 
that a bill of lading signed for the master and containing a demise clause is a contract of carriage with the 
owners of the vessel.” See also Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 
807, at p. 821 noting that the Hector is interesting as the only U.K. decision finding a bill of lading with a 
demise clause to be a charterer’s bill, but commenting that “the judgment makes no refernce to the validity 
of the clause, as opposed to its effectiveness.” For another example where the demise clause was not given 
effect see Pacol Ltd. v. Trade Lines Ltd. (The Henrik Sif) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 456 (Q.B.), where the bill 
of lading contained a demise clause, but the time charterer had allowed the plaintiff to continue the claim 
against him until it became time barred as against the shipowner. Webster J. at p. 467, found that the time 
charterer was estopped from relying on the demise clause. Reynolds, F. “The Demise Clause and the Hague 
Rules” [1987] LMCLQ 259, at p. 260 has criticized the decision in The Henrik Sif  and noting that “on 
English views of estoppel at least, the decision goes to the verge of the law.” Nevertheless, The Henrik Sif 
has still be cited as supporting the demise clause (Kaleej International Pty v. Gulf Shipping Lines (The Sun 
Diamond) [1986] 6 N.S.W.L.R. 569 (C.A.)). 
192 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.). 
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clause and a demise clause stipulating the contract was with the owner of the vessel.193 
At first instance, the bills were found to be charterer’s bills despite the clauses,194 but the 
Court of Appeal found otherwise,195 with a strong dissent from Rix L.J..196 The House of 
Lords overturned the Court of Appeal decision, and held unanimously on the issue of the 
bills of lading being owner’s bills.197 Steyn noted that Rix and Colman had adopted a 
“mercantile view” and therefore reasoned accordingly: “Given the speed at which 
international trade is transacted, there is little time for examining the impact of barely 
legible printed conditions at the time of the issue of the bill of lading. In order to find out 
who the carrier is it makes business sense to for a shipper to turn to the face of the bill, 
and in particular the signature box, rather than clauses at the bottom of column two of the 
reverse side of the bill.”198 Lord Bingham adopted a similar approach, noting that 
“business sense is that which businessmen, in the course of their ordinary dealings, would 
                                                 
193 Ibid, at p. 575.  
194 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 85 (Q.B.). Colman J. 
at p. 90, focused on the question of in what sense could the shipper be expected to understand the words 
used in the bill of lading. In relying on The Hector Colman J. found at p. 93 that the words used represented 
that the time charterer was content to be treated as a carrier despite the words on the reverse.  
195 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. 437 (C.A.). The Court 
of Appeal preferred giving effect to the clauses on the reverse which stipulated the issuer would not 
become personally liable on the bill, thus finding that the contract took effect only with the owner (Ibid, at 
pp. 470-471 and 473-474). For discussion on the Court of Appeal judgment see Andrewartha, J. & Riley, 
N. “English Maritime Law Update: 2001” (2002) 33 JMLC 329, at pp. 362-364; Girvin, S. & Bennet, H. 
“English Maritime Law 2000” [2002] LMCLQ 76, at pp. 84-87.  
196 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. 437 (C.A.), at pp. 439-
464. Rix J. at p. 450, looked the history of the demise clause and opined: “the demise clause was there to 
protect a time charterer who did not want to accept the liability of a carrier, and who therefore cautiously 
sought to ensure that the mere issue of a bill of lading by himself or his agent would not have that effect. It 
was not, however, intended to ensure that a time charterer who did want to undertake the liability of a 
carrier and signed as such could not do so.” Rix, L.J., at p. 451, was critical of the dishonest nature of the 
clause in certain instances: “the form is that of the liner company, and the demise clause is, as explained 
above, a liner company’s clause whose purpose is to prevent itself being found to be the carrier when it 
does not wish to be…Given that in practice a demise clause is printed in tiny print on the back of a form, 
and in the present case is not even identified by any title, I do not see that commercial certainty or honesty 
is promoted by the submission that the form of signature, which on a bill of lading is on the front of the 
form, and which in mercantile contracts generally, including bills of lading, has always been a focus of 
attention, should be ignored.” 
197 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.). Lord 
Steyn had dissented with respect a Himalaya clause issue and suit in tort against the shipowners, at pp. 584-
586.  
198 Ibid, at p. 583. Lord Steyn reasoned that one must approach the problem of who is the carrier under the 
bill of lading “objectively in the way in which a reasonable person versed in the shipping trade would read 
the bill. The reasonable expectations of such a person must be decisive. In my view he would give greater 
weight to words specifically chosen, such as the words which appear above the signature, rather than 
standard form printed conditions. Moreover, I have no doubt that in any event he would, as between 
provisions on the face of the bill and those on the reverse side of the bill, give predominant effect to those 
on the face of the bill.”  
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give the document…the Court must of course construe the whole instrument before it in 
its factual context, and cannot ignore the terms of the contract. But it must seek to give 
effect to the contract as intended, so as not to frustrate the reasonable expectations of 
businessmen.”199 What is evident is that the reasoning given by the Lords for 
disregarding the demise and identity of carrier clauses is fundamentally different from the 
reasoning generally used in the United States.200 The Lords have in no way invalidated 
the clause, rather they simply declined to give it effect based on a construction of the bill 
of lading contract that was in line with commercial practices and expectations. Some 
previous jurisprudence has been overruled,201 however the effect of the judgment is to 
alter the way that bills with demise clauses are construed when the ‘carrier’ identified on 
the face of the bill is neither the shipowner nor the demise charterer.202 It has been 
suggested that precise drafting of terms on the face and on the reverse of the bill of lading 
will be a priority after the Starsin judgment.203  
 
 In Canada, the law with regard to demise clauses has been far from consistent. 
Given the connection the demise clause has with the notion of joint and several liability 
of carriers, the validity of the clause has therefore followed the same trajectory. Although 
in earlier instances it had been held to be valid,204 the law then went through a phase of 
invalidating them, much like it did with the notion of joint and several liability for 
carriers. A demise clause had been specifically invalidated by the Federal Court on the 
basis that it purported to relieve the defendant charterer of liability in contravention of 
                                                 
199 Ibid, at p. 577.  
200 Although, notably Union Steel America v. M/V Sanko Spruce, 1999 AMC 344 (D. N.J. 1998), discussed 
above did disregard the demise clause on a similar basis to The Starsin. Nevertheless, generally the U.S. 
reasoning is public policy based.  
201 For example Fetim B.V. v. Oceanspeed (The Flecha) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 612 (Q.B.), where faced 
with a similar Continental Pacific Shipping bill of lading stipulating CPS as the “carrier” on the front, 
Moore-Bick J. nevertheless gave effect to the demise clause on the reverse of the bill of lading. See 
Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.), at p. 584 and 
588 on this point.  
202 See discussion on ‘who is the carrier’ as between shipowners and time charterers below in section 7.2. 
203 Girvin, S. “Contracting Carriers, Himalaya Clauses and Tort in the House of Lords” [2004] LMCLQ 
311, at p. 313.  
204 Grace Kennedy & Co. v. Canada Jamaica Line [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 336 (Que. S.C.); Apex (Trinidad) 
Oilfields v. Lunham & Moore Shipping (The Wynchwood) [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 203 (Exch. C. Can.); 
Tetley, W. “Chapter 10: Whom to Sue” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 36; Tetley, W. “The Demise 
of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 826.  
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Article III(8) of the Hague Rules.205 The demise clause has also simply been disregarded 
in order to hold the charterer liable,206 or to hold the charterer and shipowner jointly and 
severally liable.207 Two of the judgments that sounded the death toll for joint and several 
liability of carriers in Canada, are the ones that have also apparently entrenched the 
validity of the demise clause in Canadian law based very much on the notion of a single 
carrier.208 Nevertheless, it will be interesting to see how the finding of the Lords in The 
Starsin, will affect the current Canadian approach. Similarly, it will be interesting to see 
whether the Starsin alters Australian law. Unlike Canada, Australian courts have 
generally upheld the demise clause, with the Court of Appeals for New South Wales 
stating “the demise clause which I have set out above is itself an indication that this was 
intended to be an owner’s bill of lading…[the clause] remains a mean of clarifying any 
ambiguity which might arise as to the identity of the party bound by the bill of lading.”209 
The tendency in Australia has been to follow the English authorities on demise clauses: 
“In a matter of shipping law I would in any case tend, where our courts are silent, to 
                                                 
205 Canadian Klockner Ltd. D/S/ A/S Flint (The Mica) [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 478 (Fed. Ct. Can.), at p. 484. 
The case went to the Court of Appeal simply to be reversed by consent of the parties in a one line 
judgment. See Canadian Klockner Ltd. D/S/ A/S Flint (The Mica) [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 371 (Fed. C.A.). 
The judgment was evidently bought to prevent the precedent. This is unfortunate. . 
206 Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. CN Marine (The Newfoundland Coast) [1990] 1 F.C. 483 (Fed. C.A. 
Can.). The Federal Court of Appeal found on the construction of the bill of lading the charterer had signed 
in his personal capacity, but also affirmed that the trial judge was correct in hold that the clause was null 
and void for being contrary to Article III(8) of the Hague Rules (Ibid, at p. 501). The Court of Appeal also 
acknowledged that past jurisprudence involving the demise clause will normally mean the contract will be 
between the shipper and the shipowner, it cautioned that “it would seem unwise (as has been observed) to 
lay down a hard and fast rule.” (Ibid, at p. 497).  
207 Canastrand Industries v. Lara S [1993] 2 F.C. 553 (Fed. Ct. Can.). 
208 Union Carbide v. Fednav Ltd (1997) 131 F.T.R. 241 (Fed. Ct. Can.), at p. 264-265; Jian Sheng Co. v. 
Great Tempo S.A. [1998] 3 F.C. 418 (Fed. C.A. Can.), at p. 430. Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise 
Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 837 argues however that the Court of Appeal in Jian Shen didn’t 
actually rule on the validity of the demise clause, but rather simply presumed it was valid and applied it. 
Marler, D. “The Treatment, by the Federal Court of Canada, of Demise and Equivalent Identity of Carrier 
Clauses in Liner Bills of Lading” (2002) 26 Tul. Mar. L.J. 597, at p. 607, notes however that the effect of 
these two decisions with regard to the clause will be given much weight due to Nadon J’s extensive 
experience in maritime law.  
209 Kaleej International Pty v. Gulf Shipping Lines (The Sun Diamond) [1986] 6 N.S.W.L.R. 569 (C.A.), at 
p. 573-574. There have however been instances where the demise clause has not been given effect, such as 
Andersons (Pacific) Trading v. Karlander New Guinea Line [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 870 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W.), 
where the time charterer was held responsible was damaged cargo despite the demise clause, however it 
was not given effect on the basis that the time charterer as agent had failed to sufficiently disclose his 
principal, the shipowner. Arguably, the reasoning in this decision is fairly unique, especially given that the 
existence of an undisclosed principal is possible in the common law. See Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin 
Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. 437 (C.A.), per Rix L.J. at p. 452 on the issue of a principal 
known to exist but unnamed. 
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incline towards the English standpoint.”210 The same trend is visible in the law of 
Singapore.211 The Singapore Court of Appeal, similarly to the Australian Court of 
Appeals, found that the clause evidenced that “the contract contained in a bill of lading 
issued by the charterer under the authority contained in a charterparty which does not 
amount to a demise of the ship, and where possession of the ship is not given up to the 
charterer, is a contract between the shipowner and the shipper is a well established 
rule.”212
 
 The situation in Japan is similar in certain respects to Canada, wherein there have 
been contradictory judgments concerning the validity of the demise clause. Prior to the 
introduction of the Hague Rules into Japanese law, the Supreme Court of Japan had held 
that there can only be one carrier under a time charter and in that instance it will be the 
time charterer.213 The demise therefore, by implication was invalid. Nevertheless, in 
1991, Japanese courts considered the matter and determined that the demise clause was 
valid, and holding the shipowner to be the carrier.214 In The Jasmin, the court held that 
                                                 
210 Kaleej International Pty v. Gulf Shipping Lines (The Sun Diamond) [1986] 6 N.S.W.L.R. 569 (C.A.), at 
p. 575.  
211 See Meng, T. The Law in Singapore on Carriage of Goods by Sea 2nd Ed. (1994) Butterworths, 
Singapore, at p. 299 – 301 discussing the law in Singapore on the demise clause as identical to English law 
and authorities.  
212 Cascade Shipping Inc. v. Eka Jaya Agencies (Grace Liberty II) [1993] 1 SLR 980 (C.A. Singapore), at 
p. 990. The Court of Appeal however in this instance was considering the question of whether the 
shipowners were able to exercise a lien on freight where the charterers had failed to pay outstanding hire 
charges. For further discussion on the judgment of the Court of Appeal see Meng, T. The Law in Singapore 
on Carriage of Goods by Sea 2nd Ed. (1994) Butterworths, Singapore, at p. 301-302, and Tetley, W. “The 
Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 822-823.  
213 R.D. Tata & Co. v. Taiyo Shipping Co. (1928) 7 Minshu 8 (Supreme Court of Japan), as summarized 
and discussed extensively in Margolis, R. “Validity of the Demise Clause Under Japanese Law and the 
Consequences for Enforcement Abroad of Claims Under Japanese Bills of Lading” [1993] LMCLQ 164, at 
p. 164-166. See also two Hong Kong decisions, The Dong Do [1991] 2 H.K.L.R. 563 (H.K. H.C. Adm.J.).  
The Griesheim (1984) Unreported, No. 70 of 1983 (Civil) (H.K. C.A.), where the bills of lading has 
stipulated for Japanese law and both courts on the basis of expert testimony had determined that the demise 
clause is invalid under Japanese law (Margolis, ibid, at pp. 166-167, summarizing and discussing the two 
judgments).  
214 The decision of the Tokyo District Court was then upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court: 
The Jasmine (19 March 1991) Tokyo District Court. English Translation appears in: The Bulletin of the 
Japan Shipping Exchange Inc., March 1992; The Jasmine (24 February 1993) Tokyo Court of Appeal 
(Tokyo High Court). English Translation appears in: The Bulletin of the Japan Shipping Exchange Inc., 
December 1993; The Jasmine (27 March 1998) Supreme Court of Japan. For mention and discussion of the 
judgments see Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 492-493; Margolis, R. 
“Validity of the Demise Clause Under Japanese Law and the Consequences for Enforcement Abroad of 
Claims Under Japanese Bills of Lading” [1993] LMCLQ 164, at p. 167-169; Pejovic, C. “The Identity of 
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the demise clause did not in fact contravene article 15(1) of Japanese COGSA, which is 
the equivalent of article III(8) of the Hague Rules.215 In reasoning similar to the English 
authorities, the court also found that the demise clause did not have the effect of reducing 
the liability of the carrier, rather it merely specified his identity.216 This was not to remain 
the status quo in Japanese law as in 1998, in The Camfair, the Tokyo district court failed 
to give effect to a demise clause.217 Essentially, the court held that the demise clause was 
unvalid under Japanese COGSA, article 15(1), “because it intends to discharge the time 
charterer from liability as a carrier and it is a special agreement unfavorable to the 
consignor, consignee or the holder of the bill of lading.”218 It has been noted by one 
commentator “[b]ecause Japanese courts are not bound by precedents (Japanese law is 
based on civil law concepts), it is not uncommon for judges to reach opposite 
conclusions. As such, a definitive solution to the identity of carrier problem does not yet 
exist under Japanese law.”219 Nevertheless, in considering The Camfair, which placed 
importance on who is identified on the face of the bill of lading, “it is hoped that futute 
decisions will further incorporate the perspective of the bill of lading holder, and take 
into account modern business efficacy, and reduce academic arguments.”220  One may 
speculate, therefore, that Japan may be moving towards a commercial approach as 
exemplified in The Starsin.  
 
 The approach in France is similar in ways to the American approach in that the 
demise clause is not necessarily invalid, rather they have been given effect when invoked 
by shippers or consignees seeking to hold the shipowner liable. It has been noted that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 
393-394.  
215 Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 492; Margolis, R. “Validity of the 
Demise Clause Under Japanese Law and the Consequences for Enforcement Abroad of Claims Under 
Japanese Bills of Lading” [1993] LMCLQ 164, at p. 168.  
216 Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 492. 
217 Anuk Fire and Marine v. Shinwa Kaiun Kaisha (The Camfair) (30 September 1997) Tokyo District 
Court. See Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 493-496 and Pejovic, C. 
“The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of Law” (2000) 31 
JMLC 379, at p. 394. 
218 Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 496. The court did however find that 
the demise clause had unilateral enforceability, and used it to demonstrate that the shipowner had 
voluntarily assumed the carrier’s contractual liability. (Ibid).  
219 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 394. 
220 220 Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 498.  
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“l’hostilité des tribunaux à l’égard de la clause identity of carrier et de la demise clause 
est manifeste.”221  In France therefore “the demise and identity of carrier clauses are, in 
general, without effect when they are invoked by a party in order to evade or deny 
liability. French doctrine…has rarely endorsed the validity of such clauses, and has more 
often treated them with contempt. French courts have also in the past, as a general rule, 
refused to apply the demise of identity of carrier clause vis-à-vis third parties.”222 There 
are instances, however, where French courts have allowed third parties to rely on the 
clause to render the shipowner liable.223 The situation is similar in Germany where 
“d’une manière general il n’y a pas d’objection à admettre la clause Identity of Carrier”, 
however it does not have effect as against third parties.224 In The M/V Planet, the 
Bundesgerichtshof considered an identity of carrier clause.225 The German Court held 
that the owner was not the carrier despite the clause, relying instead on the fact that the 
time charterer’s on the face of the bill of lading showing him to be the carrier.226
 
 
5.3. The Current Problem 
It would perhaps be slightly simplistic to state that if entities involved in carriage 
were held jointly and severally liable, or were viewed as “carriers” then artifices such as 
the demise and identity of carrier clauses would not be able to be employed to shield 
parties who should be carriers, nonetheless this statement does have an air of truth to it. 
Ironically, the English position prior to The Starsin was at least predictable, with the 
shipowner determined to be the carrier where there is a demise clause. With uncertainty 
surrounding the validity of the demise clause in so many jurisdictions, as well as the 
conflict of laws issue where the clause is valid in other jurisdictions, it would appear the 
‘who is the carrier’ enquiry is more complex than ever.  
                                                 
221 Chao, A."Reflèxions sur la 'Identity of Carrier' Clause' ", DMF 1967, 12, at p. 18.  
222 Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 824.  
223 Cour d'Appel de Versailles, March 20, 1995 (The Soufflot), DMF 1995, 813. The Cour d’Appel rejected 
the shipowner’s arguments that the time charterer was the issuer and the party that signs the bills of lading, 
because the bill of lading did not mention the shipowner or the time charterer (ibid, at p. 813).  
224 Schölch, M.  "Jurisprudence maritime de la République fédérale d'Allemagne", DMF 1977, 116, at p. 
118-119.  
225 Trappe, J. “Chronique de jurisprudence allemande” DMF 1991, 743, who at p. 744-745 summarizes and 
discusses the judgment.  
226 Ibid, at p. 745.  
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 6. BENEFIT UNDER THE CARRIAGE CONTRACT: THE HIMALAYA 
CLAUSE 
 The inequalities that may result from the finding that the party who in essence 
performed all or a portion of the carriage contract, is not the ‘carrier’ has consequentially 
led to attempts to extend the protection of the carriage contract to what are viewed as 
third parties. The genesis of the Himalaya clause was with respect to benefits conferred 
on stevedores,227 however, its function and application is just as relevant for any party 
that may have been characterized as a carrier but for the narrow interpretation of the term.   
It has been noted that the Rules were intended to confer benefit on those considered to be 
third parties to the carriage contract,228 such as a shipowner in the instance where 
charterer’s bills were issued. With one argument being that the problem arises in common 
law jurisdictions where an “uncritical assumption [is made] that the drafters could not 
                                                 
227 The Himalaya Clause technically arose out of the judgment in Adler v. Dickson (The Himalaya) [1954] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 267 (C.A.) where an injured passenger was able to take suit against the employees of the 
carrier on the basis that the terms of the passenger ticket did not expressly or by implication benefit the 
servants of the vessel. Nevertheless the two seminal cases which concerned the clause were in relation to 
cargo damage resulting from the activities of stevedores. See Scruttons v. Midland Silicons [1962] A.C. 
446, (H.L.) at p. 474 where Lord Reid laid out the four conditions by which a stevedor would benefit under 
the contract, adopting an approach based on agency: “I can see a possibility of success of the agency 
argument if (first) the bill of lading makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the 
provisions in it which limit liability, (secondly) the bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier in addition 
to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is also contracting as an agent for the stevedore that 
these provisions should apply to the stevedore, (thirdly) the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do 
that, or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties about 
consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome.” See then New Zealand Shipping v. A.M. 
Satterthwaite (Eurymedon) [1975] A.C. 154 (P.C.), which approved Lord Reid’s conditions and applied 
them to allow the stevedores to benefit from the clause. The Himalaya clause as found in New Zealand 
Shipping v. A.M. Satterthwaite (Eurymedon) [1975] A.C. 154 (P.C.) at p. 165, as 3rd para of clause 1 in the 
bill of lading stipulates: “It is hereby expressly agreed that no servant or agent of the carrier (including 
every independent contractor from time to time employed by the carrier) shall in any circumstances 
whatsoever be under any liability whatsoever to the shipper, consignee or owner of the goods or to any 
holder of this Bill of Lading for any loss, damage or delay of whatsoever kind arising or resulting directly 
or indirectly from any act, neglect or default on his part while acting in the course of or in connection with 
his employment and, without prejudice to the generality of the forgoing provisions of this clause, every 
exemption, limitation, conditions and liberty herein contained and every right, exemption from liability, 
defence and immunity of whatsoever nature applicable to the carrier or to which the carrier is entitled 
hereunder shall also be available and shall extend to protect every servant or agent of the carrier acting as 
aforesaid and for the purpose of all the forgoing provisions of this clause the carrier is or shall be deemed to 
be acting as agent or trustee on behalf of and for the benefit of all persons who are or might be his servants 
or agents from time to time (including independent contractors as aforesaid) and all such persons shall to 
this extent be or be deemed to be parties to the contract in or evidenced by this Bill of Lading.” 
228 Newell, R. “Privity Fundamentalism and the Circular Indemnity Clause” [1992] LMCLQ 97, at p. 100.  
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have intended to confer any benefits on so-called ‘third parties’ to the bill of lading 
contract.”229 It has thus been forgotten that a majority of the delegates at the Hague 
conferences represented continental legal systems, which are noted “for [their] lack of 
squeamishness about conferring enforceable benefits on third parties to contracts.”230 In 
essence, the third party benefit is only really necessitated with respect to shipowners and 
charterers as a result of a restrictive interpretation of ‘carrier’, and therefore it is often 
employed to counteract inherent inequities that result. When a party is not “the carrier” 
he is therefore denied protection and benefit on the basis of the doctrine of privity. 
 
6.1. An Exception to Privity  
  Allowing servants, agents and independent contractors to benefit, 
depending on the wording of the clause, from the terms of the contract of carriage 
through a Himalaya clause has become a well accepted method of circumventing the 
often harsh results of the privity doctrine in common law.231 The jurisprudence on the 
clause is extensive, dealing frequently with stevedores and terminal operators, and 
generally turns on the wording of the clause.232 Nevertheless the pertinence of the clause 
in this instance is in its application to cover shipowners, charterers and any other party 
that could be considered the carrier.  
 
The notion that some doctrine or artifice would be needed to prevent tortious 
liability on the part of the shipowner was recognized by the House of Lords in 1924 
where the bills of lading were found to be charterer’s bills: “It would be absurd that the 
owner of the goods could get rid of the protective clauses of the bill of lading, in respect 
                                                 
229 Newell, ibid, at p. 100.  
230  Ibid.  
231 See Tetley, W. “Chapter 36: The Himalaya Clause – Heresy or Genius” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th 
Ed. Online at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime, at pp. 11-30; Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills 
of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at pp. 311-324; Tetley, W. “The Himalaya Clause – 
Revisited” (2003) 10 JIML 40, at pp. 46-58. Although, the clause does have its limits. See Burke Motors v. 
Mersey Docks [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 155 (Q.B.), at p. 161-162, holding that in order to benefit the 
defendant stevedores must have performed services that were referable to the carrier’s contract, and that 
causing damage to goods by negligently unloading cargo from another ship would not be covered.  
232 See authors cited ibid for a complete discussion of jurisprudence on the clause. For an example of a 
decision turning on the wording of the clause see Wilson v. Darling Island Stevedoring Co. [1956] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 346 (Aust. H.C.), at p. 357 holding that the wording of the clause, extending protection to any 
other person who may be “the carrier or bailee”, was not sufficient to cover the stevedores.  
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of all stowage, by suing the owner of the ship in tort.”233 In relation to shipowners 
benefiting from the contract via a Himalaya clause, Carver has noted that he “must 
establish that he falls within one or more of the classes of persons to whom the clause 
extends the benefit of bill of lading terms”.234 In The Mahuktai, the Privy Council 
considered the question of whether a shipowner, who was not party to the bill of lading as 
it was a charterer’s bill, was entitled to benefit from the jurisdiction clause within it by 
virtue of a Himalaya clause.235 With regard to the Himalaya clause, the Lords opined that 
the function of the Himalaya clause is “to prevent cargo-owners from avoiding the effect 
of contractual defences available to the carrier (typically the exceptions and the 
limitations in the Hague-Visby Rules) by suing in tort persons who perform the 
contractual services on the carrier’s behalf.”236 The question was whether on the wording 
of the clause, the shipowners qualified as “sub-contractors”.237 Unfortunately, it was 
considered that the jurisdiction clause was not covered by the Himalaya clause, and thus 
the sub-contractor issue fell away, and the shipowners were not able to benefit from the 
jurisdiction clause.238 The issue concerning a non-carrier shipowner was considered again 
                                                 
233 Elder, Dempster Co v. Paterson, Zochonis & Co [1924] A.C. 522 (H.L.), at p. 548. The House of Lords 
held that the shipowners were protected by the exemptions in the bills of lading, however, Viscount Cave 
and Viscount Finlay did so on the basis of vicarious immunity (Ibid, at p. 534 and p. 548), while Lord 
Summer (with Lord Dunedin and Lord Carso agreeing) did so on the basis of bailment upon terms (Ibid at 
p. 564).  
234 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 324.  
235 The Mahkutai [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1 (P.C.). The Privy Council also considered the question of 
whether the shipowner could benefit on the grounds of bailment on terms. Bailment and bailment on terms 
is discussed infra in section 8.3. 
236 Ibid, at p. 9.  
237 The clause stipulated: “4. Sub-Contracting. (i) The Carrier shall be entitled to sub-contract on any terms 
the whole or part of the carriage, loading, unloading, storing, warehousing, handling and any and all duties 
whatsoever under taken by the Carrier in relation to the Goods. (ii) The Merchant undertakes that no claim 
or allegation shall be made against any servant, agent or sub-contractor of the Carrier, including but limited 
to stevedores, terminal operators, which imposes or attempts to impose on any of them or any vessel owned 
by any of them any liability whatsoever in connection with the goods…every such servant, agent or sub-
contractor shall have the benefit of all exceptions, limitations, provision, conditions, and liberties herein 
benefiting the Carrier…” (Ibid, at p. 3).  
238 “Two questions arose in the course of argument which are specific to this case. The first is whether the 
shipowners qualify as ‘sub-contractors’ within the meaning of the Himalaya clause (cl. 4 of the bill of 
lading). The second is whether, if so, they are entitled to take advantage of the exclusive jurisdiction clause 
(cl. 19). Their Lordships have come to the conclusion that the later question must be answered in the 
negative. It is therefore unnecessary for them to answer the first question.” (Ibid, at p. 8). See also Nossal, 
S. “Bailment on Terms, Himalaya Clauses, and Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses: The Decision of the Privy 
Council in the Mahkutai” (1996) 26 Hong Kong L.J. 321, particularly at p. 330 who has criticized the 
decision of the Privy Council, noting “it complicated unnecessarily the application of techniques used to 
mitigate the harshness of the rule of privity of contract.” At p. 331, Nossal comments that the Privy Council 
failed to address the lacuna in the law where the charterer issues its own bills of lading, the shipowner is un 
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in The Starsin, and this time was decided. Colman J. at first instance determined that the 
shipowners were in fact an “independent contractor” with regard to the Himalaya clause, 
reasoning that he performed a substantial portion of the contractual obligations in the 
same manner as other parties hired by the ‘Carrier’.239 The House of Lords agreed.240 
The shipowner had submitted that the Himalaya clause should exempt him from all 
liability whatsoever in respect of the cargo, as Lord Hobhouse noted “they are not content 
that they should have the benefit of the same exemptions and limitations as are available 
to the ‘contracting’ carrier (for the obvious reason that those exceptions would not enable 
them to defeat the claim).”241 With regard to the submission that the shipowners should 
be exempt from all liability, it was viewed that “these are remarkable submissions which 
seek to carry the reach of a Himalaya clause in a bill of lading far further than any 
previous decision. If their submissions are correct they are highly significant. They will 
provide the actual performing carrier with a route for evading by means of a bill of lading 
clause the Hague Rules scheme.”242 The Lords, with the exception of Lord Steyn,243 
rejected the shipowner’s submission and allowed him to benefit from the Himalaya 
clause only in so far as the limitations and exemptions were allowed by the Hague 
Rules.244 The benefit for parties involved in carriage deemed not to be the carrier, 
therefore seems to be supported by The Starsin, however, this is dependent on clear 
stipulation or language that would permit this in the actual Himalaya clauses. This is now 
                                                                                                                                                 
protected and the “cargo interests are free to sue in tort or bailment unimpeded by the terms of the 
charterer’s bills of lading.” 
239 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 85 (Q.B.), at p. 99, 
reasoning: “Ordinarily understood the word “independent contractor” in the context  of a head contract 
means a third party with whom a party to the contract enters into a contract under which the third party 
contracts to perform some or all of the obligations which that party has undertaken to perform under the 
head contract, in other words, a sub-contractor. Where a carrier has chartered a vessel to perform the sea 
carriage which that carrier has contracted with the shipper to perform, he has in effect employed the 
shipowners to carry out the substantial part of his own contractual obligations. He has therefore employed 
the shipowner as an independent contractor just as if he had employed a stevedore to carry out the handling 
of the goods at the port of loading.” 
240 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.) 
241 Ibid, at p. 603.  
242 Ibid. Arguably, under English law given that the actual carrier is not necessarily governed by the Hague 
Rules scheme due to the narrow interpretation of the term carrier, such concern for his evading the Rules is 
perhaps misplaced. 
243 Ibid, at p. 584-586, Lord Steyn reasons that the Himalaya clause protected the shipowner against any 
liability in tort, with the effect of channeling liability to the charterers which he considers is a readily 
predictable scheme.  
244 Ibid, at pp. 582, 610-611.  
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further supported in the United Kingdom by the recent ‘Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999’ which provides that contracts may confer benefits on third parties 
where expressely provided for in the contract, although the party need not be mentioned 
by name, but simply as a member of a class of persons.245 Although the Act general 
exempts matters relating to contracts for the carriage of goods by sea,246 the exception to 
this is permitting a third party to “avail himself of an exclusion or limitation of liability in 
such a contract”.247 The explanatory note for that provision states that “this enables 
clauses which seek to extend an exclusion or limitation of liability of a carrier of goods 
by sea to servants, agents and independent contractors engaged in the loading and 
unloading process to be enforced by those servants, agents or independent contractors (so 
called ‘Himalaya Clauses’).”248 Arguably, the scope of the provision is wider than the 
explanatory note implies, given the holding in The Starsin.  
 
Other common law nations plagued with the notion of privity in this context have 
followed the English approach and have in certain instances upheld the Himalaya clause. 
Canada,249 Australia,250 New Zealand,251 and South Africa,252 have all done so, however, 
                                                 
245 The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, U.K. 1999, c.31, section 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(b). Tetley 
notes that the provision for members of a class would therefore benefit parties where classes such as , 
stevedores, subsequent owners, etc are mentioned (Tetley, W. “Chapter 36: The Himalaya Clause – Heresy 
or Genius” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 15).  
246 Ibid, section 6(5)(a).  
247 Ibid, section 6(5)(a).  
248 As quoted by Tetley, W. “Chapter 36: The Himalaya Clause – Heresy or Genius” in Marine Cargo 
Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 16. For further discussion on the impact of the Act, particularly with respect to 
charterparties see Vlasto, T. & Clark, J. “The Effect of Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on 
Voyage and Time Charter Parties” (2001) 25 Tul. Mar. L.J. 519, who notes at p. 529 that the Act does not 
exclude charterparties in 6(5) in the same manner that it does contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.  
249 Canadian courts had in the past relied on Midland Silicones to deny the use of a Himalaya clause 
(Tetley, W. “Chapter 36: The Himalaya Clause – Heresy or Genius” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 
17). In International Terminal Operators v. Miida Electronics (Buenos Aires Maru) [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752 
(S.C.C.) the Himalaya clause was upheld, although mostly on bailment inspired reasoning (ibid, at p. 782-
794). For further discussion on the judgment see Tetley, W. “The Buenos Aires Maru” (1988) 10 Sup. Crt. 
L.R. 399. For an in-depth analysis of the Himalaya clause in Canadian law see Tetley, W. “Chapter 36: The 
Himalaya Clause – Heresy or Genius” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at pp. 17-20, and Tetley, W. “The 
Himalaya Clause – Revisited” (2003) 10 JIML 40, at pp. 50-52.  
250 Previously, Australia had used a bailment reasoning to protect stevedores where actions in tort were 
brought, as found in Gilbert Stokes v. Dalgety [1948] 81 Ll. L. Rep. 337 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W.). But the clauses 
have since been upheld in Carrington Slipways Pty. v. Patrick Operations Pty. (The Cape Comorin) (1991) 
24 N.S.W.L.R. 745 (C.A. N.S.W.) and Godina v. Patrick Operations Party [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 333 
(N.S.W. C.A.). For disussion on the Himalaya clause in Australian law see Grime, R. “Bills of Lading” in 
Australian Maritime Law (1991) M. White (Ed.) Federation Press, Sydney, at p. 86-89.  
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due to either liberal judicial policies, or legislative intervention, in many respects those 
nations today have a more relaxed approach to privity than the English authorities.253 
This is also the case in the United States. Despite an early willingness to allow third 
                                                                                                                                                 
251 In Air NZ Ltd. v. Contship America [1992] 1 N.Z.L.R. 425 (H.C. N.Z.), Lord Reid’s requirements were 
utilized to test whether the Himalaya clause was effective, however this decision has been criticized. 
Myburg, P. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading – New Zealand” in Ocean 
Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer 
Law Intl, The Hague, at p. 249 has argued that the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982 has rendered 
New Zealand law less restrictive than Reid’s agency test. Myburg, at p. 250 has noted that post-1982 in 
New Zealand, all that is required would be that the bill of lading makes it clear that the third party servant, 
agent or sub-contractor was intended to be covered, and that this third party is designated clearly by name, 
description or reference to a class.  
252 South Africa is actually not a common law nation, rather Roman-Dutch law, a civilian legal system, 
prevails. In maritime law matters, however, certain areas are governed by English admiralty law. The 
determination of which matters are governed by English admiralty law and which are governed by South 
African Roman Dutch law, is made through reference to s. 6 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 
105 of 1983. For an in-depth discussion on the operation of the Act and the applicable law governing 
various maritime matters see Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta 
& Co, Cape Town, at pp.17 and following.  Nevertheless, in Santam Insurance Co. v. SA Stevedores Ltd. 
1989 (1) SA 182 (Div. Durban), the court upheld the Himalaya clause relying on both English law, 
specifically Lord Reid’s first three requirements in Midland Silicones, and also by relying on the Roman 
Dutch notion of stipulatio alteri (ibid, at p. 189-190). This decision has been subject to criticism on two 
fronts: firstly, that Wilson J. should only have applied English admiralty law, as by virtue of the South 
African Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act, that was the proper law to apply given the subject matter at 
hand, and secondly, given stipulatio alteri was inapplicable, Wilson J. should not have omitted the fourth 
requirement of Lord Reid’s test simply because it was not a requirement of stipulatio alteri (Staniland, H. 
“The Himalaya Clause in South Africa” [1992] LMCLQ 317, at pp. 319-321). Stipulatio alteri is civilian in 
nature and provides that party A may stipulate in a contract with party B, for the benefit of third party C 
(Staniland, ibid, at p. 321). The distinction between the English law and the Roman-Dutch law therefore in 
English law there is a requirement of consideration and the involvment of agency principles, where both are 
not necessary in Roman Dutch law (ibid, at p. 321-322). The South African courts have more recently 
taken an expansive approach to the Himalaya clause in LTA Construction v. Mediterranean Shipping Co 
Depots (The Izmir), 21 April 2004, SCSZ at D211 (D& C LD). Using English law, the court determined 
that the wording of the Himalaya clause which extended immunity to “every such servant or agent of the 
Carrier (including any stevedore, terminal operator or any other independent contractor)” was broad 
enough to cover the sub-contractor of the agent of the carrier. For a discussion of the judgment see Wragge, 
M. & Wagener, M. “South African Maritime Law Update: 2004” (2005) 36 JMLC 343, at pp. 356-357.  
253 For example the Canadian Supreme Court in London Drugs v. Kuehne & Nagle Intl [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 
(S.C.C.), adopted a much more relaxed approach to the privity doctrine employing a two part test with 
respect to third party benefit, which was subsequently applied in Fraser River Pile & Dredge v. Can-Dive 
Services [1999] 3 S.C.R. 108 (S.C.C.) allowing a demise charterer to benefit under the barge owner’s 
insurance contract.  The Supreme Court in London Drugs characterized the test as the first limb providing 
that the parties to the contract must intend to benefit the third party, and the second limb providing that the 
activities performed by the third party must be within the scope of activities performed under the contract 
(Ibid, at p. 109). Tetley, has argued however that although the two part test would be perfectly applicable in 
a Himalaya situation, the fact that Lord Reid’s test is so frequently applied by the Canadian Courts, renders 
it likely that the courts will continue using an agency analysis (Tetley, W. “Chapter 36: The Himalaya 
Clause – Heresy or Genius” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at pp. 19). While Canada has relaxed the 
privity requirements judicially, the English authorities are not longer applicable in New Zealand following 
the New Zealand Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, which relaxes the requirements for third party benefit in a 
manner similar to the U.K. Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.  
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parties to benefit from carriage contracts,254 the Supreme Court in 1959 adopted a 
somewhat restrictive approach to third party benefit. In Robert C. Herd v. Krawill 
Machinery Corp., the Supreme Court of the United States considered the extension of the 
carrier’s defences to stevedores facing suit in tort for damage to an industrial press.255 
Although, there was actually no Himalaya clause in Herd, the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
with regard to denying the stevedores the benefit of COGSA has formed the basis for 
subsequent jurisprudence: “We can only conclude that if Congress had intended to make 
such an inroad on the rights of claimants (against negligent agents) it would have said so 
in unambiguous terms”256 therefore “[n]o statute has limited [the stevedore’s] liability, 
and [the stevedore] was not a party nor a beneficiary of the contract of carriage between 
the shipper and the carrier, and hence its liability was not limited by that contract.”257 A 
general test therefore emerged from Herd, 258 however it was gradually expanded over 
                                                 
254 See Costabel, A. “The Himalaya Clause Crosses Privity’s Far Frontier: Norfolk southern Railway v. 
James N. Kirby” (2005) 36 JMLC 217, outlining at p. 222-223 the early American law on Himalaya 
clauses. See also Tetley, W. “Chapter 36: The Himalaya Clause – Heresy or Genius” in Marine Cargo 
Claims, 4th Ed, at pp. 20-21 outlining and discussing early U.S. jurisprudence that had departed from the 
restrictive mid-nineteenth century notion of privity in England. Conversely, see Sweeney, J. “Crossing the 
Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport” (2005) 36 JMLC 155, at p. 162-163, who 
characterizes American jurisprudence in the earlier part of the last century as hostile to exculpatory clauses 
on public policy grounds, thus the implication being that negligent parties would have difficulty exempting 
themselves from liability. Nevertheless in Collins & Co. v. Panama Railroad, 197 F.2d 893 (5 Cir. 1952), 
the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals considered the instance where longshore men hired by a railroad had 
damaged cargo and the railroad sought to benefit from the terms of the bill of lading. The Court opined at 
p. 897 that “the limitation of liability of the carrier under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is not intended 
to be personal, but, unless otherwise agreed, extends to any agency by means of which the carrier performs 
its contract of transportation and delivery.” One commentator has described this judgment as follows: 
“Collins offers a vision of carriage as a concerted effort of multiple parties who are all instrumental to the 
achievement of the venture’s common goal.” (Costabel, ibid, at p. 222).  
255 Robert C. Herd v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297 (S.C.).  
256 Ibid, at p. 301. 
257 Ibid, at p. 308.  
258 Although, not necessarily a clear test as found in Lord Reid’s four requirements. Rather it appears to 
depend on who is discussing the judgment as to what the ratio is. Nevertheless there appears to be 
consensus on the notion that the contract will be strictly construed. See Sweeney, J. “Crossing the 
Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport” (2005) 36 JMLC 155, at p. 164, noting a strict 
construction of exemption clauses. See also Costabel, A. “The Himalaya Clause Crosses Privity’s Far 
Frontier: Norfolk southern Railway v. James N. Kirby” (2005) 36 JMLC 217, at p. 226 noting that the 
Supreme Court found two conditions attached to providing benefit under the contract: “(1) that the 
contractual intent to benefit the third party be strictly construed to apply only to ‘intended’ beneficiaries; 
and (2) that the contractual intent be expressed with ‘clarity of language’.” While Tetley, W. “Chapter 36: 
The Himalaya Clause – Heresy or Genius” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at pp. 22-25 has discussed 
three preconditions to benefit: “(i) There had to be a contractual relationship between the contracting party 
and anyone who purported to claim the benefit of any clause in that contract…(ii) The language of the 
Himalaya clause had to be very specific as to who was being protected…(iii) The clause needed to be 
specific as to what benefit is being granted.” 
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the years.259 In The M/V Hanjin Marseilles, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that 
“we reject the appellants’ argument that privity of contract is required in order to benefit 
from a Himalya clause. Rather the proper test is to consider the nature of the services 
performed compared to the carrier’s responsibility under the carriage contract.”260 The 
holding by the 9th Circuit was soon utilized by the District Court of New Jersey in The 
M/V Hanjin Osaka, in extending the benefit of the Himalaya clause to allow a shipowner 
and a demise charterer to enforce a forum selection clause in the bill of lading on the 
basis that is was reasonable for the parties to expect that other parties would benefit from 
the protections in the same manner as the carrier.261 The District Court characterized the 
shipowner and the demise charterer as parties that were “intimately involved in the 
transactions.”262 Despite the district court’s holding with respect to Himalaya clauses and 
benefit for non-carrier performing parties, it has been noted by one commentator that 
“American cases have not fully confronted the issue of whether a registered owner who is 
not the COGSA carrier is nevertheless protected by COGSA.”263 This may change 
                                                 
259 Donovan, C. & Haley, J. “Who Done It and Who’s Gonna Pay? Rights of Shippers and Consignees 
Against Non-Ocean Carriers Performing part of a Contract of Carriage Covered by a Through Bill of 
Lading” (1998) 7 DCL J. Int’l L. & Prac. 415, at p. 419, discusses a “Two Factor Test” that was employed 
by certain courts by the 1980’s and 1990’s in order to extend third party benefit. “The two factors involved 
are (1) the contractual relations between the party seeking protection and the ocean carrier, and (2) the 
nature of the services performed by the third party compared to the ocean carrier’s responsibility under the 
carriage contract.” (Ibid).  
260 Akiyama Corp. of America v. M/V Hanjin Marseilles, 162 F.3d 571, at p. 574 (9 Cir. 1998). One must 
note however that in this respect there is a divergence between two Circuits. In Minkinberg v. Baltic 
Steamship Co., 988 F.2d 327 (2 Cir. 1993), the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a narrower approach 
with respect to the privity requirment than the 9th Circuit holding at p. 333: “There must be a contractual 
relationship between [the stevedore] and [the carrier] in order for the provisions of the “Himalaya clause” 
to apply…We decline to extend COGSA protections through the “Himalaya clause” to indefinite and 
unforeseeable defendents who may have only an attenuated connection to the ‘carriage of goods by sea’.” 
Admittedly, this distinction will likely not affect such parties as shipowners or charterers found not to be 
‘the carrier’ as invariably there will be a contractual relationship through a charterparty. For a discussion on 
the different privty requirements in several of the circuits see Robertson, D. & Sturley, M. “Recent 
Developments in Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits” (2003) 27 Tul. Mar. L.J. 495, at p. 568-569.   
261 Chisso America Inc. v. M/V Hanjin Osaka, 307 F.Supp. 2d 621 (D.C. N.J. 2003), at p. 626, where the 
district court quoted the 9th Circuit in M/V Hanjin Marseilles as a justification for the reasoning that parties 
would expect such benefit to be extended beyond the carrier. This was also done on the wording of the 
Himalaya clause, as the disctrict court found that the wording “agents…or others by whom the…carriage is 
procured,” would include the shipowner and the demise charterer who were “others” given they were 
intimately involved in the transactions (ibid).   
262 Ibid.  
263 Sweeney, J. “Crossing the Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport” (2005) 36 JMLC 155, 
at p. 183. Although Sweeney does acknowledge that it has been considered in his discussion of EAC 
Timberlane v. Pisces Ltd., 745 F.2d 715 (1 Cir. 1984), where the Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit 
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however, with a 2004 Supreme Court decision that extended the benefit of the Himalaya 
clause immeasurably.264 In Kirby, the inland rail carrier who damaged the goods sought 
protection from the provisions of the carrier’s bill of lading as against a shipper who had 
contracted with a freight forwarder that had issued the shipper their own bill of lading. 
The Supreme Court held that the rail carrier could benefit under both the ocean carrier 
bill of lading and the freight forwarder’s bill of lading, dispensing with privity and 
opining that “the parties must have anticipated that a land carrier’s services would be 
necessary for the contract’s performance.”265 The implication of the Kirby decision with 
regard to Himalaya clauses is that privity is no longer a prerequisite and the agency 
theory or doctrine becomes unnecessary.266 The reaction to the decision is mixed.267 
Nevertheless, it would appear that the ability of a party performing a portion of the 
carriage or a shipowner found not to be the carrier will now have an easier time 
benefiting from the protections offered under the bill of lading if so stipulated. This is 
simply another example of the existing desire to bring parties performing carriage within 
the regime that should in essence govern their liability.  
                                                                                                                                                 
allowed the shipowner to benefit from the 4(2)(q) defence in COGSA along with other parties who were 
not the carrier.  
264 Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby Pty, 2004 AMC 2705 (U.S. S.C. 2004). The Supreme 
Court overturned the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals who had held that where a freight forwarder, who had 
then contracted with a carrier, who had then subcontracted with an inland transporter who had damaged the 
goods, the shipper of the goods was not bound by the Himalaya clause in the carrier’s bill of lading vis-à-
vis the inland transporter. The 11th Circuit had reasoned that the party seeking protection must have privity 
with the shipper as based on the principle of Herd (Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby Pty, 
300 F.3d 1171 (11 Cir. 2002)). For discussion on the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals decision see Glenn, R. 
& McRae, C. “Admiralty” (2003) 54 Mercer L.R. 1317, at p. 1320-1324.  
265 Kirby, ibid, at p. 2717.   
266 Costabel, A. “The Himalaya Clause Crosses Privity’s Far Frontier: Norfolk southern Railway v. James 
N. Kirby” (2005) 36 JMLC 217, at p. 241-242.  
267 Theis, W. “Third-Party Beneficiaries in Multimodal Contracts of Carriage: Norfolk Southern Railway v. 
James N. Kirby” (2005) 36 JMLC 201, at p. 214-215, criticizes the decision as incomplete and unhelpful, 
leaving several key issues concerning third party benefit unanswered, including the issue of when a third 
party does not know about the benefit can he still claim it? Conversely, Costabel, A. “The Himalaya Clause 
Crosses Privity’s Far Frontier: Norfolk southern Railway v. James N. Kirby” (2005) 36 JMLC 217, at p. 
244-245 supports the decision’s overruling of the privity rule with respect to Himalaya clauses and 
considers that American law is now in step with other common law jurisdictions that have relaxed the 
notion of privity, finishing with the thought that “it is time to read and digest it, treasure the ideas and 
inspirations from old time that seemed to be forever gone, and savor “herersy” turned rule of law. 
Wherever you are, Lord Denning, we suspect that you are hiding a smile.” Sweeney, J. “Crossing the 
Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport” (2005) 36 JMLC 155, at p. 199, warns that the “the 
rationale for approval and limitation of Himalaya clauses in England now differs from the rationale in the 
United States provided by the Kirby decision and this divergence demonstrates the need for an international 
solution to this major trade problem.”  
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 6.2. Stipulation Pour Autrui  
 Briefly, the notion of third party benefit is not foreign to civilian nations in the 
same manner as it is to common law ones, and therefore does not pose the same judicial 
and doctrinal headaches as found in common law authorities. As discussed above in 
relation to South Africa’s stipulatio alteri,268 civilian jurisdictions possess this notion of 
third party benefit, known often as stipulation pour autrui, or stipulation for another. By 
virtue of article 1121 of the French Civil Code, and Article 1328 of the German 
Commercial Code (HGB), parties may impliedly or expressly confer rights in contracts 
for the benefit of third parties such that the third party may enforce those rights or 
performance in their own behalf.269 Similarly in the Civil Code of Quebec, article 1444 
provides: “A person may  make a stipulation in a contract for the benefit of a third 
person. The stipulation gives the third person beneficiary the right to exact performance 
of the promised obligation directly from the promisor.”270
 
In France, one need no longer rely on stipulation pour autrui with regard to 
stevedores as legislation has been enacted governing their liability, and limiting it in 
certain instances to the limits of liability applicable to the carrier.271 This however does 
not benefit a shipowner or charterer seeking to benefit under a Himalaya clause or by 
virtue of the notion of stipulation pour autrui. It has been noted that for a stipulation pour 
autrui to be successful the following four conditions must be complied with: “First, at its 
base, must lie a valid contract. Secondly, the stipulator must have a valid interest, 
pecuniary or otherwise, in having an obligation performed for the benefit of a third party. 
                                                 
268 See footnote 252 above, discussing the civilian notion of stipulatio alteri found in South African 
Roman-Dutch law.  
269 Vlasto, T. & Clark, J. “The Effect of Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on Voyage and Time 
Charter Parties” (2001) 25 Tul. Mar. L.J. 519, at p. 522.  
270 Civil Code of Quebec, 1994. Article 1445 stipulates: A third person beneficiary need not exist nor be 
determinant when the stipulation is made, he need only be determinable at that time and exsit when the 
promisor is to perform the obligation for his benefit.  
271 Tetley, W. “The Himalaya Clause – Revisited” (2003) 10 JIML 40, at p. 62-63. The provisions 
governing the liability of stevedores are found in the Law of 18 June 1966, Articles 50-51 and 53, as well 
as Article 38 of the Decree of 31 December 1966, and provide amoung other things, that the stevedore’s 
liability is limited to that of the carrier, the stevedore is not bound by bill of lading clauses in a contract of 
carriage of a container to which he is a stranger, the stevedore cannot lessen his liability but actions against 
him are prescribed after one year (ibid, at p. 62-64).  
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Thirdly, the third party who benefits from the stipulation must be determinable and must 
exist when the promisor is obliged to perform his obligation towards him. Fourthly, the 
third party beneficiary must accept the stipulation and notice of the acceptance must be 
brought to the attention of either the stipulator or the promisor.”272 On the basis of these 
requirements it has been argued by Tetley that a Himalaya clause cannot fall within the 
terms of the civilian notion of stipulation pour autrui for three reasons, firstly that the 
clause does not confer a benefit rather it is a negative right not to be sued, secondly, two 
conditions are not met by the fact that the third party is not determinably and does not 
signify his assent, and thirdly, that as such a stipulation is an exception and will be 
interpreted restrictively.273 Regardless, it was held in The Federal Schelde, that the 
defendant stevedores could rely on a Himalaya clause as by the law of Quebec the clause 
constituted a valid stipulation pour autrui.274 The Superior Court of Quebec found that 
“if one accepts the following simple definition of the stipulation pour autrui…there is no 
reason why, in principle, it cannot be applied to a clause of limitation contained by 
reference in a contract of carriage: la stipulation pour autrui est un contrat par lequel une 
personne appellée stipulant obtient d’une autre appellée commetant un engagement au 
profit d’une troisième appellée tiers bénéficiairs. There is nothing in that definition 
which would forbid the application of the principle contained [in the Civil Code] to the 
benefit stipulated in favour of all the agents of defendant Commerce including defendant 
Stevedoring.”275 Similarly, a Himalaya clause was found to be valid with regard to the 
Roman-Dutch stipulatio alteri, by the Durban Divisional Court of South Africa.276
It would appear therefore that perhaps Professor Tetley, has characterized stipulation 
pour autrui in an overly restrictive manner with respect to Himalaya clauses. 
                                                 
272 Ibid, at p. 60. Tetley had noted however that the second condition has been interpreted by the French 
courts “as entailing nothing more than the stipulator have a moral interest in the stipulation.” (ibid, at p. 60, 
footnote 157).  
273 Ibid, at p. 61.  
274 Miles International Corporation v. Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. (The Federal Schelde) [1978] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 285 (Que. S.C.), at p. 292. 
275 Ibid, at p. 291. The provision of the Quebec Civil Code in force at the time of the judgment (The current 
Civil Code of Quebec was revised in 1994), and relied on by Justice O’Connor, at p. 291, was 1029: “A 
party in like manner may stipulate for the benefit of a third person, when such is the condition of a contract 
which he makes for himself, or of a gift which he makes to another; ans he who makes the stipulation 
cannot revoke it, if the third person [has] signified his assent to it.” 
276 Santam Insurance Co. v. SA Stevedores Ltd. 1989 (1) SA 182 (Div. Durban).  
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Nevertheless, the boundaries of the civilian principle with respect to entities such as 
shipowners and charterers remains to be seen.  
 
6.3. The Visby Protocol, Article IV Bis 1  
 Article IV Bis 1 was adopted by the 1968 Visby Protocol in order to rectify 
certain problems, one of them being the tendency for claimants to attempt to circumvent 
the Rules by bringing an action against other parties, such as the employees of the carrier 
or independent contractors that were hired by the carrier. Article IV bis 1(2) provides that 
if “an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier (such servant or agent not 
being an independent contractor), such servant or agent shall be entitled to avail himself 
of the defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under this 
Convention.” Originally, the article that was suggested was broader in scope. The report 
of the Committee on Bills of Lading Clauses presented at the 1963 CMI Conference in 
Stockholm recommended a draft article with similar wording, although it included 
independent contractors.277 The report noted however that “a minority wishes to put on 
record that they cannot adhere to these provisions as far as independent contractors are 
concerned. In their view a contractor who is independent of the carrier should not, by the 
mere fact that he performs the duties which might have been performed by the carrier 
himself, become entitled to avail himself of the limitations and exceptions in the 
Convention.”278 In the plenary session at the 1963 CMI Conference, the American 
delegation suggested an amendment that excluded independent contractors and following 
debate it was adopted with 15 votes for and 6 abstentions.279 The text of the article as 
                                                 
277 Comite Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Anterpen, Belgium, at p. 596. The text of the draft article reads: “If such an action is 
brought against a servant or agent of the carrier or against an independent contractor employed by him in 
the carriage of goods, such servant, agent or independent contractor shall be entitled to avail himself of the 
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under this Convention.” 
278 Ibid, at p. 598. The report presented that those opposed to the inclusion of independent contractors, felt 
that the servants should be included and protected for social reasons , but that such reasons did not apply to 
independent contractors. (Ibid). In particular, the Greek delegate and the Italian delegate were anxious to 
exclude independent contractors (Ibid, at p. 610 and 612).  
279 Ibid, at p. 630. Those having voted in favour were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Great-
Britain, India, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United States, Yugoslavia.  
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presented to the Diplomatic Conference in Stockholm in 1967, was identical to the one 
finally adopted.280
 
 The provision appears resolve the problem of making the defences and the limits 
of liability available to servants and agents of the carrier. This is all fine and well where 
one finds themselves in a Himalaya inspired situation where the master or deckhand is 
being sued, however, the difficulty arises where others, such as shipowners or charterers, 
who do not enjoy privity of contract are not so easily characterized as servants or agents. 
Scutton has noted that the provision “does not purport to protect the ‘actual carrier’ in 
cases where the carriage is performed by someone other than the party who issued the bill 
of lading.”281 Arguably, it is unfortunate that by excluding independent contractors this 
article has in essence done little to alleviate the problem with respect to shipowners and 
charterers. Nevertheless, as cases such as The Starsin have demonstrated, if there is clear 
wording in the Himalaya clause the benefit will be extended to shipowners, and arguably 
charterers, on the same reasoning.  
 
                                                 
280 Ibid, at p. 631. 
281 Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London.  
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 7. THE MULTIFACETED LONE CARRIER 
 
7.1. Who is the Carrier? A Complex Enquiry 
Who is the carrier? Arguably, this is the darling topic of many a journal article, 
textbook chapter, colloquium and conference. Not without just cause however, as this 
question is one that has plagued claimant’s attorneys and judges alike for the past eighty 
years. The unfortunately narrow interpretation given often to Art. 1(a) of Hague 
necessitates this doctrinal and judicial enquiry, which would otherwise be avoided under 
a more inclusive view of the definition of carrier as demonstrated above. When 
determining who is to be characterized as ‘the carrier’, the two parties who most often are 
found to be the source of litigation in this regard are the time charterer and the shipowner. 
This is where the issue is perhaps most contentious. Nonetheless, there are other parties 
who have been found to be the carrier in certain instances. Frequently the demise 
charterer is found to be the carrier, however, this determination is not terribly surprising 
and is in line with even the most narrow interpretation of the Hague Rules. Where the 
issue becomes more difficult is when considering parties who are performing several of 
the essential functions in the carriage of the goods, such as slot charterers, freight 
forwarders, or vessel managers. Unlike the difficulties with regard to the time charterer 
and the shipowner where the issue is determining which of the two is the carrier, the 
enquiry concerning the other parties often revolves around whether they can be 
considered to be a carrier under the Hague Rules.   
 
 The enquiry is particularly complex and often litigious partly on the basis that 
determining the identity of the carrier is “a question of fact that depends upon the 
documents and circumstances of each case.”282 As discussed below, the courts have 
nevertheless in certain instances set out criteria and guidelines in order to facilitate the 
                                                 
282 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 386. See also Canficorp (Overseas Projects) Ltd. v. Cormorant Bulk-
Carriers (1984) A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 32028 (Fed. C.A. Can.), where the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal 
at para 37 noted that “the question of whether a given party is not is not a carrier within the meaning of the 
Rules so as to attract liability for damages sustained to the cargo is a question of fact depending upon the 
documents in each case.”  
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enquiry. This is particularly the case in instances involving a choice between a shipowner 
and a time charterer, as well as in situations involving freight forwarders.  
 
7.2. Shipowner vs. Time Charterer 
 Generally, the issue of ‘who is the carrier’ tends to arise most frequently when a 
time charterer has issued bills of lading. The inquiry is therefore whether the shipowner is 
the ‘carrier’ or whether the time charterer fills that role under the Hague and Hague-
Visby Rules. The law in this area is unnecessarily complex given that as demonstrated 
above, both of these parties share what are the core duties of the carrier under uniform 
law. Nevertheless, various tests, doctrines, and legal principles are employed by the 
courts in the quest for allocating the ‘carrier’ label to one of the two parties. The 
unfortunate result of this process however is the determination that once either the 
shipowner or the charterer is labeled the ‘carrier’, the remaining entity is therefore not a 
party to the carriage contract. With regard to the aims of the Hague Rules as discussed 
above, this polarized view is perhaps at its worst when the shipowner is viewed not to be 
the carrier. Recalling that the Rules had at their core the aim to regulate shipowner and 
cargo owner relationships and provide an equitable bargain with respect to duties and 
liabilities. It therefore does violence to the Rules to then hold in many instances that they 
do not govern the shipowner. This is particularly true where the shipowner escapes all 
responsibility.283 It is this eventuality that is one of the undesirable results of a single 
carrier characterization of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. A non- pluralistic view of 
the term carrier, thus necessitates the creation of judicial tests to determine whether to 
assign carrier status to the shipowner or the time charterer.  
 
                                                 
283 Arguably, it is equally unjust that a plaintiff may circumvent the Rules to render a shipowner fully liable 
for all losses, contrary to their expectation under contract. This polarized view and its unfortunate 
consequences are exemplified in an Australian decision where it was held that the time charterer was the 
‘carrier’ under the bill of lading, and thus the shipowner was not a party to the bill of lading contract. 
(Garsden v. Australian Coastal Shipping Commission [1977] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 575 (N.S.W. C.A.)). The court 
of first instance had found that the shipowner, as a bailee of the goods, was unable to benefit from the one 
year time limitation in Art. III(6), and on appeal Moffitt J. opined that the definition of ‘carrier’ in the 
Rules “makes it clear that the owner is brought with the Rules and, in particular, Article III dealing with 
responsibilities and liabilities, only when he is a party to the relevant contract, that is he enters into a 
contract of carriage covered by a bill of lading or a similar document of title. The Rules, and hence the 
discharge of liability provided in Rule 6 of Article III, do not extend to a liability which is not under a 
contract of carriage.” (Ibid, at p. 579).  
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 By way of introduction, a brief explanation of what the term “time charterer” 
encompasses is perhaps desirable. As the term implies, a time charterer is an individual or 
entity that has contracted to hire a vessel for a designated period of time.284 Perhaps the 
reason why the time charterer and shipowner arrangement has resulted in complications 
and difficulties with regard to ‘who is the carrier’ is the nature and division of the 
responsibilities for carriage under the time charterparty contract.285 The essence of the 
arrangement is such that the time charterer has the vessel and the master and crew placed 
at his disposal for his use and employment, yet the master and crew remain the servants 
of the owner.286 The owner therefore is responsible for “the nautical operation and 
maintenance of the vessel and the supervision of the cargo – at least from a seaworthiness 
point of view. Within the framework of the contract, however, the charterer decides the 
voyages to be made and the cargoes to be carried.”287 It is this division of responsibility 
that in many instances has given rise to confusion. One author characterizes this 
relationship as “a joint venture between the owners and the charterers, because they share 
the responsibilities of a carrier under the Hague/Visby Rules.”288 It is this sharing of 
responsibilities that has led to a grey area with respect to the assignment of liability for 
cargo claims, leading one commentator to describe this process in a less than definite 
manner; “The liability for the cargo may be determined in different ways and may rest 
with the owner or with the charterer or may be divided between them in one way or 
another.”289
 
 The enquiry as to whether the carrier is the shipowner or time charterer, or 
whether the bills are charterer’s bills or the shipowner’s bills, is one that has consumed a 
                                                 
284 For further discussion and a concise description concerning the of the nature of a time charterparty see 
Hill, C. Maritime Law 4th Ed. (1995) Lloyd’s of London Press, London, at p. 186. For an indepth  and 
complete examination of the subject see generally Wilford, M et al. Time Charters (2003) LLP, London.  
285 For an example of a time charterparty see the New York Produce Exchange form issued by the 
Association of Ship brokers and Agents USA Inc., or NYPE form, with the most recent version being the 
NYPE 1993, which is arguably the most frequently used time charterparty. For further examples see 
Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and Chartering Practice 4th Ed. (1995) LLP, London, at appendix II for the 
BIMCO LINERTIME charterparty, appendix IV for the NYPE 1993 charterparty, and appendix V for the 
SHELLTIME 4 charterparty, 1984.  
286 See Hill, C. Maritime Law 4th Ed. (1995) Lloyd’s of London Press, London, at p. 186.  
287 Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and Chartering Practice 4th Ed. (1995) LLP, London, at p. 90.  
288 Tetley, W. “Case Note: The Starsin” (2004) 35 JMLC 121, at p. 123.  
289 Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and Chartering Practice 4th Ed. (1995) LLP, London, at p. 92.  
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fair amount of effort and energy in most jurisdictions. Perhaps nowhere is this more the 
case then in the United Kingdom. Justice Colman remarked in The Starsin that “it would 
strike one unfamiliar with maritime law as quite extraordinary that there should have 
grown up such an immense body of decided cases devoted to the issue whether owners or 
time charterers are parties to the bills of lading contracts.”290 The question as to whether 
a bill of lading is an owner’s bill or a charterer’s bill is one of construction of the bill of 
lading.291 Generally, one of the most telling elements tends to be the signature. There is a 
long line of established authority reaching back to the mid-nineteenth century that where 
the master has signed the bill of lading, despite the fact that the ship is chartered, the bill 
is an owner’s bill and the shipowner is liable.292 Where the bill of lading is signed “for 
the master” by an agent, the owners will also be held to be the contracting parties.293 The 
general rule with respect to signatures and charterer’s bills as laid down in The Rewia, 
after synthesizing the authorities is: “a bill of lading signed for the master cannot be a 
charterer’s bill unless the contract was made with the charterers alone, and the person 
signing has authority to sign and does sign, on behalf of the charterers and not the 
owners.”294 Therefore the issue of who is the carrier will often depend on by whose 
                                                 
290 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 85 (Q.B.), at p. 89. 
This is also seen by referring to Carver, where 16 pages are devoted to the topic of deciphering whether a 
bill is an owner’s bill or a charterer’s bill. (Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, at pp. 123-139).  
291 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at pp. 127; The 
Venezuela [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 393 (Q.B.), at p. 395; The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 185 (Q.B.), at 
p. 187.  See the M.B. Pyramid Sound v. Briese Schiffahrts (The Ines) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 144 (Q.B.), at 
p. 149, where Clark opined: “in order to ascertain who the true contracting parties were  it is necessary to 
examine the whole document and indeed to consider the whole context in which it came into existence.”  
292 See Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at pp. 129-
130 discussing decisions from the 19th and 20th century on that point. See also Cooke, J. et al. Voyage 
Charters (1993) LLP, London, at p. 713, stating “generally, the shipowner is to be identified as “the 
carrier” under a bill of lading signed by or on behalf of the master.”  
293 Cooke, J. et al. Voyage Charters (1993) LLP, London, at p. 382-383. Nevertheless this is not always the 
case, see Namchow Chemical v. Botany Bay Shipping [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 523 (C.A.), at p. 529 “the 
presence of the words “For master” is, I would think, no more than a historical vestige, alike with the 
opening words of the testatum clause. I think that the words “for the master” were not struck out because 
the [charterer’s] employee who signed probably thought it quite unnecessary to do so. In the circumstances 
I have mentioned I do not accord it any greater significance.” 
294 The Rewia [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 325 (C.A.), at p. 336. However, see also The Venezuela [1980] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 393 (Q.B.), at p. 396 where an identity of carrier clause indicating the time charterer as the 
carrier was held to be sufficient to render the time charterer liable as ‘the carrier’ under the terms of the bill 
of lading despite the fact that the bill of lading had been signed under the words “on behalf of the master”. 
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authority the bill was signed.295  In The Knutsford, the House of Lords resorted to the 
time charterparty to determine if authority existed, and found that it did thus binding the 
owners where the time charterers signed the bill.296 Construction of the terms of the bill 
of lading will also play a part as in The Hector, where although the time charterers were 
authorized to sign bills of lading on behalf of the shipowner, Rix J. found the bills to be 
charterers’s bills given the fact that the face of the bill had the time charterer listed as 
“carrier”.297 The House of Lords decision in The Starsin, as discussed previously, has 
added a new dimension to the enquiry as to whether the bills are charterer’s bill or 
owner’s bills.298 Despite certain authorities,299 where the bill of lading is on the 
charterer’s form and signed by the charterer as ‘the carrier’ then the bill is a charterer’s 
bill despite the demise clause and identity of carrier clause in the back of the bill.300 The 
construction of the bills will now be subject to an analysis intended to reflect what the 
                                                 
295 See Pritchett, R. “Charterer’s Authority to Sign Bills of Lading under Standard Time Charter Terms” 
[1980] LMCLQ 21, at p. 21. See also M.B. Pyramid Sound v. Briese Schiffahrts (The Ines) [1995] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 144 (Q.B.), at p. 149, after examining the charterparty, Baltime, Clause 9 indicated that “the 
charterers to indemnify the owners against all consequences or liabilities arising from the master, officers 
or Agents signing bills of lading.” Clark J. then held “it is in my judgment implicit in that clause that the 
charteres or their agents had authority to sign bills of lading on behalf of the owners,” and thus the bills to 
be owners bills. For a similar result see The Berkshire [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 185 (Q.B.), at p. 188-189, 
although in this instance authority was found in clause 8 of NYPE.  
296 S.S. Knutsford v. Tillmanns & Co. [1908] A.C. 406 (H.L.), at p. 191. See The Ines, ibid. See also NGO 
Chew Hong Edible Oil v. Scindia Steam Navigation (The Jalamohan) [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 443 (Q.B.), at 
p. 451 holding that by virtue of the NYPE time charterparty the owners had expressely authorized the 
issuing of bills of lading on their behalf and thus the bills were owners bills.  See also W.R. Fletcher v. 
Sigurd Haavik Aksjeselskap (The Vikfrost) [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 560 (C.A.), at p. 567, where the authority 
given by the owners  in the time charter extended not only to the charterer but to the subsequent sub-
charterer. Coversely, for a different approach see the Australian decision of Andersons (Pacific) Trading v. 
Karlander New Guinea Line [1980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 870 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W.), where it was found that the time 
charterer was signing on the authority of the shipowner and as agent of the shipowner, but the court at p. 
875-876 held that in the absence of disclosure on the face of the bill of lading of the existence of the 
charterer’s principal, the charterer was liable.   
297 Sunrise Maritime v. Uvisco Ltd. (The Hector) [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 287 (Q.B.). at p. 293, where Rix J. 
continued: “of course, even questions of construction must be set in their factual matrix: but that is usually 
limited to matter which are either known or ought to be known to both parties to the contract.” For further 
discussion on the judgment and it’s implications with regard to identity of carrier see Waldron, A. 
“Owner’s or Charterer’s Bill of Lading? The Mystery Deepens” [1999] LMCLQ 1.  
298 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.). 
299 Fetim B.V. v. Oceanspeed (The Flecha) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 612 (Q.B.), at p. 618-619, where the bills 
were held to be owner’s bills despite similar fact to The Starsin, on the basis that the time charterer did not 
go far enough to make it clear that the parties intended that the time charterer would be contracting in place 
of the owner. 
300 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.), at pp. 579, 
584, 590, 597, and 615.  
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“reasonable expectations of businessmen” would be.301 Finally, certain authors have 
provided guidelines to aid in the enquiry.302 Canadian law with respect to whether the 
time charterer or the shipowner is the carrier is in essence very similar to the English 
approach,303 and the same can be said for the law of Singapore.304
 
In the United States, despite the tendency in many instances to hold the 
shipowners and charterers jointly and severally liable, there are still certain Circuits that 
require privity of contract, and therefore one must still determine who is the contractual 
carrier. One commentator, however, has noted that “identifying the proper defendant is 
somewhat more difficult, but even this issue is less of a concern for United States courts 
than it is for many forum courts. The combination of less formal legal approaches in this 
country…ensure that this issue is rarely dispositive.”305 Nevertheless, there are guidelines 
for determining whether the shipowner or the charterer is the contractual carrier. In Otto 
                                                 
301 Ibid, at p. 577.  
302 Hill, C. Maritime Law 4th Ed. (1995) Lloyd’s of London Press, London, at pp. 207-208 provides: “(1) If 
the bill of lading is signed by the master personally or it is signed on his behalf by the charterer or his 
agent,then the contract of carriage evidenced by (or eventually contained in) the bill of lading would be 
likely considered on with the registered shipowner…(2) In those rare circumstances where the time 
charterer has signed the bill in his own name and where the intention appears to have been that he was 
signing on his own behalf with no indication that he was signing for the master or as agent for the owner, 
then he, the charterer will be considered the carrier. (3) A clue as to the carrier’s identity may be found in 
the charterparty itself by way of some provisions pointing to the true intended identity provided that such a 
provision is incorporated into the bill of lading itself, thus giving the shipper and/or third-party holder of 
the bill constructive notice of that information.” See also Cooke, J. et al. Voyage Charters (1993) LLP, 
London, at pp. 381-382, summarizing the authorities into four steps. Although it should be noted that step 4 
concerning when bills are charterer’s bills should be viewed with suspicion in light of the judgment by the 
House of Lords in The Starsin. 
303 Although, with the exception of Canada’s brief foray into joint and several liability as discussed above 
in section 4. Otherwise, in Aris Steamship Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals (1980) 110 D.L.R. (3d) 1 
(S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada held that where the ship’s captain signs the bill of lading, the 
captain therefore contracts on behalf of the owner and not the time charterer. The Supreme Court of Canada 
opined in Paterson Steamships Ltd. v. Aluminum Co. [1952] 1 D.L.R. 241 (S.C.C.), at p. 256: “where the 
charterparty does not amount to a demise of the ship and possession remains with the owner, the contract is 
made not with the charterer but with the owner.” See Apex (Trinidad) Oilfields v. Lunham & Moore 
Shipping (The Wynchwood) [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 203 (Exch. C. Can.), where the master signed as agent 
of the shipowners, thus the plaintiff’s action failed as the time charterer’s were not the carrier and thus not 
party to the action.  
304 The Arktis Sky [2000] 1 SLR 57 (H.C. Singapore), where the High Court relied on the seminal English 
judgments of The Berkshire and The Ines, when deciding where the shipowner had privity of contract by 
virtue of the vessel being on time charter. The High Court found that at p. 72, as the bill was stamped by 
the time charterer’s as “agents only”, and at p. 78, that the master’s signature bound the shipowner , thus 
holding, at p. 79, that the shipowner and not the time charterer was the carrier. 
305 Sturley, M. “An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case” (1997) 21 Tul. 
Mar. L.J. 263, at p. 268.  
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Wolf the court outlined factors providing guidance in determining whether a vessel owner 
was the carrier: “1) Who advertised the service? 2) Who booked the cargo or, if the cargo 
was booked through an agent, on whose behalf did the agent act? 3) If the cargo was not 
delivered directly to the vessel, on whose behalf was the cargo received and stored prior 
to loading? 4) Who hired the loading stevedores? 5) Whose name appears on the heading 
of the bill of lading? 6) On whose behalf was the bill of lading signed? 7) Who ultimately 
received from the shipper the remuneration for the transportation services? 8) Who 
selected the vessel which performed the carriage? 9) Who issued the notice of arrival or 
on whose behalf was the notice of arrival issued? 10) Who hired the discharging 
stevedores? 11) Who hired the clerks to tally the cargo off the ship? 12) If the cargo was 
not delivered directly from the vessel to the consignee, who stored the cargo or on whose 
behalf was it stored following discharge and pending delivery? 13) Who hired the clerks 
who delivered the cargo to the consignee and who issued the delivery receipts…The two 
most important factors are the name on the heading of the bill of lading and the signature 
on the bill of lading.”306 The signature will often be deciding.307 Judge Learned Hand in 
The Poznan, in considering the liability of a shipowner and the charterer where the bills 
were issued by the charterer, opined: “Clearly the [charterer] is liable for all bills of 
lading signed by it. It is liable besides on those signed by the master, since they were 
signed with its consent and in its name, and since it had no right to compel him to sign for 
the owners.”308 The issue in the American courts tends to center around whether the 
charterer signed or issued the bill with or without authority from the owners.309 Notably, 
                                                 
306 Otto Wolf Handelsgesellschaft v. Sheridan Transportation Co., 800 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Vir. 1992), at p. 
1362. In this instance, the court found that there was no privity between the cargo claimant and the 
shipwoner, and thus the shipowners motion for summary judgment was granted and the claimant’s action 
was dismissed (ibid, 1366-1367). See also D B Trade International v. Astramar CIA Argentina, 1988 WL 
139329 (N.D. Ill. 1988), at para 2, finding that determining liability as a carrier involves the documents 
between the parties and dealings between the parties. 
307 United Nations Children’s Fund v. S/S Nordstern, 251 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), where is was held 
at p. 838 that the charterer was liable as they signed the bills in their own name, and on behalf of the 
charterer; Centennial Insurance Co. v. M/V Constellation Enterprise, 639 F. Supp 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), at 
p. 1265.  
308 The Poznan, 276 F. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), at p. 432.  
309 Dempsey & Associates v. S.S. Sea Star, 1970 AMC 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), at p. 191, where the court 
found that where shipowner did not authorize the time charterer to issue bills of lading on the master’s 
behalf, the shipowner is not liable for cargo damage; Union Steel America v. M/V Sanko Spruce, 1999 
AMC 344 (D. N.J. 1998), at p. 347; Ingersoll Milling v. M/V Bodena, 619 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), at 
p. 504, holding the time charterer but not the shipowner liable as “the master accepted the bills of lading as 
presented. He did not authorize or require that they be issued under his authority. I see no connection 
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the signature “for the master” is not given as much weight in American law as it is in 
English law.310 As discussed above, demise and identity clauses generally will not be 
used to identify the shipowner or the time charterer as ‘the carrier’.311
 
 The French have a different approach to the British and the Americans with 
regard to establishing who is the carrier given carriage involving a shipowner and a time 
charterer.  The master’s signature is seen to bind the charterer more often than the owner 
as “[g]enerally, the master is considered to be acting for the person who is in charge of 
the commercial management of the vessel. In the case of a time charterer, that person is 
the charterer.”312 An example of this is found in The Antares, where the Cour d’Appel de 
Rennes found that the charterer had taken control of the commercial aspects of the vessel, 
therefore the captain now signs the bills for him and no longer represents the owner.313 
Nevertheless, the Cour de Cassation has found that in the instance where the bill does not 
mention the name of the owner or the name of the charterer, the claimant has a right of 
action against the owner of the vessel despite the fact that the bill indicates that the vessel 
is under charter.314 The Cour de Cassation has held again recently that where the time 
charterer is not identified on the bill of lading, the shipowner is liable.315 In commentary 
                                                                                                                                                 
whatsoever between [the shipowner] and the plaintiff.”; Glynwed Steels v. Great Lakes and European 
Lines, 1979 AMC 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1978), at p. 1291, holding the time charterers liable for having issued the 
bills; Yeramex International v. S.S. Tendo, 1979 AMC 1283 (4 Cir. 1979), at pp. 1288-1289; Thyssen Steel 
Co. v. S.S. Adonis, 364 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), at p. 1355; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. M/V 
Vigsnes, 1985 WL 6414 (N.D. Fla. 1985), at para 3.  
310 Yeramex International v. S.S. Tendo, 1979 AMC 1283 (4 Cir. 1979), finding the bills were charterer’s 
bills despite signature “for the master”. The Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit opined that the caption ‘for 
the master’ “has ambiguous meaning in modern-day commerce.”(Ibid, at p. 1289). See also Mente & Co. v. 
Isthmian (The Quarrington Court), 36 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), at p. 283, disregarding the signature 
“as agents for the master”. 
311 See section 5.2 supra. See also Union Steel America v. M/V Sanko Spruce, 1999 AMC 344 (D. N.J. 
1998), where the time charterer was held to be the carrier despite a demise clause.  
312 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 389. 
313 Cour d’Appel de Rennes, January 30, 1986, DMF 1987, 586, at p. 586.  
314 Cour de Cassation, July 21, 1987 (The Vomar), DMF 1987, 573, at p. 573-574. The Cour d’Appel had 
also found in The Volmar, that the shipowner was responsible. See Cour d’Appel Aix-en-Provence, 
October 22, 1985, DMF 1987, 155. 
315 Cour de Cassation, January 22, 2002 (The Jian Ge Hai), DMF 2002, 937. See also Cour d’Appel de 
Rennes, June 15, 1988, DMF 1989, 444, holding that where the bill had no en-tete, no mention of who the 
carrier is, no reference to a charterparty, and simply the signature of the master under the name of the 
vessel, the shipowner is responsible for the damage to the goods. See also Cour d’Appel de Rouen, May 11, 
1984, DMF 1985, 162, where on similar fact that shipowner was the “transporteur apparent” on the basis 
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following the decision, Corbier noted that “cette affaire illustre aussi les difficultés du 
transporteur maritime à s’exonérer de la présumption de responsabilité qui pèse sur 
lui.”316 Simon has noted that French courts will examine the bill of lading and find: “s’il 
est sans en-tete, l’armateur propriétaire du navire désigné sur ce document est declare 
transporteur; si au contraire il est émis à l’en-tete de l’affréteur ou de toute autre 
personne, c’est ce dernier qui se voit attribuer cette qualité et, par voie de consequence, 
ce n’est plus l’armateur.”317 Although, this is not always the case.318 Similarly in 
Belguim, “lorsque le conaissement ne comporte pas d’indication concernant le 
transporteur maritime, il doit etre considéré comme signé uniquement pour le compte du 
propriétaire.”319
 
7.3. Demise Charterer and Bareboat Charterer 
 The characterization of a demise charterer or bareboat charterer as ‘the carrier’ is 
not a terribly problematic exercise and therefore has not given rise to the same dilemmas 
that arise with regard to time charterers. In this nature of chartering arrangement the 
“[b]areboat charter [or] demise charter means that the vessel is put at the disposal of the 
chaterer for a certain period of time, but here the charterer takes over virtually the entire 
responsibility for the operation of the vessel and all the costs and expenses except the 
capital costs.”320 Given that both the demise and the bareboat charterers control the 
master and crew,321 it has been noted that if a vessel is chartered by demise or bareboat, 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the master signed, the bill had no en-tete, the bill referred to a charterparty but it was unattached and 
the content was unknown. 
316 Ibid, at p. 940. See also Remond-Gouilloud, M. Droit Maritime, 2nd Ed. (1993) Ed. A. Perdone, Paris, 
at p. 348-349, noting that the in situations where there is no en-tete the shipowner, or “transporteur 
apparent”, is therefore liable. For the same holding see also Cour d'Appel de Rouen, April 25, 1996 (The 
Panagiotis), DMF 1998, 268. 
317 Simon, P. “Qui est le transporteur maritime?”, DMF 1995, 26, at p. 26.  
318 The Cour de Rennes in The Julia found there where the bill of lading had no l’en tete but none of the 
documents mentioned the armateur then il n’avait pas la qualité de transporteur. The decision has been 
criticized by Tassel, Y. "Le connaissement sans en-tête" DMF 1987, 547, at p. 553, and by Achard, R. 
"L'action directe des porteurs de connaissements contre le propriétaire du navire dans l'affrètement à 
temps" DMF 1984, 259, who at p. 260 refers the way in which the armateur Cypriote was able to escape all 
responsibility for wetted cargo as generally a fraude. 
319 Delwaide, L. "Chronique de droit maritime belge II" DMF 1989, 734, at p. 756.  
320 Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and Chartering Practice 4th Ed. (1995) LLP, London, at p. 85.  
321 There is not a great distinction between a bareboat charterer and a demise charterer. The former hires the 
master and crew, while the later only controls them. In BARECON 89, which is the 1989 BIMCO bareboat 
charter, Clause 9, entitled “Maintenance and Operation”, part (b) stipulates: “The Charterers shall at their 
own expense and by their own procurement man, victual, navigate, operate, supply, fuel and repair the 
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the charterer “generally replaces the shipowner.”322 Not only is this the case in practice 
but with respect to the legal characterization of the charterer as well. “It has long been 
recognized that in the case of a bareboat charter, bills of lading bind the charterers and 
not the owners.”323 The rationale given is that the master of the vessel is the agent of the 
charterer, and thus when signing the bill of lading binds the charterer.324 Arguably 
though, through the control of essentially every aspect of the vessel, the charterer is 
acting as owner. The House of Lords, over a century ago, determined that the owner was 
not liable to a cargo claimant where the vessel was under a demise charter.325 Lord 
Herschell first enquired, “[w]as it a “demise” of the ship, or if not strictly speaking a 
demise was it an agreement which put the vessel altogether out of the power and control 
of the owner, and vested that power and control in the charterer, so that during the time 
that this hiring lasted she must be regarded as the vessel of the charterers, and not as the 
vessel of the owner?”326 Having answered in the affirmative, Lord Herschell then opined; 
“[i]n the present case the right of the plaintiff to complain of the loss of their goods by 
reason of the facts alleged, may be regarded as arising as a matter of contract out  of the 
bills of lading that were signed [and therefore] seems to me impossible to contend that 
these were contracts made either with the master of the agents on behalf of the defendant 
[shipowner].”327 This is now well established.328 Generally, viewing the bareboat or 
                                                                                                                                                 
Vessel whenever required during the Charter period and they shall pay all charges and expenses of any kind 
and nature whatsoever incidental to their use and operation of the Vessel under this Charter, including any 
foreign general municipality and/or state taxes. The Master, officers and crew of the Vessel shall be the 
servants of the Charterers for all purposes whatsoever, even if for any reason appointed by the owner.” 
(BARECON 89 can be found as the appendix in Davis, M. Bareboat Charters (2000) LLP, London). [FILL 
IN TETLEY DIFF BWT BARE BOAT AND DEMISE/ HARE 
322 Tetley, W. “Chapter 10: Whom to Sue” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 13. Available online at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime.  
323 Davis, M. Bareboat Charters (2000) LLP, London, at p. 99. 
324 Tetley, W. “Chapter 10: Whom to Sue” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 14, stating “[t]he demise 
charterer replaces the shipowner as carrier, and this is confirmed by the signing of the bills of lading by the 
master or his authorized agent, who does so as the agent of the demise charterer.” See Travelers Indemnity 
Co. v. S.S. Polarland, 1976 AMC 1878 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where there was a bareboat charter and thus at p. 
1886, the court found that the owner “entered into no relationship, contractual or otherwise, with Nimpex, 
the shipper.” 
325 The Baumwoll Manufactur von Carl Scheibler v. Christopher Furness [1893] A.C. 8 (H.L.). 
326 Ibid, at p. 14.  
327 Ibid, at p. 16. See also p. 21, per Lord Watson, concurring with Lord Herschell.  
328 Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law: Practitioner’s Ed. (1987) West Publishing, Minn, at p. 
311 states “if the factual context is demise, with the complete relinquishment of the possession, command, 
and navigation of a ship to the demise charterer, the later will be held to be a COGSA carrier.” See The 
Guiseppe di Vittorio [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 136 (C.A.), holding a demise charterer liable, and at p. 159 
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demise charterer as the carrier is an appropriate characterization given that demise 
charterers for all intents and purposes are responsible for every aspect of carriage as ‘the 
carrier’ in the eyes of third parties. 
 
 Where bareboat and demise charterparties have arisen as an issue with respect to 
who is the carrier, is in the unfortunate instance where cargo claimants have instituted 
suit against the owners of the vessel unaware of the existence of a charterparty, only 
becoming aware after the expiration of the limitation period. Interestingly enough, the 
English courts in two instances, have manipulated the facts or employed legal gymnastics 
in order to protect the claimant where arguably it would not have been necessary. 
Characterizing the shipowner and the charter to be carriers, would have provided an 
equitable solution to the dilemma for all parties, thus allowing the claimants to recover 
from the shipowners, who would have then recovered from the demise charterers. It must 
be recalled that the charterparty between the shipowner and the charter provides a clear 
right of indemnity, not subject to the one-year time limitation, and therefore the proper 
party would have born the loss.329 Nevertheless, the courts adopted an infinitely more 
complex approach. In The Puerto Acevedo, at first instance it had been held that the 
bareboat charterers could not be joined given the expiry of the time limitation, however 
the Court of Appeal allowed the joinder.330 Lord Denning reasoned that “[i]f justice 
requires it, the additional defendant can be joined, even though it means depriving him of 
the time bar under the Hague Rules…In this case the cargo-owners believed all the time, 
quite honestly and reasonably, that the shipowners were the people responsible and were 
accepting responsibility. It would be most unjust that, after the year had expired, the P. 
                                                                                                                                                 
opining: “Blasco was, or was in a situation equivalent to that of a demise charterer…Blasco is, to all intents 
and purposes, the practical “owner” of the vessel.” See Dibiase v. United States, 711 F.Supp. 648 (D.C. 
Maine 1989), holding that a demise charterer is to be treated as owner for most purposes including liability 
for unseaworthiness. 
329 Clause 21, entitled “Bills of Lading”, of BARECON 89 reads: “The Charterers are to procure that all 
Bills of Lading issued for carriage of goods under this Charter shall contain a Paramount Clause 
incorporating any legislation relating to the Carrier’s liability for cargo compulsorily applicable in the 
trade; if no such legislation exists, the Bills of Lading shall incorporate  the British Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act. The Bills of Lading shall also contain the amended New Jason Clause and the Both-to-Blame 
Collision Clause. The Charterers agree to indemnify the Owners against all consequences or liabilities 
arising from the Master, officers or agents signing Bills of Lading or other documents.” 
330 Marubeni Corporation and Marubeni American Corporation v. Pearlstone Shipping Corporation (The 
Puerto Acevedo) [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 38 (C.A.).  
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and I. Club  (who covered both shipowners and demise charterers) should escape. It is 
plain to me that leave should be given to add the demise charterers as defendants.”331 The 
legal ground relied on was a wide judicial discretion to add defendants,332 which 
arguably when faced with a statutory time bar is not the strongest legal grounding. In The 
Stolt Loyalty, the Court of Appeal faced a similar situation in that the defendant bareboat 
charterer objected to the writ on the basis that it was time barred.333 In this instance, the 
solicitors for cargo had sent a telex stating “please confirm by return that owners grant 
[time extension] as requested” and Gard U.K., the P&I Club for both the shipowner and 
the charterer, had replied by telex “we have received authority to grant you an extension 
on behalf of the Shipowners”.334 The charterers argued that the extension was only 
granted to the owners, yet the Court of Appeal determined that the term “owner” in the 
telexes meant the charterer, despite what is arguably very clear wording. Lord Justice 
Hoffman reasoned “[i]t seems to me that a word like “owner” does not have a very fixed 
and absolute meaning. It can vary according to its context. It can of course mean the 
registered owner, but in the context of a bill of lading it can also mean the party which 
has the liabilities of the shipowner under the contract of affreightment…It seems to me 
that the use of the word “owner” in that telex meant, and was understood to mean, the 
company which was the owner for the purposes of the bill of lading...the bareboat 
charterers.”335 It is interesting therefore that the narrow interpretation of a flexible term 
such as ‘carrier’ has required an interpretation of the term ‘owner’ that arguably does 
violence to its fairly standard meaning.  
  
7.4. Voyage Charterer 
                                                 
331 Ibid, at p. 40-41.  
332 Ibid, at p. 40, per Lord Denning. As well, at p. 41, per Lord Justice Bridge: “we have jurisdiction to 
make such an order. It may be a jurisdiction which will rarely be exercised…”. As well it should be noted 
that it was an unopposed ex parte application, leaving Lord Justice Bridge at p. 41 to comment that “of 
course the second defendants, as they now become, will have the opportunity if so minded to apply to have 
our order set aside.”  
333 The Stolt Loyalty [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 598 (C.A.). 
334 Ibid, at pp. 600-601.  
335 Ibid, at p. 601. See K. Lokumal & Sons v. Lotte Shipping (The August Leonhardt) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
28 (C.A.), for a contrary result where similar facts arose but in the instance of a time charterer and an 
owner, and the Court of Appeal at p. 35 allowed the owner’s defence of a time bar. See also Kenya 
Railways v, Antares Co. (The Antares) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 424 (C.A.), again involving a time charterer 
and an owner, where the Court of Appeal found that the claim against the owner was time barred.  
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 A voyage charter is a contract “under which a vessel is to load at one or more 
named ports (or identified berth within a port) a particular specified cargo to be carried to 
a named discharging port or ports. The shipowner’s remuneration for performing his 
obligations under the charterparty is known as freight.”336 The majority of the time 
liabilities that arise are with respect to the voyage charterer as plaintiff against the 
shipowner or time charterer, or where the voyage charterer is not the plaintiff, claims are 
simply channeled to time charterers or shipowners.337 Where there is a tendency for the 
voyage charterer to become a carrier, is where he is liable jointly and severally along with 
other ‘carriers’.338 This has been the case where the voyage charterer has issued a bill of 
lading,339 as well as where the voyage charterer is not responsible for issuing bills of 
lading.340 The factual situation that tends to give rise to a voyage charterer as a defendant 
in a cargo claim, is where party X has sold goods to party Y, and party X ships the goods 
to party Y by chartering a vessel under a voyage charterparty. Party X is therefore the 
‘shipper’ as listed in the bills of lading as well as the voyage charterer. This has been the 
situation in several cases that have concluded that the voyage charterer was ‘a carrier’.341 
                                                 
336 Hill, C. Maritime Law 4th Ed. (1995) Lloyd’s of London Press, London, at p. 221.  
337 See Bauer, G. “Responsibilities of Owner and Charterer to Third Parties – Consequences under Time 
and Voyage Charterers” (1975) 49 Tul. L.R. 995, at pp. 1010-1012. See Office of Supply Government of the 
Republic Korea v. M/V Naftoporos, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15671 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), Gagliardi J., at lexis p. 
15, found that where the voyage charterer had simply nominated an agent for the owners who then signed 
the bill of lading as agent for the master, the voyage charterer was not a carrier. The shipowner was the 
carrier, and the voyage charterer “simply exercised its right under the voyage charter to nominate the ship’s 
agent at the loading port.” (Ibid).  
338 See Tribunal de commerce de Paris, December 21, 1977, DMF 1978, 501, finding the voyage charterer 
jointly and severally liable with the time charterer. See also discussion section 4, supra. Note though, even 
where there is a tendency to hold shipowners and charterers jointly and severally liable, the voyage 
charterer may not be amoung them. See Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. The M/V Gloria, 767 F.2d 229 
(5 Cir. 1985), at p. 235, where the 5th Circuit court of Appeal found that the shipowner and the time 
charterer were carriers under COGSA but that the voyage charterer was not a carrier under COGSA as he 
“did not enter into a contract of carriage defined by the Act and thus was not a carrier.” For a discussion on 
the difference between the definition of ‘carrier’ in the 5th Circuit and the 2nd Circuit of the U.S. see section 
4 supra.  
339 Tribunal de commerce de Paris, ibid, where the voyage charterer had issued the bill of lading.   
340 Joo Seng Hong Kong v. S.S. Unibulkfir, 483 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where despite the fact that the 
voyage charterer did not issue bills of lading, he was held to be a carrier under COGSA.  
341 Thyssen Steel Caribbean v. Palma Armadora, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15926 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), where the 
plaintiff had purchased steel rods, from a company who then voyage chartered a vessel. The voyage 
charterer, one of several defendants argued that although the charter was in his name, he was also the 
‘shipper’ and therefore could not have entered into ‘a contract of carriage with the shipper’ as well he did 
not sign the bills of lading (Ibid, at lexis p. 16). Sweet D.J. dismissed those arguments on the basis that to 
be considered a carrier one does not need to sign the bills of lading, in this district. Joo Seng Hong Kong v. 
S.S. Unibulkfir, 483 F. Supp. 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), had similar facts where the voyage charterer and the 
party to whom the bill of lading was issued and named as ‘shipper’ were the same entity. The court 
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As well, liability on the part of the voyage charterer will also tend to arise where the 
voyage charterer assumes responsibility for loading, stowing and discharge.342 As with 
time charters and shipowners, whether the bills are voyage charterer’s bills or the 
shipowner’s bills is a matter of construction.343 The Court of Appeal of Australia found 
that by virtue of the construction of the bills of lading and the voyage charterparty, that 
the voyage charterer was the carrier: “in my opinion the construction which the 
documents and the surrounding circumstances yield is that the defendant intended to 
issue the bills on its own account as carrier.”344
 
7.5. Slot Charterer 
 It has been noted that “the growth of vessel sharing arrangements in the liner 
industry has been nothing short of explosive.”345 Vessel sharing arrangements are 
implemented by slot charterparties. According to Hill, the term “slot charterparty” has 
“reference to the carriage of containers, or to use current jargon, TEUs (20-foot 
equivalents). The shipowner or operator ‘rents out’ or hires a ‘piece’ of space (a 
percentage of the total space available on vessel) for carrying TEUs in return for which 
he receives hire calculated in accordance with the number of slots (accommodation for 
each TEU) payable whether or not those slots or spaces are actually used.”346 In practice, 
slot charters are employed where “two or more operators, usually of similarly size vessel 
in a particular geographic trade, will agree to share space on one another’s 
vessels…Space is utilized more efficiently and operating costs are reduced while service 
is expanded.”347 Each operator books cargo under its own name and furnishes, stuffs, 
lashes, loads and discharges its own containers.348 Despite what would ordinarily be a 
potentially complex arrangement given that bareboat and time charterers may also enter 
                                                                                                                                                 
determined that “it is clear that Cook, as a voyage charterer, is a carrier subject to suit under COGSA on the 
bills of lading now held by the plaintiff.” (Ibid, at p. 47).  
342 See Bauer, G. “Responsibilities of Owner and Charterer to Third Parties – Consequences under Time 
and Voyage Charterers” (1975) 49 Tul. L.R. 995.  
343 Namchow Chemical v. Botany Bay Shipping [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 523 (C.A.), at p. 527.  
344 Ibid, at p. 529.  
345 Reilly, M. “Identity of the Carrier: Issues Under Slot Charters” (2001) 25 Tul. Mar. L.J. 505, at p. 506, 
noting that as of September 1999, “the six top alliances accounted for approximately ninety percent of Teu 
capacity in the Asia-Europe and Asia-North America Trades.” 
346 Hill, C. Maritime Law 4th Ed. (1995) Lloyd’s of London Press, London, at p. 186.  
347 Reilly, M. “Identity of the Carrier: Issues Under Slot Charters” (2001) 25 Tul. Mar. L.J. 505, at p. 506.  
348 Ibid. 
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into alliances to share vessel space via slot charterers, the law with regard to slot charters 
appears to be not as problematic as several of the areas discussed above.  
 
 What facilitates the search for ‘the carrier’ with regard to a slot charter is the fact 
that such parties jealously guard their customers and actively avoid the situation where 
the shipper is in doubt as to whom he is contracting with. “Of paramount importance to 
an alliance member is maintaining its role as carrier to its own customers…For this 
reason, each party to the slot charter issues its own bills of lading to cargo carried in its 
slots. In fact, to distance its alliance partners and commercial competitors form its cargo, 
the slot charterer takes pains to avoid a contractual relationship between the [ship]owner 
and the slot charterer’s cargo.”349 The standard form slot charterparty issued by BIMCO, 
Slothire, in clause 13, prohibits the use of Identity of Carrier clauses in bills of lading 
issued by the charterer that seek to establish a contractual link between the vessel owner 
and the cargo carried.350 Under the traditional approach, the slot charterer would 
therefore be the carrier as it is this party who has entered into a contract of carriage with 
the shipper. There appears to be no conceptual barrier to holding a slot charterer to be the 
carrier, or even deeming him to be one of several carriers, in the United States.351 Under 
English law the situation is perhaps more complex. It would appear that in slot charter 
arrangement, the slot charterer who issues the bill of lading is the carrier vis-à-vis the 
cargo claimant. In The Hamburg Star, several containers were lost overboard, which had 
been covered by bills of lading issued by a slot charterer.352 The slot charterer was 
viewed as carrier for having issued the bills of lading,353 but ultimately the shipowner 
was the defendant, and one of the issues was whether the goods were bailed to the slot 
charterer, then sub-bailed to a second charterer then sub-bailed to the shipowner, or 
whether the goods were simply bailed to the slot charterer and then sub-bailed to the 
                                                 
349 Ibid.. 
350 Slothire clause 13(a)(i) stipulates “No Identity of Carrier Clause which purports to establish a 
contractual relationship between the Owners and the cargo interests of the Charterer.” Slothire can be found 
at: www.bimco.dk/upload/slothire.pdf.   
351 Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v. OOCL Inspiration, 137 F.3d 94 (2 Cir. 1998), at p. 102.  
352 The Hamburg Star [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 399 (Q.B.). In this instance the Bermuda shipowners, whose 
vessel was managed by a Hong Kong company, time charterered the vessel. The time charterer then back to 
back chartered the vessel, to a company who has entered in a vessel sharing agreement, with two other 
parties.  
353 Ibid, at p. 403 and chart on p. 410-411.  
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shipowner.354 In a simple action therefore, the slot charterer is generally the carrier, 
however, where the factual situation involves other parties, which it will more often than 
not due to the nature of a slot charter agreement, then difficulties arise characterizing the 
respective roles of the parties. It has been noted that in situations involving novel and 
complex contractual arrangements, such as slot charters, there is a tendency in England 
for plaintiffs to base claims in bailment or tort.355 Slot charterers themselves appear 
therefore to not give rise to the complex enquiry on carrier status as do other charterers, 
however, where the law does become complex is with regard to the legal status vis-à-vis 
other parties involved and the founding of the action. Actions founded outside the Hague 
and Hague-Visby scheme are discussed below.356
 
7.6. Freight Forwarder 
 A freight forwarder had been described as an entity who “acts as an intermediary 
between the shipper and the ocean carrier. The freight forwarder arranges for ocean 
transportation by locating available spaces, handles various ocean documentation for the 
shipper’s goods, including preparation of bills of lading, and performs such other services 
as arranging for the transport of the goods to dockside…The freight forwarder receives 
compensation from both the shipper and from the carrier.”357 The legal characterization 
of the freight forwarder is a problematic area in most jurisdictions given the dual nature 
of his role in carriage. “The freight forwarder traditionally acts as an agent who arranges 
for the shipment of goods belonging to his client/the shipper…At times, the freight 
forwarders has acted a principal contractor arranging the carriage in his own name.”358 
Generally, when acting as agent the freight forwarder is not regarded as a carrier, 
however when acting as principal his liability is frequently that of a carrier. “Freight 
forwarders may or may not be considered as carriers depending on whether their 
                                                 
354 Ibid, at p. 403.  
355 Gaskell, N et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 270.  
356 See section 8, infra.  
357 In re Black & Geddes, 1984 AMC 451 (Bkrtcy. N.Y. 1984), at p. 453.  
358 Tetley, W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed. Online 
at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime, at p. 3. Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law: 
Practitioner’s Ed. (1987) West Publishing, Minn, at p. 281 notes: “The freight forwarder, who receives 
compensation from both shippers and carriers, may either be an agent or an independent contractor with 
respect to both parties.” 
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activities involve merely “arranging” or actually “effecting” the shipment.”359 Aside, 
from the evident result of this distinction being that the freight forwarders has the 
liabilities and limits imposed upon him that the carrier would if found to be carrier,360 
there is another important repercussion from the agent/principal distinction. Where the 
freight forwarder is the agent for the shipper, the consignee acquires contractual rights 
under the bill of lading,361 however where the freight forwarder is the principal, “there is 
no contractual relationship between the person carrying the goods and the person 
ultimately suffering loss of, or damage to, the goods.”362 An absence of privity may lead 
in many circumstances to actions outside the Hague or Hague-Visby Regime.363 
Although, in certain circumstances legislation has rectified the problem of privity, for 
example, by virtue of section 2(4) of the U.K. Carriage of Goods Act, freight forwarders 
may take suit for damages on behalf of the owner of the goods lost or damaged.364
 
 Whether a freight forwarder is an agent or a principal is generally a factual 
matter.365 “The position of the forwarders as an intermediary between carrier and shipper 
                                                 
359 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part IV)” (1976) 7 
JMLC 615, at p. 630, footnote 193. See J.C. Penny Co. v. American Express Co. 102 F.Supp. 742 
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).  
360 See Tetley, W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at 
p. 31 in the context of discussion concerning the freight forwarder as principal, notes that the freight 
forwarder, depending on the jurisdiction concerned, is bound by the Hague, Hague-Visby or Hamburg 
Rules, for loss or damage between loading and discharge. See also Comalco Aluminum v. Mogul Freight 
Services (The Ocean Trader) (1993) 113 A.L.R. 667 (Fed. Crt. Aust.), where the federal court 
characterized the contract between the shipper and the freight forwarder as a contract of carriage, but was 
unable to apply the Hague Rules as the damage has occurred prior to loading. The federal court therefore 
awarded damages on the basis of the negligent stuffing of the container, and did not have to address the 
thorny issue of if the damages had occurred during the sea leg, did the misrepresentation remedy overlap 
with the scheme of liability provided for in the Hague Rules. For further discussion on actions outside the 
scheme of the Rules see section 8 infra. 
361 See Livermore, J. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading - Australia” in Ocean 
Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer 
Law Intl, The Hague, at p. 81 noting that under present Australian bills of lading legislation the consignee 
aquires the rights under the bill of lading where the freight forwarder is the agent of the shipper.  
362 Livermore, J. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading - Australia”, supra note , 
at p. 81. See also Davies, M. “The Elusive Carrier: Whom Do I Sue and How?” [1991] A.B.L.R. 230, at p. 
231.  
363 See section 8 infra, discussing actions outside the Hague and Hague Visby Regime.  
364 Carriage of Goods Act 1992, c. 50 (U.K.) 
365 See Ocean Projects v. Ultratech [1994] 2 SLR 369 (C.A. Singapore), at p. 375 noting “A freight 
forwarder may act as principal or agent depending on the facts of the case and the construction of the 
contract in question.”  See also Tetley, W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine 
Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 4; Ramburg, J. “The Vanishing Bill of Lading & The Hamburg Rules Carrier” 
(1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 391. 
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is not always easily ascertained, and must often depend upon careful of the facts of each 
individual set of circumstances.”366 Professor Tetley has provided a list of criteria to 
assist in determining whether the freight forwarder is an agent or a principal, which had 
been utilized by the Federal Court of Canada: “(a) the manner in which the forwarder 
characterizes its obligations on the contractual documents; (b) the manner in which the 
parties have dealt with each other in the past; (c) whether a bill of lading was issued; (d) 
whether the shipper knew which carrier would actually carry the goods; (e) the mode of 
payment: did the forwarder charge an amount calculated upon the freight and other 
expenses and then charge a further amount or a percentage as a fee? Or did the forwarder 
charge an all-inclusive figure?”367 Other authors have proposed similar lists.368 As have 
courts in other jurisdictions.369 In a recent Beijing maritime arbitration award, where the 
issue of whether the freight forwarder was a carrier, the arbitral tribunal held: “As to 
whether the person who was entrusted with the transportation of the cargo should be 
treated as the carrier, the following factors were commonly considered in China and in 
the international community: whether the person entered into the transport contract with 
the shipper or cargo owner in his own name or in the name of the carrier, whether the 
                                                 
366 Hill, D. Freight Forwarders (1972) Steven & Sons, London, at p. 69.  
367 Bertex Fashions v. Cargonaut Canada (1995) 95 F.T.R. 192 (Fed. Ct. Can.), at p. 196, quoting Tetley, 
W. Marine Cargo Claims 3rd ed., however the identical list may now be found with updated footnotes in 
Tetley, W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 6 – 7.  
368 See Jones, P. “The Forwarder – Principal or Agent, Carrier or Not?” in Bankruptcy: Present Problems 
and Future Perspectives (1986) R. de Boo, Toronto, at pp. 162-163, also quoted in Bertex Fashions v. 
Cargonaut Canada (1995) 95 F.T.R. 192 (Fed. Ct. Can.), at p. 195-196: “(a) has the forwarder performed 
aprt of the transport using his own employees? (b) Did the customer (or its agent) receive a bill of lading 
issued by another party? (c) Did the customer choose the carrier, possibly at the time that costs of transport 
by different carriers were presented to him for his selection? (d) Did documentation given to the customer 
prior to his delivery of the goods for transport give a reasonable explanation of the role played b the freight 
forwarder? (e) Was there a course of dealings prior to the shipment in question? (f) How did the forwarder 
charge for his services? Was the charge characterized as freight?”   
369 In Zima Corp. v M.V. Roman Polanski, 493 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), at p. 273, the District Court 
gave the following criteria: “(1) the way the party’s obligation is expressed in documents pertaining to the 
agreement, although the party’s self-description is not always controlling; (2) the history of dealings 
between the parties; (3) issuance of a bill of lading, although the fact that a party issues a document entitled 
‘bill of lading’ is not always in itself determinative; (4) how the party made its profit in particular, whether 
the party acted as ‘agent of the shipper…procuring the transportation by carrier and handling the details of 
shipment’ for fees ‘which the shipper paid in addition to the freight charges of the carrier utilized for the 
actual transportation.” See also Tetley W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine 
Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 8 citing Zima Corp v. M.V. Roman Pazinski, along with several other Southern 
District New York cases that support and follow the criteria.  
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person collected the freight on his own behalf or on the carrier’s behalf.”370 The tribunal 
held that the freight forwarder was not a carrier on the based on the fact that he did not 
issue the bill of lading, simply booked the space on the vessel and then passed on the 
freight to the party who carried the goods.371 Notably, this issue would not arise today as 
the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China has since come into force,372 and 
addresses the issue of the “multimodal transport operator”.373 Where the freight 
forwarder is not a carrier, and provided they exercised reasonable care when the goods 
were in their custody, then they are not liable for damage or loss during carriage.374 
Conversely, in Bertex Fashions, the Federal Court of Canada held the freight forwarder 
to be the carrier, and thus liable, on the basis that the bill of lading led the shipper to 
believe the forwarder would be carrying the goods and the freight charged was an all 
inclusive figure that could not be considered a commission.375 Similarly in Singer Co, the 
English commercial court found the freight forwarder to be the principal on the basis that 
he “undertook responsibility ‘for crating and delivering to the U.K. port. A lump sum 
consideration was to be payable, without any breakdown of the consideration for 
particular services. In essence [the cargo owners] were looking for a complete package of 
services, leaving it to the [freight forwarder] to subcontract when necessary.”376 A 
Singapore Court of Appeal decision found that where the cargo owners had established a 
                                                 
370 Shujian, L. “Beijing Maritime Arbitration Awards 1994-1996” [1997] LMCLQ 572, at p. 575. Shujian 
at p. 574-576 translates and summarizes the decision of the tribunal in the matter of Sinotrans Q.   
371 Ibid, at p. 576. See also Freight Systems v. Korea Shipping Corp. (The Korea Wonis-Sun) (1990) LMLN 
290, where a freight forwarder had been held to not to be the carrier but rather an agent, and therefore 
despite the fact that he had issued a house bill and paid out to the cargo claimant, he could not recover from 
the carrier on the grounds that he was not the principal. This is seemingly an unjust consequence of being 
regarded as not a carrier. Arguably, if both may be viewed as carriers, contribution between those liable 
would have been possible.  
372 See section 11.1, infra, entitled: “Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China” for further 
discussion on the Code and its contents.  
373 Article 102 provides that the multimodal transport operator “means the person who has entered into a 
multimodal transport contract with the shipper either by himself or by another person acting on his behalf.” 
Under the multimodal transport operator assumes responsibility for the performance of the contract, and it 
has been postulated that Sinotrans Q in the above arbitral award would not fall under the definition 
(Shujian, L. “Beijing Maritime Arbitration Awards 1994-1996” [1997] LMCLQ 572, at p. 575).  
374 See The Maheno [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81 (Sup. Crt. N.Z.), where the New Zealand court at p. 87 
determined that the freight forwarder was simply “an arranger” and “neither the plaintiffs nor their agent 
nor the defendant envisaged that the defendant would carry by sea as there is only one service to New 
Zealand”. The court held at p. 89 that as the forwarders were not negligent with regards to packing or 
locking the container, they were not liable.  
375 Bertex Fashions v. Cargonaut Canada (1995) 95 F.T.R. 192 (Fed. Ct. Can.), at p. 196.  
376 Singer Co. v. Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 164 (Q.B.), at p. 167.  
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letter of credit in favour of the freight forwarder for the full freight, under which the 
forwarder was to tender a clean bill of lading, and the cargo owners had only learnt of the 
existence of an actual carrier after the damage occurred, the freight forwarder was 
therefore the carrier with respect to the cargo owner.377 The legal situation with regard to 
freight forwarders as carriers has become rather complex in Australia. In The Cape 
Comorin, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales characterized a freight forwarder as 
both an agent and a principal.378 Stevedors who damaged the cargo sought to benefit 
from either or both of the Himalaya clauses in the two bills of lading were issued, a house 
bill and an ocean bill. The Court of Appeal determined that vis-à-vis the consignee the 
forwarder was the principal, but when carrying out the instructions to ship the goods the 
forwarder was acting as agent, which included as part of his mandate, to obtain the bill of 
lading from the actual carrier. One author finds that this decision to be of great advantage 
to carriers in that “previously there was a very real risk that carriers could not obtain any 
contractual benefit from their own bills of lading as against consignees (because of the 
interposition of another ‘carrier’, namely the freight forwarder), the carrier can now do 
so, provided it can be established that the freight forwarder had a mandate from its client 
to ship the goods and as part of that mandate could obtain a bill of lading from the actual 
carrier.”379 Arguably, the analysis of shifting agent and principal is awkward, and 
although lauded for its result, one may express dismay that such an approach is required 
due to the fact that the actual carrier is thus not longer a ‘carrier’ because there is a 
contractual carrier. A holding similar to the Australian court can be found in a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court judgment, where a freight forwarder contracted with a carrier who then 
subcontracted with an inland carrier who damaged the goods.380 The holding with respect 
to the freight forwarder, ICC, has been succinctly summarized by one commentator as: 
“It declared that ICC was a principal in its own right, but at the same time an agent for 
the purposes of creating Himalaya protection accorded to Norfolk Southern [the inland 
carrier]. The Court presented two lines of support for this conclusion, reliance on 
                                                 
377 Ocean Projects v. Ultratech [1994] 2 SLR 369 (C.A. Singapore), at p. 375.  
378 Carrington Slipways Pty. v. Patrick Operations Pty. (The Cape Comorin) (1991) 24 N.S.W.L.R. 745 
(C.A. N.S.W.). 
379 Hetherington, S. “Freight Forwarders and House Bills of Lading” [1992] LMCLQ 32. 
380 Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby Pty, 2004 AMC 2705 (U.S. S.C. 2004).  
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precedent and policy considerations.”381 Finally, in certain instances American courts 
have taken a restrictive view of COGSA, holding that it is only applicable to “carriers” 
and not freight forwarders, thus denying the freight forwarders the package limitation.382 
The characterization of a freight forwarder, therefore, is therefore a complex inquiry.  
 
 The Continental legal systems have in many instances incorporated the notion of a 
freight forwarder into their various codes. This negates in many respects the above 
discussion of whether or not a freight forwarders is ‘the carrier’, by imposing either a 
separate legal regime or specifically mandating how such parties will be characterized. 
Under the German Commercial Code (HGB),383 section 407 provides for a “Spediteur” 
who is one who undertakes to conclude a contract of carriage in his own name but for his 
client’s account.384 Similar to a freight forwarder as agent, the “spediteur” must only 
exercise due diligence in selecting and instructing carriers.385 Belgium has a similar legal 
situation under the Code de Commerce,386 as does Italy under the Civil Code.387 France 
has two entirely separate regimes: the “commissionaire de transport” which coincides to 
the freight forwarder as a principle, and the “transitaire” which is simply a freight 
forwarder agent.388 The “commissionaire de transport” has an obligation de resultat,389 
                                                 
381 Theis, W. “Third-Party Beneficiaries in Multimodal Contracts of Carriage: Norfolk Southern Railway v. 
James N. Kirby” (2005) 36 JMLC 201, at p. 210.  
382 Sabah Shipyard v. M/V Harbel Tapper, 984 F.Supp. 569 (S.D. Tex. 1997), at p. 574; Hoffman-LaRoche 
v. M/V Jefferson, 731 F.Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), at pp. 110-111.  
383 For a further discussion on the German HGB see section 11.7. entitled “German Commercial Code”. 
384 Ramburg, J. “The Vanishing Bill of Lading & The Hamburg Rules Carrier” (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 
391, at p. 400.  
385 Ibid. 
386 The Code de Commerce of Belgium, arts. 91 to 108, contain provisions governing the “commissionaire 
de transport” which is distinct from the carrier, and although he enters into the contract in his own name his 
activities are ancillary to the carriage, such as booking, sending and receiving goods, and therefore he is not 
responsible for the acts or omissions of the actual carrier. (Ibid, at p. 401).  
387 The Italian Civil Code article 1737 provides for a “spedizionere”, which in certain respects is in essence 
similar to the German “spediteur”. (Ibid, at p. 400). Italy also has a “vettore”, which is a carrier, although 
defined as a person who undertakes either to perform or procure the transport, and thus where there is a 
“spedizionere-vettore” he will be liable as a contracting carrier. But where the entity is characterized as a 
“spedizionere-mandataire” he will not be responsible as a carrier, thus similar to the “spediteur”. (Ibid, 401-
402).   
388 See Ramburg, J. “The Vanishing Bill of Lading & The Hamburg Rules Carrier” (1979) 27 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 391, at p. 401-402, however one should note that the Code de Commerce was updated in 2000, 
and although the new codal provisions are in substance similar to the old provisions and therefore 
Ramburg’s discussion remains instructive, the numbering has changed. Previously 96 to 102 of the Code de 
Commerce were applicable, now articles L.132-3 to L.132-9 are applicable. For the text of the new Code de 
Commerce online visit http://big.chez.tiscali.fr/adroit/commerceetconsommation/html/commerce.htm. See 
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and although Ramburg comments that “the only exception being force majeur”,390 in fact 
the commissionaire may also invoke the defences and limitations of the carrier,391 as well 
as “the limitations contained in the standard trading conditions of freight forwarders’ 
associations.”392 The “transitaire” on the other hand, has an obligation de moyens, and 
therefore must simply exercise due diligence and reasonable care in carrying out the 
instructions given.393 These continental systems have essentially solved in most respects 
the issue of whether a freight forwarder is ‘the carrier’. 
 
 Finally, a discussion of NVOCCs is warranted. NVOCC, or Non-vessel operating 
common carriers are in many respects similar to freight forwarders, and are often 
considered under the heading of freight forwarders.394 They are a construct of the United 
States, and are defined in the Shipping Act of 1984 as “ ‘non-vessel-operating common 
carrier’ means a common carrier that does not operate the vessels by which the ocean 
transportation is provided, and is a shipper in its relationship with an ocean common 
carrier.”395 Under U.S. law they have a dual role. “The law treats the NVOCC as a 
hybrid. With respect to shippers, the NVOCC is a common carrier that must file a rate 
tariff with the Federal Maritime Commission. With respect to the vessel and her owner, 
the NVOCC is a shipper and a customer.”396 NVOCC’s are treated as carriers and are 
                                                                                                                                                 
also Tetley, W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at pp. 
32-38 for an in-depth discussion of legislation and jurisprudence relating to the two major categories of 
freight forwarders in France 
389 Ramburg, J. “The Vanishing Bill of Lading & The Hamburg Rules Carrier”, at p. 401; Tetley, W. 
“Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 33-34.  
390 Ramburg, ibid.  
391 Cour d’Appel de Rouen, May 24, 1995, DMF 1996, 369. 
392 Tetley, W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders”, in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 
35.  
393 Ibid, at p. 36.  
394 See Tetley, W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, 
who considers NVOCCs in his chapter, and Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law: Practitioner’s 
Ed. (1987) West Publishing, Minn, at pp. 281-282.  
395 Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. Appx. 1702(17)(B). 
396 Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law: Practitioner’s Ed. (1987) West Publishing, Minn, at p. 
282.  
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thus subject to the laws governing carriers, such as U.S. COGSA,397 and have been 
allowed by the courts to benefit from the limitations and exclusions therein.398   
 
7.7. Vessel Manager 
 Vessel management companies are a more recent feature of the sea carriage 
industry. The ownership and management structure of fleets has changed considerably in 
recent decades, mostly as a result of the attempt to limit risks and exposure to liability.399 
It is therefore this “break up of the traditional shipping companies in the past five decades 
[that] has resulted in the emergence of large ship-management companies which have 
taken responsibility for the technical management of many ships.”400 Certain authors 
hold a more critical view of management companies, or vessel managers, as is evident by 
their characterization of the practice; “In many cases, the registered owner of a ship is a 
company with no assets other than the ship itself. The true owners take profit out of such 
one-ship companies through devices such as management fees paid by the shipowning 
shell to a ship management company.”401 Conversely, management companies have been 
simply described as providing services wherein “[t]he owner will thus entrust to another 
                                                 
397 See Tetley, W. “Chapter 33: Responsibility of Freight Forwarders” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at 
p. 12. See Hartford Fire v. Novocargo USA Inc. (M/V Pacific Senator), 257 F.Supp. 2d 665 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), where an NVOCC was held jointly and severally liable with a liner company for cargo damage.  
398 Tetley, ibid, at p. 31. For a French case dealing with NVOCCs, see Cour d’Appel de Versailles, April 4, 
2002 (The Peninsular Bay and the Singapore Bay), DMF 2002, 944, where the Cour d’Appel held that even 
though a NVOCC bill of lading was issued, the shipowner was nevertheless responsible.  
399 See Charest, D. “A Fresh Look at Treatment of Vessel Managers Under COGSA” (2004) 78 Tul. L. 
Rev. 885, at p. 888 – 889, commenting on the modern tendency of individual ships in fleets to be owned by 
separate one-ship companies, with their beneficial owner being a parent or holding company, as a method 
of reducing risks with regard to the fleet. See also Mandaraka-Sheppard, A. “The Beacons of Wise Men 
and Management of Legal Risks” (1999) 30 JMLC 63, at p. 65, commenting on the common practice of 
establishing one-ship companies for the purposes of limitation of liability and risk as well as noting the 
court’s acceptance of the practice as a legitimate method of ship operation.   
400 Drewry Shipping Consultants in  “Fleet Management: The New Paradigm” as quoted by Charest, D. “A 
Fresh Look at Treatment of Vessel Managers Under COGSA” (2004) 78 Tul. L. Rev. 885, at p. 889. 
Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and Chartering Practice 4th Ed. (1995) LLP, London, at p. 94, notes that 
that the role of vessel managers have become increasingly important and prevalent for several reasons: 
“Because of the recent shipping depression some owners have gone bankrupt and the receiver normally has 
no knowledge of shipping, and then the commercial activity may be entrusted to a manager for a period of 
time. Similarly, several shipyards have become important shipowners, when the buyer under a shipbuilding 
contract has been unable to or has refused to take delivery of the vessel under construction. Furthermore, 
investors in some countries have bought second hand tonnage without sufficient knowledge of the shipping 
business and for a period they may entrust the ship to a manager waiting for second-hand prices to go up so 
that she may be sold at a profit…[t]hus the shipowner’s motives for management services may vary.” 
401 Davies, M. “In Defence of Unpopular Virtues: Personification and Ratification (2000) 75 Tul. L.R. 337, 
at p. 363.  
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person (the manager) one or several of his functions. It may be that the manager will 
maintain, inspect, man and equip the vessel, keep books, attend to the claims, make 
calculations and otherwise attend to the commercial operation of the ship.”402 Generally, 
vessel managers can vary between taking responsibility for the operational aspects of the 
vessel or providing services that “encompass the entire operational and business aspects 
of a fleet of ship.”403 Admittedly, the exact role of the vessel manager is difficult define 
with complete consistency given the potential differences among management 
agreements. Regardless, the general characterization of vessel managers with respect to 
uniform carriage law has been varied, leaving their role in the legal regime uncertain and 
in need of clarification.  
 
 There are several ways to approach the question of vessel managers. In English 
law, it has been noted that the vessel manager is the agent of the shipowner, and therefore 
it is the shipowner who bears the legal and commercial risk.404 Conversely, the Chinese 
courts have held the vessel manager, also described as a ship operator, to be a carrier.405 
In the United States, the handling of vessel managers is more varied. As mentioned 
above, in certain instances the vessel manager has been found to be jointly liable with the 
shipowner.406 One author has noted that the U.S. courts “tend to address the question of 
vessel managers’ position within the COGSA rubric in one of four ways: (1) vessel 
managers are simply not carriers and are excluded from COGSA; (2) vessel managers are 
agents of the carriers and excluded from COGSA; (3) vessel managers, if they are party 
to the bill of lading, are included under COGSA; or (4) vessel managers, if they are 
incorporated by a Himalaya clause, are included in COGSA.”407 Nevertheless, the vessel 
                                                 
402 Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and Chartering Practice 4th Ed. (1995) LLP, London, at p. 94.  
403 Charest, D. “A Fresh Look at Treatment of Vessel Managers Under COGSA” (2004) 78 Tul. L. Rev. 
885, at p. 890. 
404 Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and Chartering Practice 4th Ed. (1995) LLP, London, at p. 94. 
405 See for example People’s Insurance Co. of China Property v. Shanghai Pujiang Transport (2003) 
Summarized in Li, K. “Chinese Maritime Law 2003-2004” [2005] LMCLQ 383, at p. 390. In this instance 
the court held that all three defendants, the charterer who was characterized as the contractual carrier, the 
shipowner and ship operator who were characterized as actual carriers, to be jointly liable for damage to the 
cargo. For further discussion on Chinese carriage law, see section 12.2, infra, entitled: “Maritime Code of 
the People’s Republic of China”. 
406 See section 4 supra.  
407 Charest, D. “A Fresh Look at Treatment of Vessel Managers Under COGSA” (2004) 78 Tul. L. Rev. 
885, at p. 893.  
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manager has become an entity that has in certain instances joined the ranks of parties able 
to be characterized as ‘the carrier’.408 What tends to be problematic is that given that the 
shipowner is generally a party to the action, from a single carrier point of view, the vessel 
manager despite having in essence acted as carrier, is generally left without protection. It 
has been noted “the absence of privity of contract between the shipper and the ship 
manager has been successfully argued against affording the ship manager the protection 
of COGSA’s limitation of liability by extention.409 For example, in The M/V Captain 
Nicholas I, where the cargo claimant had taken suit against the vessel owner, time 
charterer, voyage charterer, and the vessel manager for rust damage to steel cargo, the 
court found that the vessel manager was not the carrier and held that the plaintiff’s claim 
against him was not limited in any way by COGSA.410 The court found that “[a]s a 
consequence of not being a carrier, the Court finds that the clause does not extend any 
COGSA limitation…[to] the manager of the vessel.”411 Similarly in The M/V Lake 
Marion, the shipowner was entitled to benefit from COGSA’s $500 package limitation, 
but the vessel manager was liable for full damages without the benefit of any limitation 
of liability.412 It has been noted that “[i]n view of the broad range of ‘shipowning’ 
responsibilities a manager may undertake, and of the fact that managers do not enjoy 
‘carrier’ status under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, managers are ripe for suing.”413 
                                                 
408 Thyssen Inc. v. S.S. Atlantic Forest, 1987 AMC 1873 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), where the vessel manager was 
held liable for damages under COGSA. As well, in Intersteel v. M/V Federal Huron, 1988 WL 70123 (E.D. 
La. 1988) the court determined that the vessel managers were COGSA carriers on the basis that the master 
who had signed the bill of lading was employed by the vessel managers. 
409 Sweeney, J. “Crossing the Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport” (2005) 36 JMLC 155, 
at p. 183.  
410 Steel Coils v. M/V Captain Nicholas, 197 F. Supp 2d 560 (E.D. La. 2002), at p. 568. For further 
discussion on other aspects of the judgment see Leary, M. “Vessel Manager Liability in Tort Actions: Steel 
Coils v. M/V Captain Nicholas I” (2003) 27 Tul. Mar. L.J. 645. Leary, at p. 652, supports the court’s 
finding, and suggests that if vessel managers desire protection then they must insist on being specifically 
enumerated in the Himalaya clause. For an example of a vessel manager benefiting from a Himalaya clause 
see Ferrex International v. M/V Rico Chone, 718 F.Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1988), the vessel manager was 
permitted to limit his liability in accordance with COGSA on the basis of a Himalaya clause in the bill of 
lading that had been incorporated into the dock receipt. 
411 M/V Captain Nicholas, ibid, at p. 568.  
412 Steel Coils v. M/V Lake Marion, 2001 WL 1518302, 2002 AMC 1680 (E.D. La. 2001). Affirmed 331 
F.3d 422 (5 Cir. 2003). The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, at p. 438-439 noted that the vessel manager had 
based their arguments in the fact that the realities of maritime commerce justifies the use of one-ship 
corporations without employees that must therefore use vessel managers, rather than simply arguing that 
they benefited from the protection of the Himalaya clause. Arguably this was an oversight on the part of the 
attorneys, that demonstrates the necessity of the Himalaya argument for the protection of vessel managers.  
413 Greenman, D. “Limitation of Liability Unlimited”(2001) 32 JMLC 279, at p. 309.  
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The exclusion of vessel managers from the protective umbrella of COGSA has been 
criticized; “”[t]o exclude those that perform the duties of the carrier from the operation of 
the very statute designed to regulate exactly those actions is a flawed approach on its 
face…courts should include vessel managers within the definition of “carriers” to the 
extent that their participation warrants such inclusion.”414  
                                                 
414 Charest, D. “A Fresh Look at Treatment of Vessel Managers Under COGSA” (2004) 78 Tul. L. Rev. 
885, at p. 910.  
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 8. THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS: WHAT TO DO WITH THE 
PARTY WHO IS NOT THE CARRIER? 
 In the majority of instances, court have determined that there is one ‘carrier’ in 
any given factual situation. Regardless of whether this is accomplished by virtue of a 
disjunctive interpretation of the language in art. 1 of the Hague Rules, or by reliance on a 
demise clause, what remains is the predicament where one, or several, of the defendant 
parties involved in the carriage operations is not the ‘carrier’ but nonetheless has caused 
or contributed to the loss or damage of the claimant’s goods. In essence, this has proved 
to be an incredibly contentious and complex area of carriage law, which surprisingly 
enough continues to be so even eighty years after the advent of the Hague Rules. One 
would have thought that a certain measure of uniformity and certainty would have 
emerged in this area, however, this is not the case. Legal remedies concerning parties 
deemed not to be the carrier, therefore remains a problematic area of carriage law.  One 
must note however, that the problem of circumvention of the Hague and Hague-Visby 
Rules via action in tort or bailment as discussed below is not a problem linked solely to 
remedies against the party who is not ‘the carrier’. Actions in bailment and tort have also 
been launched successfully against “the carrier” causing one leading British commentator 
to observe that “it might be thought logical that where the international Convention 
applied, e.g. the Hague Rules, the courts would take that to be the basis, possibly the sole 
basis on which liability rules would be assessed. Unfortunately the Hague Rules have 
been regarded as an encrustation on the common law and the two do not sit easily 
together…Accordingly, standard English pleadings in cargo claims will not allege a 
breach of the Convention alone, but may invoke bailment, negligence, or conversion in 
addition to contract.”415 This has also been the case in certain districts of the U.S. which 
require privity in order for a defendant to be considered a carrier; “those involved in 
handling the cargo who are not in privity of contract with the plaintiff – including a 
shipowner or charterer who is not in privity with the cargo owner under the bill of lading 
                                                 
415 Gaskell, N et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 270. Gaskell uses the 
example of Lord Diplock in Barclays Bank v. Customs and Excise [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81 at p. 89 
describing the contract for carriage of goods by sea under a bill of lading as a combined contract of 
bailment and transportation.   
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– may nevertheless be subject to an action in tort or bailment. Depending on the existence 
and wording of a Himalaya clause, an action against a third party may produce an even 
higher recovery than an action against the contracting carrier. Accordingly, a cargo 
damage complaint will typically include allegations of negligence and breach of bailment 
(in addition to allegations of breach of the contract of carriage).”416
 
 On a preliminary note, this area of the law is arguably where the breakdown of the 
Hague and Hague-Visby system is particularly evident. As discussed above, the object of 
introducing uniform carriage law was to institute a compromise or bargain involving 
shipping and carrier interests such that the legal relations between them would be 
regulated and predictable.417 In this respect, holding that the charterer, the shipowner, or 
any other prominent party to the carriage is not the ‘carrier’ creates the undesirable 
situation wherein the uniform law is circumvented and thus its purpose is undermined. 
This results in windfalls and hardships on both sides of the carriage equation. An 
unfortunate cargo claimant may find that the entity that they believed they were 
contracting with and that appeared for all intents and purposes to be the carrier, was in 
reality a contractual stranger to the transaction. In essence, to require a claimant to 
“unravel the web of ownership interests” prior to claiming within the short time frame 
allowed demonstrates a profound unfairness and a substantial obstacle given the realities 
faced when bringing a cargo claim.418 Conversely, a time charterer issuing bills of lading 
including a jurisdiction clause or a vessel management company may find themselves in 
an entirely different jurisdiction, subject to non-contractual causes of action and 
unprotected by the mandated limits of liability. This practice has been noted to be 
undesirable in that “it overturns the allocation of risk agreed upon by the original parties 
to the contract of carriage and permits the cargo owners to sue in tort or bailment the 
persons who actually performed the work, thereby evading those contractual limitations, 
                                                 
416 Sturley, M. “An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case” (1997) 21 Tul. 
Mar. L.J. 263, at p. 271.  
417 Newell, R. “Privity Fundamentalism and the Circular Indemnity Clause” [1992] LMCLQ 97, notes at p. 
102, that “the purpose of the Hague Rules was to bring about not only some form of international 
uniformity but an appropriate compromise between shipowning and cargo interests.” 
418 Charest, D. “A Fresh Look at Treatment of Vessel Managers Under COGSA” (2004) 78 Tul. L. Rev. 
885, at p. 895-896.  
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exceptions, and other terms.”419 The effectiveness of the system of uniform law as 
regulating bill of lading contracts is therefore decreased by the ability of plaintiffs to 
forum shop and circumvent the limits of liability with respect to certain defendants, and 
equally, by the ability of certain parties to the carriage endeavor to contractually 
exonerate themselves from responsibility to the cargo claimant.  It is therefore this 
notion, that there exists only a single carrier in the act of sea carriage, which necessitates 
the following discussion of the causes of action potentially involved with regard to a 
party who is not the ‘carrier’. An exhaustive discussion of each cause of action, however, 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation given that each topic is in itself a vast area of law. 
The aim of this section, is therefore to simply demonstrate the multiplicity of legal 
problems and legal complexities that can arise where one is forced or taken outside the 
regime into other causes of action.  
 
8.1. Contract  
 As discussed above rendering parties liable in accordance with the obligations, 
defences and limits of the contract of carriage is arguably the ideal. Where this is not the 
case, there are in fact other contractual remedies that have been utilized to render such 
parties liable to the shipper or consignee. In Brandt v. Liverpool, the plaintiff whom had 
had the goods consigned to him as a pledgee presented the bill of lading, paid the freight 
and took delivery of the goods, but no contractual rights were transferred under the Bills 
of Lading Act 1855.420 The Court of Appeal determined that a new contract ought to be 
inferred between the shipowner and the plaintiff which arose upon receipt of the goods 
and payment of the freight, thus entitling him to claim in respect of damage to the 
goods.421 The principle of implied contract as determined by the Court of Appeal has 
been subsequently applied and has become known as the Brandt v. Liverpool implied 
contract.422 Carver has noted that “this type of contract can arise between carrier and 
consignee (even though the latter is not, and has not become, a party to the bill of lading 
                                                 
419 Nossal, S. “Bailment on Terms, Himalaya Clauses, and Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses: The Decision of 
the Privy Council in the Mahkutai” (1996) 26 Hong Kong L.J. 321, at p. 329.  
420 Brandt v. Liverpool, etc., Steam Navigation Co. [1924] 1 K.B. 575 (C.A.).  
421 Ibid.  
422 See Sonicare International v. East Anglia Freight Terminal [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 144, where this was 
one of the heads of claim.   
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contract) on the discharge of the goods and their delivery by the carrier to the consignee 
against presentation of a bill of lading or of certain documents.”423 Although, the implied 
contract is distinct from the contract of carriage,424 nevertheless the terms tend to be 
those of the bill of lading.425 Arguably, the implied contract doctrine is one that arose to 
allow a party that would otherwise be unable to take suit. Nevertheless, it has been a 
device employed in order to protect a shipowner who was not a party to the contract.426 
The Court of Appeal, in implying a contract between a shipowner and a consignee where 
there was a voyage charter, stated “there would seem to us very powerful grounds for 
concluding that it is necessary to imply a contract between BP and the shipowners to give 
business reality to the transaction between them and create the obligations which, as we 
think, both parties plainly believed to exist.”427 It would appear therefore that implied 
contracts are actually in effect rendering the Rules applicable where they would 
otherwise not be as a result of privity, and are thus not necessarily a tool for claimants 
attempting to circumvent the Rules, but rather a device used to ensure the Rules govern 
situations that they were intended to but cannot on due to restrictive interpretation.  
 
8.2. Tort of Negligence 
                                                 
423 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 280. For 
further discussion of implied contract under British law see Carr, M. “Current Developments Concerning 
the Form of Bills of Lading – Great Britain” in Ocean Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and 
EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer Law Intl, The Hague, at pp. 173-174.  
424 See The St. Joseph [1933] P. 119 holding that the law of the new contract will depend on the intention of 
the parties and not on the law of the original contract of carriage. See Colinvaux, R. Carver’s Carriage by 
Sea 12th Ed. (1982) Stevens & Sons, London, at p. 72.  
425 In New Zealand Shipping v. A.M. Satterthwaite (Eurymedon) [1975] A.C. 154 (P.C.), at p. 168, Lord 
Wilberforce stated “The consignee is entitled to the benefit of, and is bound by, the stipulations in the bill 
of lading by his acceptance of it and request for delivery of the goods thereunder. This is shown by Brandt 
v. Liverpool S.N. Co.” 
426 In Carver’s discussion of the notion of implied contract he argues that one of the interpretations of the  
Elder Dempster judgment is that “an implied contract was directly concluded between the shippers and the 
shipowners, without any intervening agency of the charterers”( Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills 
of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 279-280). Briefly, in Elder, Dempster Co v. Paterson, 
Zochonis & Co [1924] A.C. 522 (H.L.), the plaintiff took suit for damaged palm oil against the shipowner 
who had time chartered the vessel , however the House of Lords held that the shipowner was protected by 
the terms of the bill of lading for bad stowage.  
427 Compania Portorafi Commerciales v. Ultramar Panama (The Captain Gregos 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
345 (C.A.), at pp. 402-403 where the Court of Appeal referred to a Brandt v. Liverpool implied contract, 
and proceeded to imply a contract based on the bill of lading terms between the shipowner and consignee 
where the vessel has been under voyage charter. See conversely Mitsui & Co. v. Novorossiysk Shipping 
(The Gudermes) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 311 (C.A.), where the Court of Appeal was unwilling to find an 
implied contract as it was a matter of fact, which on the facts in this instance did not merit implying a 
contract.  
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 In the Nicholas H, Lord Steyn expressed policy concerns surrounding recovery in 
tort outside the Rules: “The dealings between shipowners and cargo owners are based on 
a contractual structure, the Hague Rules, and tonnage limitation, on which the insurance 
of international trade depends…The result of a recognition of a duty of care in this case 
will be to enable cargo owners, or rather their insurers, to disturb the balance created by 
the Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules as well as by tonnage limitation provisions, 
by enabling cargo owners to recover in tort against a peripheral party to the prejudice of 
the protection of shipowners under the existing system…”.428 Admittedly, the Nicholas H 
concerned the liability of a classification society, however the same considerations arise 
where claimants circumvent the contractual carrier to sue the shipowner, or circumvent 
the contractual carrier to sue a time or voyage charterer. It has been noted that cargo 
claimants prefer to sue in tort “simply so as to overcome the exceptions and limitations of 
liability which the contracting carrier could invoke in a contractual action.”429
 
 In the United States, the 1898 Supreme Court judgment The John G. Stevens, 
established that an admiralty claim could be brought in tort, regardless of whether there 
was a contract governing the carriage of the goods.430 The ability to launch suit in tort 
was expanded in the middle of the 20th century, to no longer require the plaintiff to be 
privy to the contract on which the duty was founded. In The President Monroe, the court 
considered the situation where both the shipowner’s and the shipbuiler’s negligence 
damaged the plaintiff’s goods, opining: “It was, for a great many years, a well-established 
rule at both common law and maritime law that privity of contract had to exist for the 
maintenance of a tort action that involved negligence when the liability of the defendant 
appeared to depend upon the breach of a contractual obligation to the plaintiff…Since 
Sieracki [Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946)] a long line of cases make 
clear that the determination of negligence liability of a tortfeasor, or of joint tortfeasors, 
to one injured in person or in property in the maritime law is now based upon the long-
established principles of duty of care, forseability and proximate cause, and is unaffected 
                                                 
428 Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Bishop Rock Marine Co. (The Nicholas H) [1996] A.C. 211 (H.L.) at p. 239-
240. 
429 Tetley, W. “Chapter 9: Proving the Contract or Tort” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed. Online at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime, at p. 27. 
430 The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113 (1898), at p. 117.  
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by the presence or absence of privity on a contractual relationship.”431 As seen more 
recently however, tortious actions against parties not under the umbrella of COGSA are 
not as prevalent given the expansive view of the COSGA carrier. The U.S. does provide 
for perfect study, as where privity is not a requirement for ‘carrier’ under COGSA, we 
tend to see less tortious litigation outside COGSA, in essence demonstrating that the 
‘practical approach’ is very much a solution in this instance. It is interesting to note 
however, that an action in tort in the United States is sometime employed by claimants to 
obtain other benefits, such as a higher maritime lien ranking.432
 
Under English law, “should the claimant succeed in establishing both its title to 
sue and a breach by the shipowner of its duty of care, then recovery for physical loss or 
damage to the cargo will be made in full.”433 The seminal case in English law regarding 
the availability of tort actions in carriage of goods situations is The Aliakmon, where the 
claimants sued the shipowner after the time charterer had damaged the goods.434 The 
House of Lords considered the factual situation where the risk has passed to the buyers of 
steel coils on shipment, but the property in the coils did not pass until after shipment.  
The buyers or claimants in this instance could not rely on an implied contract on the 
principle of Brandt v. Liverpool as discussed above due to the rather complex facts in this 
instance where the buyers when having claimed delivery from the carrier were doing so 
as the agents of the seller, a fact which the carrier was aware of.435 Nor were the buyers 
able to rely on the Bills of Lading Act 1855, as they were neither consignees named in 
nor endorsees of the bills of lading, thus leaving the buyers to claim in tort. Lord Brandon 
determined that “in order to enable a person to claim in negligence for loss caused to him 
by reason of loss or of damage to property, he must have had either the legal ownership 
of or a possessory title to the property concerned at the time when the loss or damage 
                                                 
431 Sears Roebuck v. American President Lines (The President Monroe) [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 385 (N.D. 
Cal. 1971), at p. 391.  
432 Tetley, W. “Chapter 9: Proving the Contract or Tort” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed. Online at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime, at p. 27, footnote 129.  
433 Baughen, S. “Charterers’ Bills and Shipowners’ Liabilities: A Black Hole for Cargo Claimants?” (2004) 
10 JIML 248, at p. 251.  
434 The Aliakmon [1986] 1 A.C. 785 (H.L.).  
435 One may not establish the existence of an implied contract under Brandt v Liverpool if delivery was 
taken when acting as an agent for another person.  
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occurred, and it is not enough for him to have only had contractual rights in relation to 
such property which have been adversely affected by the loss of or damage to it.”436 This 
remains the law today, as the House of Lords in The Starsin held that where the damage 
to cargo occurred before title passed to the cargo owners, there is no cause of action in 
tort.437 As discussed previously, the function of the Himalaya clause is to prevent 
performing carriers from being liable in tort without the protection of the bill of lading, 
and therefore in actions in tort where possible the clauses have been employed to do 
so.438 The policy issue that shipowners would not be able to benefit from the protections 
of the Rules in tort actions was recognized in The Aliakmon, however, the decision turned 
on other grounds.439 Nevertheless this has not prevented shipowners from becoming 
liable in tort for damages,440 or other parties where the Himalaya clause did not cover 
them.441  
 
In Singapore, the approach is decidedly English as demonstrated in The Golden 
Lake, where the consignee was held not to be able to sue the shipowner in contract on the 
                                                 
436 The Aliakmon [1986] 1 A.C. 785 (H.L.), at p. 809. 
437 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.), at pp.586,  
590-591, and 603. Lord Hoffman stating “It is well established that a claim in negligence for damage to 
property is only maintainable by a person who had either the legal ownership of or a possessory title to the 
property at the time when the damage occurred.” (Ibid, at p. 586). For an explanation of the facts of the 
Starsin in relation to the multiple plaintiffs and their situation in relation to ownership of the goods see 
Andrewartha, J. & Riley, N. “English Maritime Law Update: 2001” (2002) 33 JMLC 329, at pp. 362-364 
(although their review of The Starsin pertains to the Court of Appeal decision).  
438 See The Mahkutai [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1 (P.C.) and Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The 
Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.). See also Wilson, J. “A Flexible Contract of Carriage – The 
Third Dimension?” [1996] LMCLQ 187, who after a discussion of the negative effects of privity on 
contract of carriage, at p. 200, advocates that parties who would otherwise be found not to be parties to the 
contract use the Himalaya clause to protect themselves from the harsh effects of privity preventing them 
from benefiting under the contract. 
439 The Aliakmon [1986] 1 A.C. 785 (H.L.), at p. 801: “a shipowner accepts goods for carriage in the 
reasonable anticipation that whoever becomes the owner of them is covered by the contract of carriage in 
the bill of lading which will be governed by the Hague Rules. It is not possible to make the alleged duty of 
care award in tort subject to the Hague Rules.” For a discussion of the policy considerations in the 
judgment see Treitel, G. “Bills of Lading and Third Parties” [1986] LMCLQ 294, at pp. 301-303.  
440 Hispanica de Petroleos v. Vencedora Oceanica Navegacion (The Kapetan Markos) [1987] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 321 (C.A.), at p. 332-333, where the shipowners were found liable in tort  (as the vessel had been 
chartered) for the breach of a duty of care with regard to the goods. See also The Forum Craftsman [1985] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 291 (C.A.), at p. 296, where in an action in tort, due to the fact that the shipowner was not a 
party to the bill of lading he was not entitled to benefit from the exclusive jurisdiction clause 
441 See for example Steel Coils v. M/V Captain Nicholas, 197 F. Supp 2d 560 (E.D. La. 2002), where the 
wording of the Himalaya clause did not cover the vessel manager.  
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basis of privity, but whose action in tort was upheld.442 The Singapore High Court found 
that “on the evidence before me, the defendants are the carriers. They are not a party to 
the contract evidenced by the bill of lading and they cannot be a party as it does not 
purport to make them a party. The bill of lading was not signed on their behalf or for their 
benefit. The defendants are common carriers and liable to the plaintiff for the full 
measure of their loss.”443
 
 The Canadian approach is not as restrictive with regards to who can sue in tort as 
the one found in the United Kingdom. It has been noted that “there is a difference of 
opinion between the courts in Canada and those in England on the question of whether 
the buyer without either title or possession can sue in negligence a carrier of the goods 
through whose negligence the goods may have been damaged...In Canada therefore, the 
scope of a third party’s liability to a non-owner, who is in the process of acquiring title to 
goods which he is buying would appear to be much wider than in England.”444 As 
opposed to the English court in The Aliakmon, the Federal Court of Appeal has 
commented “…a buyer of goods has been held to have a cause of action in tort against a 
carrier notwithstanding that he did not own the goods at the time of the loss.”445 Certain 
Canadian courts have explicitly rejected the English approach concerned that it is too 
narrow a view with respect to duties of care.446 The Canadian perspective has also 
restrained the action in tort such that a plaintiff may not circumvent the Rules for a 
greater recovery. The Federal Court, in considering a claim against a shipowner found 
not to be ‘the carrier’ in tort, opined “[a] rule which hinges a right to sue on whether or 
                                                 
442 Fuji Electronics and Machinery Enterprise v. New Necca Shipping (The Golden Lake) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 632 (H.C. Singapore). 
443 Ibid, at p. 636.  
444 Fridman, G. Sale of Goods in Canada 3rd Ed. (1986) Carswell, Toronto, at p. 443-444.   
445 St. Lawrence Construction Limited v. Federal Commerce and Navigation Co. [1985] 1 F.C. 767 (Fed. 
C.A.), at p. 786.  
446 Triangle Steel & Supply Co. v. Korean United Lines (1985) 63 B.C.L.R. 66 (B.C.S.C.), where the 
British Columbia Supreme Court had rejected the British approach and refused to follow the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in The Aliakmon, as well as other English authorities. In London Drugs v. Kuehne 
& Nagle Intl [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada opined that  a narrow English 
view was not the law in Canada such that in Canada “our law of negligence has long since moved away 
from a category approach when dealing with duties of care. It is now well established that the question of 
whether a duty of care arises will depend on the circumstances of each particular case, not on pre-
determined categories and blanket rules as to who is, and who is not, under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care.” (Ibid, at p. 408).  
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not a plaintiff in a case such as the present can prove whether property in the goods 
passed before or after the cause of action arose is not an attractive one. It may be that 
claim should be subject to limitations and defences comparable to those set out in the 
Hague Rules. A defendant is expected to be responsible for foreseeable damage cause to 
the plaintiff. I see no reason why a plaintiff, such as the holder of a bill of lading, should 
not as against a shipowner, similarly, be restricted to recovering on the basis of “expected 
liability”. As a matter of fact, no greater amount of damages is being claimed, in this 
case, against the shipowner in tort than could be recovered under the bill of lading.”447 
One notable improvement in Canadian law, over such jurisdictions as Singapore, is the 
notion that the shipowner is protected by “expected liability” rather than exposing the 
shipowner to full liability as a common carrier. In Canada, therefore, the proprietary 
interest in the goods is not a prerequisite for suit against the carrier as thus the action in 
tort is more widely available to the cargo claimant. The Australians have also rejected the 
narrow approach in the United Kingdom.448
 
The utilization of an action in tort to circumvent the limits of liability and 
exclusions where an action exists in contract was also a problem in Italy. The Italian 
                                                 
447 Canastrand Industries v. Lara S [1993] 2 F.C. 553 (Fed. Ct. Can.), at p. 608.  
448 See Caltex oil (Australia) Pty. v. The Barge Willemsted (1976) 136 C.L.R. 529 (H.C. Aus), at p. 568-
569: “No doubt to discard the element of physical injury to person or property as a prerequisite to the 
recover of damages in negligence means that its effect of tending to ensure that compensable damage is 
restricted to that which is immediately consequential upon tortious act also disappears; there then looms the 
spectre, described by Cardozo C.J. in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche as that of ‘liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class’…A feature of the suggested 
exclusionary rule is the importance placed upon the existence in the plaintiff of some proprietary or 
possessory interest in property which suffers physical injury; such an interest will suffice to make 
recoverable any consequential economic loss but without it economic loss which is in all other respects 
identical will not be recoverable…No doubt risk and property are usually coincidental but, where they are 
not, a denial of recovery of the risk bearer’s  economic loss consequential upon injury to a chattel the 
property in which is in another, and the consequence that such economic loss must go uncompensated for 
simply because of this division of risk and property, seems neither just nor expedient.” Livermore, J. 
“Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading - Australia” in Ocean Bills of Lading: 
Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer Law Intl, The 
Hague, at p. 71 has noted that the more expanded view of proximity in Australian law would mean that The 
Aliakmon would not be followed in Australia.  
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Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to chose between an action in contract restricted by 
the Hague Rules, and an action tort which is not.449  
 
The use of an action in tort to circumvent the Rules has been restricted in the 
English courts on the basis of ownership. Where it has been expanded, in Canada for 
example, the judicial doctrine of ‘expected liability’ has been employed to protect the 
terms that the parties expected to be bound to by contract.  Nevertheless, it remains in 
many jurisdictions a tool for claimants to circumvent the terms on which they contracted.  
 
8.3. Bailment and Sub-Bailment on Terms 
 Bailment has a long association with carrier liability for the loss or damage of 
goods. In the 17th century English courts imposed strict liability on common carriers. It 
has been argued that the origin and legal foundation of that strict liability was 
bailment.450 Bailment is predominantly seen in English carriage of goods jurisprudence. 
It has even been noted to be “the secret weapon of the common law.”451  
 
 The law of bailment and sub-bailment has received a fair amount of attention 
from the English judiciary in the past decade or so.452 Professor Palmer has characterized 
                                                 
449 Berlingeri speaking during the drafting session on June 11, 1963 of the CMI Committee on Bills of 
Lading Clauses, preparing the draft text of Article IV Bis. Verbatim record of Berlingeri’s comments found 
in Comite Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires, at p. 604.  
450 In Nugent v. Smith (1876) 1 C.P.D. 423 at p. 430, Cockburn C.J. opined that “the strict liability of 
carriers was introduced by custom in the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I as an exception to the ordinary 
rule that bailees were bound to use ordinary care.” (Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of 
Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 203). Note though that this view on the origin of 
strict liability is not without controvery. The view based on bailment was opposed by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes who argued that strict liability actually predates the law of bailment, and thus the present liability 
of common carriers is a survival of the old law (Holmes, O. The Common Law (1881) Little Brown, 
Boston, at p. 184). Nevertheless several authors do characterize carrier liability as arising from the breach 
of a bailment relationship (See Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime 
Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at 
p. 11). For a comprehensive and in-depth discussion of the different theories surrounding the origin of 
carrier liability see Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules 
(2002) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, at pp. 2 – 9. 
451 Reynolds, F. “Maritime and other influences on the common law” [2002] LMCLQ 182, at p. 184.  
452 Compania Portorafi Commerciales v. Ultramar Panama (The Captain Gregos 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
345 (C.A.); Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.); 
M.B. Pyramid Sound v. Briese Schiffahrts (The Ines) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 144 (Q.B.); Hispanica de 
Petroleos v. Vencedora Oceanica Navegacion (The Kapetan Markos) [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 321 (C.A.); 
Mitsui & Co. v. Novorossiysk Shipping (The Gudermes) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 311 (C.A.); Sonicare 
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bailment as “a legal relationship distinct from both contract and tort”, while Bell has 
concluded that “bailment has to be recognized as a sui generis source of obligations.”453 
The key element of bailment is possession.454 Where bailment has become prominent in 
cargo claims is in the notion of bailment on terms. The concept that a non-contractual 
party such as a shipowner may benefit from the terms arose in Elder Dempster where the 
shipowner sought to take advantage of the bill of lading where the goods had been carried 
by charterers.455 Lord Sumner, in his often quoted speech,456 stated “in the circumstances 
of this case the obligations to be inferred from the reception of the cargo for carriage to 
the United Kingdom amount to bailment upon terms, which include the exceptions and 
limitations of liability stipulated in the known and contemplated bill of lading.”457 This 
notion was re-examined in The Pioneer Container, where cargo owners took suit against 
a shipowner, the bills of lading were issued by another party, yet the shipowner sought to 
                                                                                                                                                 
International v. East Anglia Freight Terminal [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 48 (C.L.C.C.); Spectra International 
v. Hayesoak [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 153 (C.L.C.C.); The Forum Craftsman [1985] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 291 
(C.A.); The Future Express [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 542 (C.A.); The Owners of Cargo Lately on Board the 
Vessel K.H. Enterprise v. The Owners of the Vessel Pioneer Container (The Pioneer Container) [1994] 2 
A.C. 324 (P.C.); Fort Sterling v. South Atlantic Cargo Shipping (The Finnrose) [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 559 
(Q.B.).  
453 Palmer and Bell quoted by McMeel, G. “The Redundancy of Bailment” [2003] LMCLQ 169, at p. 171.  
454 Note that a key element of bailment is possession, therefore in Compania Portorafi Commerciales v. 
Ultramar Panama (The Captain Gregos 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 345 (C.A.), at p. 404-406 where the 
Court of Appeal considered the instance of a consignee, voyage charterer and shipowner, bailment was of 
little use as “it is elementary that there can be no bailment without possession in the bailee. It can, we think, 
truly be said that PEAG consented to the terms on which the goods were bailed to the shipowners, but 
unless PEAG bailed the goods to that bailor (which in our view they plainly did not) it makes no 
difference.” (Ibid, at p. 405). See also Spectra International v. Hayesoak [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 153 
(C.L.C.C.), at p. 155 on the requirement of physical possession. For the notion that the bailment will end 
when possession ends, see M.B. Pyramid Sound v. Briese Schiffahrts (The Ines) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 144 
(Q.B.), at p. 156 holding that “the bailment to the charterers came to an end when the goods were delivered 
to the [ship]owners. The owners then became the bailees (not sub-bailees) of the goods for carriage to St. 
Petersburg.” 
455 Elder, Dempster Co v. Paterson, Zochonis & Co [1924] A.C. 522 (H.L.) 
456 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.), at p. 601; 
The Owners of Cargo Lately on Board the Vessel K.H. Enterprise v. The Owners of the Vessel Pioneer 
Container (The Pioneer Container) [1994] 2 A.C. 324 (P.C.), at p. 340; McMeel, G. “The Redundancy of 
Bailment” [2003] LMCLQ 169, at p. 197; Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 294.  
457 Elder, Dempster Co v. Paterson, Zochonis & Co [1924] A.C. 522 (H.L.), at p. 564. See conversely, Fuji 
Electronics and Machinery Enterprise v. New Necca Shipping (The Golden Lake) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
632 (H.C. Singapore), where the High Court of Singapore, distinguishing Elder Dempter, held at p. 636 
that the benefit of the exemption clause was not expressely conferred upon the shipowner. For of 
exemption clauses as they relate to bailment and sub-bailment see Liang, C. “Benefits and Burdens of 
Third Parties Under Exception Clauses in Bills of Lading” (1999) 24 Tul. Mar. L.J. 225, at p. 227-234.  
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benefit from the exclusive jurisdiction clause in the bill of lading.458 Lord Goff phrased 
the issue as follows: “Their Lordships are here concerned with a case where there has 
been a sub-bailment – a bailment by the owner of the goods to a bailee, followed by a 
sub-bailment by the bailee to a sub-bailee – and the question has arisen whether, in an 
action by the owner against the sub-bailee for loss of the goods, the sub-bailee can rely as 
against the owner upon one of the terms upon which the goods have been sub-bailed to 
him by the bailee.”459 In finding that the shipowners could rely on the clause, Lord Goff 
opined “that the relevant clause in the sub-bailment would be in accordance with the 
reasonable commercial expectations of those who engage in this type of trade, and that 
such incorporation will generally lead to the conclusion which is eminently sensible in 
the context of carriage of goods by sea…”.460 In a subsequent judgment the Privy 
Council appeared to restrict the use of sub-bailment on terms by linking it to the 
Himalaya clause.461 Nevertheless, Lord Hobhouse in The Starsin, demonstrated that 
                                                 
458 The Owners of Cargo Lately on Board the Vessel K.H. Enterprise v. The Owners of the Vessel Pioneer 
Container (The Pioneer Container) [1994] 2 A.C. 324 (P.C.).  
459 Ibid, at p. 335.  
460 Ibid, at p. 347. For further discussion on the Hong Kong Court of Appeal judgment, which the Privy 
Council upheld, see Swadling, W. “Sub-bailment on Terms” [1993] LMCLQ 9. Swadling at p. 13 
expressed the sentiment that “The Pioneer Container has the potential to become the most important 
bailment case decided this century.” For commentary on the Privy Council’s judgment see Bell, A. “Sub-
bailment on Terms: A New Landmark” [1995] LMCLQ 177, and particularly at p. 178-180 for a discussion 
on the thorny issue of consent as it relates to sub-bailment.  
461 The Mahkutai [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1 (P.C.). In this instance, the shipowner sought to rely on an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause in the same manner as in The Pioneer Container, however, the Lords 
determined at p. 10, that the Himalaya clause allowed the shipowners as sub-contractors to benefit from 
certain terms in the bill of lading but those terms, according to the Lords, did not include the exclusive 
jurisdiction clause. Therefore “their Lordships find it impossible to hold that, be receiving the goods into 
their possession pursuant to the bill of lading, the shipowner’s obligations as bailees were effectively 
subjected to the exclusive jurisdiction clause as a term upon which they implicitly received the goods into 
their possession. Any such implication must, in their opinion, be rejected as inconsistent with the express 
terms of the bill of lading.” (Ibid, at p. 10). For discussion on the judgment as contrasted with The Pioneer 
Container see MacMillan, C. “Elder, Dempster Sails On: Privity of Contract and Bailment on Terms” 
[1997] LMCLQ 1. See also Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, at p. 300-301 discussing the holding of the Privy Council resulting in the strange situation where 
the bailee shipowner was in a worse position where the contract contained a Himalaya clause as opposed to 
where the contract did not. See Nossal, S. “Bailment on Terms, Himalaya Clauses, and Exclusive 
Jurisdiction Clauses: The Decision of the Privy Council in the Mahkutai” (1996) 26 Hong Kong L.J. 321, at 
p. 331-332 discussing the policy considerations at play in the judgment, and arguing that “the reasonable 
commercial expectations of the parties in The Mahuktai would have been that the terms of the bills of 
lading, issued by the charterers under authority from the shipowners, would govern the rights and liabilities 
of the parties involved in the adventure.” See also Lotus Cars v. Southhampton Cargo Handling (The 
Rigoletto) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 532 (C.A.), considering the interaction between an action in bailment and 
the Himalaya clause, where a sports car had been stolen from the possession of stevedores. In Lotus, the 
stevedores were held not to be bailees, but for a contrasting approach see Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. 
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bailment and sub-bailment on terms is alive and well in English law.462 Lord Hobhouse 
considered the situation where the owners of the goods had no contract with the 
shipowner as the time charterer was ‘the carrier’, and opined: “(1) in situations such as 
the present there is bailment and sub-bailment; (2) no attornment by the sub-bailee to the 
goods owner is necessary; (3) notwithstanding that there is no contract between them, the 
sub-bailee owes to the goods owner the duties of a bailee for reward; (4) but the sub-
bailee may rely upon the terms upon which he took possession of the goods from the 
bailee; (5) the fact that there is a Himalaya clause in the contract between the goods 
owner and the bailee does not oust the sub-bailee’s right to rely upon the terms of the 
sub-bailment.”463 Lord Hobhouse concluded that the claimants would have been able to 
hold the shipowners liable as bailees or sub-bailees and the shipowners would have been 
able to rely on the terms under which the goods had been taken into their possession.464 It 
appears that bailment may have certain advantages over tort actions. From a claimant’s 
prospective, it has been noted that there are four critical differences between a claim in 
bailment and one in tort, that make bailment the more attractive choice: “First, the burden 
of proof is reversed…liability will be imposed on the bailee unless it can prove that it 
took reasonable care of the goods…Secondly, a defendant owes no duty of care in 
negligence to take positive steps to prevent theft by third parties of the claimant’s goods 
which are in its possession. Thirdly, a bailee will be liable for the defaults of any 
independent contractors…Fourthly, recovery in respect of pure economic loss is possible 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Import and Export (The Elbe Maru) [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 206 (Q.B.), at p. 209 where sub-
contractors after discharge had goods stolen from them and were considered bailees. Bailment has also 
been used in Canadian law. See Hiram Walker & Sons v. Dover Navigation Co. [1950] 83 Ll. L. Rep. 84 
(K.B.), concerning the liabililty of the shipowner’s as bailees (Canadian law was applicable, and the 
plaintiff was Canadian, even though the forum for the action was England). 
462 Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.). 
463 Ibid, at p. 602. It is important to note that the issue of attornment appears to be settled with regard to 
bailment in this respect. It had proven to be a contentious issue in the past. See Baughen, S. “Bailment’s 
Continuing Role in Cargo Claims” [2001] LMCLQ 393, at p. 396-398. See also Baughen, S. “Charterers’ 
Bills and Shipowners’ Liabilities: A Black Hole for Cargo Claimants?” (2004) 10 JIML 248, at pp. 248-
250. For judgments where attornment was an issue see Sonicare International v. East Anglia Freight 
Terminal [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 48 (C.L.C.C.), particularly at p. 52-52, and The Future Express [1993] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 542 (C.A.), particularly pp. 550-551.  
464 The Starsin, ibid, at p. 602. Lord Hobhouse continued: “Further, by way of comment, the cargo-owners 
could, by relying upon the godds owner/sub-bailee relationship, have put the burden on the shipowners to 
excuse their failure to deliver the goods undamaged. But at trial they did not. They relied upon a Donohue 
v. Stevenson claim [tort] and had to discharge the burden of proof which that entailed.” (Ibid, at p. 603) 
Ouch…I would not want to be the claimant’s solicitor the morning that judgment was released. 
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in a bailment action.”465 Nevertheless, it would appear that bailment is in certain 
instances a successful way of creating a parallel regime to the Rules, with the same 
effect, for instances where “the reasonable commercial expectations” of those involved in 
the transaction would expect to be covered by those terms.  
 
 Bailment is not restricted to the commonwealth however, and has been used in the 
United States. Arguably it is comparatively rare given the expansive definition of 
‘carrier’ in the U.S., nevertheless it has been pleaded. In Schnell v. The Vallescura, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that the shipowner was liable to the cargo owner as a bailee 
when cargo entrusted into his care and custody.466 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
reviewing authorities in the context of claims in bailment, has determined that “(1) when 
applicable, COGSA provides the exclusive remedy for cargo damage against carriers; and 
(2) general maritime law applies when COGSA is inapplicable to a particular party or 
under particular circumstances.”467 In Otto Wolf, where the plaintiff attempted to render 
the shipowner liable as a bailee where the plaintiff’s contract was with the chareterer, the 
court found that bailments are contractual in nature and therefore no bailment situation 
could be found.468 In The M/V Naimo, the court held that “fairness dictates that the law of 
bailment be an available remedy to a shipper where the owner is not bound to the contract 
of carriage.”469 The bailment contract is therefore not necessarily the contract of carriage. 
Bailment in the context of carriage law has been characterized as the delivery of goods to 
the bailee in trust, under an express or implied contract which requires that the bailee 
perform the trust and either redeliver the goods or dispose of then in accordance with the 
                                                 
465 Baughen, S. “Bailment’s Continuing Role in Cargo Claims” [2001] LMCLQ 393, at p. 395. See 
Salmond and Spraggon v. Port Jackson Stevedoring (The New York Star) [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 298 (H.C. 
Aus), at p. 325-326, for a discussion on stevedor’s as bailees and the duty to take reasonable care of the 
goods.  
466 Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 (U.S. S.C.). The Supreme Court, at p. 304, held that that the 
carrier was “a bailee entrusted with the shipper’s goods, with respect to the care and safe discharge of 
which the law imposed upon him an extraordinary duty [because] discharge of the duty [was] particularly 
within his contract” 
467 Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V Kavo Yerakas, 50 F.3d 1349 (5 Cir. 1995), at p. 1354.  
468 Otto Wolf Handelsgesellschaft v. Sheridan Transportation Co., 800 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Vir. 1992), at p. 
1366. The cargo claimant’s suit was then dismissed (ibid, at p. 1367).   
469 Tuscaloosa Steel Co. v. M/V Naimo, 1992 WL 477117 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The Court relied on Nichimen 
Co. v. M/V Farland, 1972 AMC 1573 (2 Cir. 1972), as having allowed a claim in bailment in addition to a 
claim under COGSA. Actually, the 2nd Circuit in Farland simply stated that the shipper had established a 
prima facie claim in bailment, but never actually determined whether they were liable in bailment and 
whether it was a remedy alongside COGSA or whether COGSA was an exclusive remedy.  
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trust.470 The bailee must have exclusive possession of the bailed property in order for 
bailment to arise.471 Claims in bailment have therefore failed where claimants have been 
unable to demonstrate an express or implied bailment contract and where the goods were 
not in the exclusive possession of the defendant during carriage.472 In the United States, 
although several bailment claims have been pleaded and been successful,473 bailment is 
not as frequently an issue as in the United Kingdom given the tendency to subsume most 
parties under the Rules. 
 
8.4. Concurrent Liability: Tort and Contract 
 With regard to English law, the position with respect to concurrent liability is well 
settled.474 “Concurrent liability in contract and tort is now firmly established in English 
law. That a plaintiff has a cause of action in contract does not preclude that plaintiff from 
bringing an action in tort in respect of the same set of facts.”475 The issue was firmly 
settled by the House of Lords in the nineties in Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates.476 This 
is also the state of the law in commonwealth nations such as Canada and Australia.477 
This, however, is not the position in civil law jurisdictions. “Cumul”, or rather the joinder 
                                                 
470 T.N.T Marine Service Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Drydocks, 702 F.2d 585 (5 Cir. 1983), at p. 588.  
471 Ibid.  
472 Otto Wolf Handelsgesellschaft v. Sheridan Transportation Co., 800 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Vir. 1992), at p. 
1366; Thyssen Steel Co. v. M/V Kavo Yerakas, 50 F.3d 1349 (5 Cir. 1995), at p. 1355.  
473 Polo Ralph Lauren v. Tropical Shipping, 215 F.3d 1217 (11 Cir. 2000), allowing bailment but denying 
the tort claim; Cargill Ferrous Int’l v. M/V Sukarawan Naree, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13102 (E.D. La. 
1997), where bailment was pleased but was not successful on the basis that the defendant never had 
exclusive possession of the goods.   
474 Previously there was a school of thought which held that “as a general rule, the law did not recognize 
concurrent liability in negligence where there was a breach of a contractual duty of care unless the tort duty 
arose ‘independently of the contract’.” (Swanton, J. “Concurrent Liability in Tort and Contract: The 
Problem of Defining the Limits” (1996) 10 J. Cont. L. 21, at p. 22). See Jarvis v. Moy, Davies Smith 
Vandervell [1936] 1 K.B. 399 (C.A.), at p. 405, concerning the concurrent liability of stockbrokers. 
Notably, in certain instances, bailees and ‘common carriers’, were exempt from the restrictions that tort 
actions had to arise independently of contractual actions. (Swanton, ibid, at p. 22, footnote 11). 
475 Smith, S. “Concurrent Liability in Contract and Unjust Enrichment: The Fundamental Breach 
Requirement” (1999) 115 L.Q.R. 245.  
476 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates [1995] 2 A.C. 145 (H.L.).  
477 See the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse (1986) 21 D.L.R. (4th) 
481 (S.C.C.), and the holding of the High Court of Australia in Bryan v. Maloney (1995) 69 A.L.J.R. 375 
(H.C. Aus.), concerning the liability of builders.   
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of delictual and contractual actions, is prohibited.478 This is the case in such civilian 
jurisdictions as France479 and Quebec.480  
 
 The ability to launch suit in tort and contract, and arguably bailment, renders the 
law in this area increasingly complex, especially when one considers the nature of 
tortious liability in the common law as encompassing many torts.481 Actions may thus be 
founded in various torts, for example, the tort of conversion,482 tort of negligent 
misrepresentation,483 tort of deceit,484 or tort of negligence.485 Arguably, if an action is 
available in contract on the basis of the contract of carriage, the action should be routed 
through contract to fall under the Hague Rules regime. Unfortunately, in certain instances 
this is not always the case.486 Nevertheless, where one may find a particular tendency to 
launch suit in both tort and contract is where there is the potential that the time limitation 
has elapsed. In The Finnrose, a cargo of tissue paper was damaged by rain and the owner 
                                                 
478 Tetley, W. “Chapter 9: Proving the Contract or Tort” in Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed, at p. 28. Online 
at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime.  
479 See for example the Cour d’Appel de Paris, October 28, 1960, DMF 1961, 342, holding that “le cumul 
de la responsabilité délictuelle et de la responsabilité contractuelle est impossible.”  
480 Civil Code of Quebec, article 1458 provides: “every person has a duty to honour his contractual 
undertaking. Where he fails in this duty, he is liable for any bodily, moral or material injury he causes to 
the other contracting party and is liable to reparation for the injury; neither he nor the other party may in 
such a case avoid the rules governing contractual liability by opting for rules that would be more favourable 
to them.” 
481 The law of torts in the common law developed in a very compartmentalized fashion resulting in a series 
of torts, for example one may still take suit under a Rylands v. Fletcher tort, the tort of nuisance, tort of 
deceit, or tort of negligent misrepresentation. The common law developed many different separate torts, 
and arguably it is only after the seminal case of Donahue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (H.L.), with the 
development of the tort of negligence, that one can begin to see a general obligation not to harm another, or 
duty of care, crystallizing in the common law. See Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of 
Obligations (1999) Oxford University Press, Oxford, particularly “Chapter 4: The Substantive Law of 
Torts”, and “Chapter 9: The Law of Torts in the Nineteenth Century: The Rise of the Tort of Negligence”.  
482 See Gaskell, N et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 270 noting that 
standard English pleadings invoke the tort of conversion as well as bailment, negligence, and contract.  
483 See for example, Comalco Aluminum v. Mogul Freight Services (The Ocean Trader) (1993) 113 A.L.R. 
667 (Fed. Crt. Aust.), where the Federal Court of Australia considered whether the remedies for 
misrepresentation and those under the Hague Rules should both be available, holding in the end that the act 
of stuffing the container would be governed by tortious liability, while the act of carrying it, by the liability 
scheme in uniform law. 
484 See for example, Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan Nation Shipping Corporation and Others (No. 2) 
[2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 218 (C.A.), where the carrier was held liable in the tort of deceit for antedating bills 
of lading in exchange for a letter of indemnity.  
485 As discussed above, see section 8.2. 
486 See section 8.5, infra, entitled Visby Protocol Art. 4 bis 1, and particularly the discussion of The Gregos. 
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of the cargo claimed against the shipowner in contract and tort of negligence.487 The 
cargo owner’s claim was dismissed,488 but nevertheless, tortious and contractual claims 
are generally launched in such instances.489 In the United States, launching a suit in tort 
and contract concurrently is unproblematic as well. In The President Monroe, the 
claimants’ cargo was wetted when ballast water entered the hatch covers and suit was 
launched against the shipowner alleging negligence and unseaworthiness under 
contract.490 The court found the shipowner liable under contract for breach of the 
obligation to furnish a seaworthy vessel,491 but also found the shipowner liable for 
negligence after the evidence at trial had shown that “the crew of the President Monroe 
conducted the ballasting operation in a negligent and careless manner.”492 One can 
therefore see, how the multiplicity of actions on which to potentially found liability 
increases the complexity of the law in this area, fostering the tendency of claimants 
attorneys or solicitors to simply launch all possible actions in the hopes that one will 
apply.   
 
8.5. The Visby Protocol, Article. IV Bis 1 
 It had become evident after sometime that the stipulated limits of liability and 
prescription period mandated by the Hague Rules could be circumvented in respect of 
goods damaged or lost by an action in tortious or delictual liability. Evidently this was 
viewed as undesirable, and therefore the Visby Protocol of 1968493 attempted to remedy 
                                                 
487 Fort Sterling v. South Atlantic Cargo Shipping (The Finnrose) [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 559 (Q.B.), at p. 
561. 
488 Ibid, at p. 576. 
489 See The Amazona [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 130 (C.A.) and The Nordglimt [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 470 
(Q.B.), both addressing the issue of time bars, where in The Nordglimt, the action was commenced after the 
year expiry, while in The Amazona, the action was commenced in time, but if the action was dismissed in 
favor of arbitration the cargo owners raised concerns that it would be time barred, which the court assuaged 
by holding the arbitration would not be.  
490 Sears Roebuck v. American President Lines (The President Monroe) [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 385 (N.D. 
Cal. 1971), at p. 386-387. Suit was also launched against the shipbuilder on the basis of implied warrantee 
of fitness alleging that the hatch covers were defective.   
491 Ibid, at pp. 386 and 387. 
492 Ibid, at p. 388. The shipowner was held jointly and severally liable with the shipbuiler. For further 
discussion on this, see section 4 on joint and several liability. 
493 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to 
Bills of Lading, Brussels, February 23, 1968. 
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this problem.494 The report by the Committee on Bills of Lading Clauses presented at the 
CMI 1963 Stockholm Conference addressed the issue of circumventing the Rules: “The 
Sub-Committee was aware that attempts have been made – and often successful ones – to 
get around the limitations and exemptions of the B/L Convention…thus in some 
countries a contracting party may sue in contract but also in tort. Therefore if sued in tort, 
the carrier may find himself deprived of the benefit of limitation and of the one year 
prescription period etc.”495 The draft Article IV Bis 1 presented in the report read: “Any 
action for damages against the carrier, whether founded in contract or in tort, can only be 
brought subject to the conditions and limits provided for in this Convention.”496 It has 
been noted that during the drafting meetings some of the participants had in mind the 
situation where the receiver brings an action in tort against the carrier to avoid the Hague 
Rules, while others present supported the provision as having wider implications and 
reaching beyond the bill of lading holder.497 For example, the delegate from Finland was 
very critical noting that the provision does not regulate “an action in tort that can be taken 
against the carrier without having reference to the Convention …for this reason, the 
whole paragraph is useless…”.498 The text of the provision was subsequently amended at 
the Stockholm Conference without any explanation as to the reasoning from the relevant 
committee,499 and no reference or discussion concerning the change can be found in the 
travaux preparatoires.500 The adopted text of Article IV Bis 1 stipulates: “The defences 
and limits of liability provided for in these Rules shall apply in any action against the 
carrier in respect of loss or damage to goods covered by a contract of carriage whether 
the action be founded in contract or tort.” Despite the fact that prima facie the wording of 
                                                 
494 Berlingieri, F. “The Hague-Visby Rules and Actions in Tort” (1991) 107 LQR 18, at p. 18, who notes 
that Article IV Bis 2 was plainly directed at the problem of actions in tort used to evade the protections of 
the Hague Rules.  
495 Comite Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Anterpen, Belgium, at p. 596.  
496 Ibid.  
497 Berlingieri, F. “The Hague-Visby Rules and Actions in Tort” (1991) 107 LQR 18, at p. 20. Mr. 
Belingeri represented Italy in a portion of the drafting meetings for the Committee, see Comite Maritime 
International, The Travaux Preparatoires, at p. 604.  
498 Comite Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires, at p. 607.  
499 Berlingieri, F. “The Hague-Visby Rules and Actions in Tort” (1991) 107 LQR 18, at p. 20. 
500 Comite Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires, cover the drafting and adoption of Article 
IV bis in pp. 595 – 633, and no reference in those pages can be found that may shed light on the 
amendment of the provision.  
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the article would seem to resolve the issues discussed above and bring most of those 
claims within the umbrella of the Hague-Visby Rules, this ultimately proved not to be 
case.  
 
 Initially, there was a divergence of opinions as to the meaning and scope of the 
provision. One interpretation was that the provision only applied with respect to the 
parties to the contract, or in other words, “the words [in] Art. IV bis (1) merely mean that 
a person who is a party to the contract of carriage cannot improve his position by 
disregarding the contract and suing in tort.”501 The interpretation of the article as only 
applying where privity of contract already exists between the plaintiff and the defendant 
has been described shortly after the implementation of the Protocol by one commentator 
as “not right”.502  Conversely, it was viewed that the scope of the article was more 
expansive in that it could encompass the situation where the owner or charterer, 
whomever was the party to the carriage contract, was being sued by a third party, thus 
someone not a party to the bill of lading.503 Other authors have adopted the view as well, 
arguing that “any action in tort against the contracting carrier in respect of loss of or 
damage to goods covered by a contract of carriage to which the Rules apply is subject to 
the Rules, whether brought by a party to the contract of carriage or not.”504 When 
considering what is arguably viewed as a more expansive interpretation of the provision, 
one should note that this still fails to encompass the situation where charterer’s bills are 
issued and the claimant takes suit against the shipowner, or vice versa where the charterer 
is not a party to the contract by virtue of the bills being owner’s bills. Arguably, this is 
the heart of the problem. The possibility was noted not long after the article came into 
force that one interpretation available was to give the actual carrier the benefit and 
protection of the Hague-Visby Rules despite the fact he is not a party to the bill of lading 
                                                 
501 Treitel, G. “Bills of Lading and Third Parties” [1986] LMCLQ 294, at p. 304.  
502 Diamond, A. “The Hague-Visby Rules” [1978] LMCLQ 225, at p. 248.  
503 Ibid. Diamond used two examples of a scenario where a third party would take suit against the carrier 
who is party to the contract. The first being where a bank with security in the goods never becomes party to 
the contract as the bank was never able to take delivery given that the goods were lost. This example was 
modeled on Brandt v. Liverpool [1924] 1 K.B. 575.  The second example is where a shipper contracts with 
a freight forwarder who consolidates his shipment with others and receives a single bill of lading for the 
entire shipment, and when the goods are lost the shipper sues the carrier to avoid the limits of liability in 
the freight forwarding contract.   
504 Berlingieri, F. “The Hague-Visby Rules and Actions in Tort” (1991) 107 LQR 18, at p. 20. 
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contract.505 It was argued however that “[t]his is a bold construction. There is little in the 
wording of the new Rule or in art. 1(a) to support the wider proposition, however 
attractive it may seem in the abstract.”506 On the basis of a textual interpretation however, 
there is support for the proposition that the defendant need not be party to the contract, as 
the provision simply stipulates that the goods must be covered by a contract of carriage, 
no where indicating that the carrier must be party to that contract. Nevertheless, one may 
argue that failing to adopt an interpretation of the provision that protects both shipowners 
and charterers from suit in tort, allows the mischief made possible by the narrow 
interpretation of the notion of ‘carrier’ to continue. With respect, there is a coherence that 
is lacking in the second interpretation discussed above, in that the plaintiff need not be 
party to the contract of carriage to fall within the scope of article IV bis 1, yet the 
defendant must be a party to the contract of carriage otherwise he fails to benefit from the 
protection afforded and obligations imposed by the article, and thus the Rules.  
 
 The English Court of Appeal has, to a large extent settled the debate. In The 
Captain Gregos, the Court of Appeal that Article IV Bis 1 only applied with respect to 
plaintiffs who are parties to the contract of carriage.507 The Court adopted the view that 
the article ensured that a cargo owner would be no better off taking suit in tort than if he 
had taken suit in contract: “The only reason why the cargo-owners seek to found on the 
                                                 
505 Diamond, A. “The Hague-Visby Rules” [1978] LMCLQ 225, at p. 249.  
506 Ibid. Diamond justifies this comment by stating at p. 249, footnote 66, that the difficulties of arguing 
such an interpretation are “(a) The action must be against “the Carrier” who is defined as “includes the 
owner or charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper.” The word “includes” may signify 
“means and includes”; see “comprend” in the French text…(b) Even if the definition is not all embracing, 
the defendant must be someone, even though not an owner or charterer, “who enters into a contract of 
carriage with a shipper”.” Respectively, one may suggest that Diamond’s view of the article IV bis 1 is 
tainted by the assumption that the definition of ‘carrier’ in the Rules is limited to one carrier. If one is to 
consider that there may be several carriers, than the objections to an expansive interpretation of article IV 
bis 1 are reduced. One might also consider the fact that no where in the wording of article IV bis 1 does it 
stipulate that it is restricted to the carrier who entered into the contract, rather, the wording simply states 
any ‘action against the carrier’ and requires that the goods be ‘covered by a contract of carriage’. Nor is the 
article subject to any of the other articles in the Rules, thus why would one limit the scope of the article by 
referring to other portions of the rules.  
507 Compania Portorafi Commerciales v. Ultramar Panama (The Captain Gregos) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
310 (C.A.), at p. 318, per Lord Justice Bingham: “If [the Rules] had been intended to regulate relations 
between non-parties to the bill of lading contract, it is hard to think the language would not have been both 
different and simpler.” As well, at p. 318, per Lord Justice Slade: “These provisions, in my judgment, by 
themselves show fairly clearly that the purpose of all the articles is to govern the relationship of the parties 
to the contract under a contract of carriage of goods by sea.” 
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shipowners’ alleged misconduct rather than on the breaches of the rules is, as I infer, that 
for whatever reason they let the year pass without bringing suit. That is in my view 
precisely the result the rules were intended to preclude.”508 This narrow view of view of 
the provision has been criticized. Berlingeri has criticized the decision by referencing the 
original CMI wording of the article, quoted above, noting that the intent was to cover all 
actions in tort regardless if the plaintiff was a party to the contract, and therefore Lord 
Justice Bingham should not have interpreted the article restrictively based on the 
reference made to the contract of carriage.509 An important criticism of the decision is the 
fact that when Lord Justice Bingham interpreted article IV bis 1 he was guided by the 
doctrine of privity, reasoning that “[w]hatever the law in other jurisdictions, the general 
principle that only a party to a contract may sue on it is well established here. If the 
draftsmen of he 1924 and 1971 Acts had intended that respective rules to infringe that 
principle or appreciated that that was their effect, I think they would have sought to make 
that clear in the Acts. It would be strange if so fundamental a principle were to be so 
inconspicuously abrogated.”510 That privity would play such an important role in the 
interpretation of the provision is both surprising and disappointing given that the aim of 
uniform law is to provide some measure of uniform interpretation. In this instance, Lord 
Macmillan’s plea for an international interpretation of the Act appears to have been 
disregarded; “It is important to remember that the Act of 1924, was the outcome of an 
International Conference and that the rules in the Schedule have an international 
currency. As these rules must come under the consideration of foreign Courts, it is 
desirable in the interests of uniformity that their interpretation should not be rigidly 
controlled by domestic precedents of antecedent date, but rather that the language of the 
rules should be construed on broad principles of general acceptance.”511 In his judgment, 
Lord Justice Bingham did acknowledge that such an interpretation may lead to different 
                                                 
508 Ibid, at p. 316, per Lord Justice Bingham. The Lord Justice, at p. 315, relied “on the learned editors of 
Scrutton” when adopting the view that the principle object of the article was to ensure contractual claimants 
were not in a better position by launching a tort claim.  
509 Berlingieri, F. “The Hague-Visby Rules and Actions in Tort” (1991) 107 LQR 18, at p. 19-20.  
510 Compania Portorafi Commerciales v. Ultramar Panama (The Captain Gregos) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
310 (C.A.), at p. 318.  
511 Stag Line v. Foscolo, Mango & Co. (1931) Ll. L. Rep. 165 (H.L.), at p. 174. See also Gaskell, N et al. 
Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London., at p. 270 expressing his disappointment that the 
statutes based on the Hague Rules were interpreted in light of the common law and blended with common 
law actions, rather than having the Convention be the sole basis for the carrier’s liability.  
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results in different jurisdictions, but nevertheless opted for a privity based 
interpretation.512 Commentary on the judgment of Lord Justice Bingham, has expressed 
disapproval over the lack of consideration of the international character of the rules; 
“Special consideration must in any case be given to the fact that the two Acts 
implemented international conventions, which have to be seen against the background of 
many different legal systems. Attention should surely be paid, therefore, to interpreting 
the relevant conventions against their international backgrounds. It seems, with respect, 
odd to proceed on the basis that such a convention should be interpreted rather strictly 
against the background of English law…”513 Nevertheless, article IV bis 1, has been 
given a narrow interpretation in English law, which although undesirable, is arguably 
consistent with the narrow interpretation English law has given to other articles in the 
Hague-Visby Rules. It is regrettable that given the proliferation of actions launched 
outside the Hague-Visby regime, the Lord Justices did not use the opportunity to 
streamline the law in this area and ensure that a greater number of claims were routed 
back under the umbrella of uniform law. In any event, the Lord Justices’ holding appear 
to have been the desired route in England, as despite the attempts to deal with tort action 
in Visby Art. 4 bis 1, “the Law Commission rejected any suggestion that the Carriage of 
Goods Act 1992 should abolish any action against a carrier in tort.”514  
 
8.6. Conclusion 
 It would appear from the proliferation of actions outside the Hague-Visby 
scheme, that arguably violence is being done to the regime that was intended to regulate 
liability between the carrier interests and shipper interests. To some extent it has reached 
a level that is almost absurd, with the cargo claimant in Sonicare International v. East 
Anglia Freight Terminal founding the action in contract, simple bailment, bailment by 
                                                 
512 Compania Portorafi Commerciales v. Ultramar Panama (The Captain Gregos) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
310 (C.A.), at p. 317: “We are again (no doubt unavoidably) obliged to resolve this issue without the help 
which the decisions or opinions of foreign Judges or Jurists might have given us. I have not for my part 
found it an easy question. I am particularly concerned that idiosyncratic legal rules on privity might yield 
different results in different countries. But on a balance I prefer the cargo-owners argument.” 
513 Berlingieri, F. “The Hague-Visby Rules and Actions in Tort” (1991) 107 LQR 18, at p. 21.  
514 Gaskell, N et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 270.  
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attornment, Brandt v. Liverpool implied contract and the common law duty of care.515 
Nevertheless, certain causes of action outside the Rules, specifically bailment and 
implied contract, are arguably being used by the courts to duplicate what would be the 
terms of the contracts of carriage in efforts to deal with the narrow application of the 
Rules.  
                                                 
515 Sonicare International v. East Anglia Freight Terminal [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 144, at p. 52 Justice 
Hallgarten lists Sonicare’s causes of action noting “during the course of the hearing, subject to the title 
issue, no fewer than five possible ways were canvassed whereby Sonicare might be in a position to hold 
EAFT accountable for the loss.”  
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 9. A TEAM OF CARRIERS? THE INCREASING NUMBER OF PARTIES 
INVOLVED IN CARRIAGE  
The uniform law with regard to carriage of goods by sea has become in certain, 
and arguably many, respects outmoded. Over the past 80 years since the birth of uniform 
carriage law, the shipping industry has fundamentally changed. “Where once the carrier 
and the shipper, mutually exclusive parties who together comprised the sum of the 
shipping world, where the only two players, the current production is an ensemble cast of 
role-players and specialists, each playing his part in pursuit of the ultimate goal: the 
efficient transportation of goods by sea.”516 It has been noted that today “[i]t is 
impossible for the carrier to perform carriage alone due to the increase in his commercial 
relations and to specialize in the whole transportation area owing to the development in 
shipping technique and procedure. As a result of developments in maritime commerce the 
loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody and discharge of goods by experts have 
become necessary. Nowadays, almost all segments of carriage are carried out by third 
parties rather than the contracting carrier.”517 “The subcontracting of cargo-related 
services has developed to such an extent that the traditional ocean carrier is now 
subcontracting even the ocean carriage itself. Under vessel sharing arrangements amoung 
ocean carriers, called “slot charters”, shipper may never contract with an actual 
shipwoenr, much less with the owner of the carrying vessel. Ocean carriage by sub-
contract is now performed not only for traditional ocean carriers but for the NVOCC, an 
entity that may become a carrier to cargo owners or a shipper to shipowners. All other 
traditional functions of ocean carriage – pre-loading storage, examination, weighing or 
measuring, packaging, loading, stowage on board, fumigation, documentation, unloading 
and warehousing – can be expected to be carried out, at least in part, by subcontractors or 
the carrier. Thus the concept of “carrier” – on which twentieth century modal regimes 
were based – has lost most of its traditional meaning.”518 The multiplicity of parties has 
                                                 
516 Charest, D. “A Fresh Look at Treatment of Vessel Managers Under COGSA” (2004) 78 Tul. L. Rev. 
885, at p. 877.  
517 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 85.  
518 Sweeney, J. “Crossing the Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport” (2005) 36 JMLC 155, 
at p. 171-172.  
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not only turned the spotlight on the identity of the carrier problem, as illustrated by more 
recent uniform law attempts and domestic legislation, but it has also increased the 
complexity of the problem. What was a problem of multiple performing parties with 
regard to ocean carriage has now become a multimodal problem. Thus the issue of 
performing parties has now become complicated by the myriad of issues surrounding 
multimodalism. This, as seen below, renders the process of modernizing uniform law 
with regard to ‘carriers’ infinitely more difficult than if ocean carriage were the sole 
concern. 
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 10. A STILL BORN SOLUTION: THE HAMBURG RULES 
 Interestingly enough, despite the fact that the existing regime failed to properly 
handle instances where multiple parties performed the carriage, the dissatisfaction with 
the Hague Rules regime stemmed primarily from other sources. The fact that ‘the carrier’ 
had become invariably split in practice into carriers was a problem for the commercial 
interests involved in carriage, whereby the impetus for the Hamburg Rules were 
problems more along the political lines. By the time UNCITRAL was preparing to 
consider reforming the rules of carriage in the late 1960’s, the interests involved in 
shipping differed greatly from those involved during the 1920’s. The drafters and the 
negotiators of the Hague Rules were commercial parties. Among the 44 delegates at the 
ILA Conference at the Hague, only four were affiliated with political or diplomatic 
interests, while the remainder were from the private commercial sector.519 These 
individuals included a coal merchant, shipowners, barristers and lawyers, an underwriter, 
the chairman of Lloyd’s, the managing director of Produce Brokers, an adjuster, shippers, 
bankers, and professors.520 Conversely, the Hamburg Rules conferences were an entirely 
political affair.521 In the intervening years, shipping had taken on an important role in the 
economies of developing nations, as exports had begun to account for a high percentage 
of their gross national product.522 By the early 1970’s, the developing nations accounted 
for approximately 65 percent of all maritime shipments, while owning only 7.6 percent of 
the world’s maritime fleet.523 While the dissatisfaction with the Hague Rules had 
become, for the traditional maritime nations,524 centred around the rules for unit 
                                                 
519 Hague Conference Report, at p. 168-74, also found in Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal 
Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” 
(1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 88, f.n. 23.  
520 Ibid. 
521 For a discussion on the political nature of the Hamburg Rules conferences and the role of developing 
nations in the process see Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International 
Maritime Rulemaking Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 107.  
522 Frederick, ibid, at p. 107. 
523 Frederick, ibid, at p. 103, citing Haiji, “UNCTAD and Shipping” (1972) 6 World Trade L. 58, at p. 58; 
Karan, The Carrier’s Liability, supra note , at p. 32, noting the reverse statistic, that while newly 
independent nations were responsible for 65% of the shipments in maritime commerce, industrialized 
nations owned 93% of the mercantile fleet.  
524 Although notably it was such cargo-oriented states as the U.S., Canada, Australia and France, that 
pushed for improvements. See Herber, R. “The Hamburg Rules: Origin and Need for the New Liability 
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limitation of liability (the monetary value as well as the rules determining the unit), time 
bars, and the law of agency in the context of non-delegable duties and the use of carrier 
defences,525 conversely, the developing nations had focused their ire on other issues. 
Their dissatisfaction revolved around the carrier’s 17 exculpatory provisions, including 
the “catch-all” exemption, and in particular the existence of the fire and nautical fault 
defences.526  Essentially, it was viewed by the developing nations that the allocation of 
risk was slanted heavily in favour of the carrier.527   Sweeney has described this view in a 
slightly more dramatic fashion; “Dissatisfaction of the developing world stems essentially 
from the belief that the operation of traditional maritime law (along with other aspects of 
world trade) impairs the balance of payments position of developing states so as to insure 
                                                                                                                                                 
System” in The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and 
Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 44.  
525 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 72-73. With respect to the agency complaints, they centered around two judgments: The Munster 
Castle (Riverstone Meat Co. v. Lancashire Shipping Co [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57 (H.L.), which rejected 
the carrier’s assertion that hiring a competent repairer or inspector was sufficient to demonstrate due 
dilligence), and The Himalaya (Adler v. Dickson [1955] 1 Q.B. 158, [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 267 (C.A.)) this 
judgment opened the door for use of such Himalaya clauses to extend the benefit of the carriers exemptions 
to other parties in the maritime transaction, such as stevedores as exemplified in Scruttons v. Midland 
Silicons (1962) A.C. 446 (H.L.)).  The traditional maritime states were concerned about the non-delagable 
nature of the seaworthiness obligation and preferred to implement a duty to make a careful selection of 
repairers or inspectors (Sweeney, ibid). Secondly, there was concern about the extent of the use of the 
carriers defences, particularly where willful acts were involved and where it is extended beyond the crew, 
for example to the stevedores (Ibid).  
526 Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in 
The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 5; Sweeney, “The UNCITRAL Draft 
Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 69, at p. 73-74. Other contentions 
regarding carrier’s potential liability revolved around the limits of liability, the possibility of over-all 
limitation and the fact that Article 3 was subject to Article 4 (Sweeney, ibid).  
527 An UNCITRAL report from the last UN session of 1969 describes the statements of the representatives 
from the developing countries: “[They] stated that present-day legislation in the field reflected, in many 
respects, an earlier economic phase of society, as well as attitudes and practices which seemed unduly to 
favour ship-owners at the expense of the shippers.” (Report of the United Nations Committee on 
International Trade Law on the work of its Second Session, para 26, U.N. Doc. A/7747, quoted in Werth, 
D. “The Hamburg Rules Revisited – A Look at the US Options” (1991) 22 JMLC 59, at p. 64. Shaw makes 
an interesting correlation noting that: “some fifty years after the adoption of the Hague Rules, we find, 
again, primarily the users of shipping services, in this case the developing countries, raising at the political 
level practically the very same complaints generated earlier by shipper interests in the then British 
Dominions, Western Europe and United States – excessive exemptive privileges for carriers, exoneration 
from negligence in key shipowner operations such as navigation, and restrictive jurisdiction clauses in Bills 
of Lading.” (Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key 
Issues” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 6).  
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continued poverty and perpetual under-development in an industrial age.”528 It was this 
state of affairs that initiated a re-examination of the uniform law on carriage of goods by 
sea, and therefore not the fact that the notion of the carrier in the Hague Rules was wholly 
inadequate for application in modern carriage.  
 
 To produce the draft convention, a Working Group on International Legislation 
on Shipping, was convened by UNCITRAL and composed of seven members.529 Due to 
objections, however, the working group was expanded to twenty on members in March of 
1971.530 The working group held six sessions from January 1972 to February 1975 
wherein the Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea was prepared.531 Despite the 
fact that the definition of ‘carrier’ and allocation of responsibility in the instances of 
multiple parties to the carriage endeavour, were not the impetus for the Hamburg Rules, it 
was evident to all parties, developing nations and traditional maritime states, that this was 
a problematic area of carriage and in need of reform. This is evident partially by the fact 
that during the Working Group sessions, certain aspects proved to be a fairly non-
contentious.532 Extending the defences of the carrier to others was one such issue. The 
discussion centred predominantly around the choice of language, but consensus soon 
developed in favour of retaining the language used in the Brussels, or Visby, Protocol.533 
On the other hand, the issue of transhipment proved to be contentious and 
                                                 
528 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 73; quoted in Yancy, B. “The Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg” (1983) 57 
Tul. L. Rev. 1238, at p. 1250.  
529 Chile, Egypt, Ghana, India, U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A. (Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft 
Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 69, at p. 77).  
530 Sweeney, “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 77. The members of the working group for all sessions were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Tanzania, 
U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, U.S.A. and Zaire. Spain attended the first few meetings but was then replaced 
by the Federal Republic of Germany. (Ibid). Of the ten largest shipowning nations, Japan, Norway, U.K., 
U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and Germany, were in the working group, while Liberia, Greece, Panama, and Italy were 
not. (Ibid).   
531 Sweeney, “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport 
of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 523.  
532 As opposed other issues, such as the basis of carrier liability, or the fault provision, which was discussed 
often contentiously, five out of the six sessions. See Sweeney, “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 69, at p. 103-117, and see also Sweeney, “UNCITRAL 
and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport of Goods” ” (1991) 22 
JMLC 511, at p. 524. 
533 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part II)” (1976) 7 JMLC 
327, at p. 340-341.  
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controversial.534 With respect to the topic at hand, multiple parties acting as ocean 
carriers, certain portions of the debate, which took place predominantly during the fifth 
session,535 are relevant. Norway had prepared a proposal regulating transhipment that 
provided for the contracting carrier’s liability to cover the entire carriage unless exempted 
where the goods are in the charge of another, and that where both are liable their liability 
is joint and several.536 There were objections from Australia on the basis of the 
exculpatory clauses and that the shipper would not know whom to sue or where the 
damage occurred.537 An alternative was suggested based on a provision in the 
Secretariat’s report that did not provide for the exemption from liability,538 however it 
was met with mixed results.539 Subsequent drafts were proposed with the central issue 
being the wording relating to the ability of the contracting carrier to exempt himself from 
liability for loss or damage to the goods.540 The main concern, particularly on the part of 
                                                 
534 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part II)” (1976) 7 JMLC 
327, at p. 341.  
535 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part II)” (1976) 7 JMLC 
327, at p. 341. 
536 Norway’s proposal provided: 
1) Optional Transhipment or Substitution 
If, according to an option contained in the contract of carriage, the entire carriage or a part thereof has been 
performed by a person other than the contracting carrier, the contracting carrier shall remain responsible 
according to the provisions of the convention as if he himself had performed the entire carriage. The person 
performing the carriage shall be deemed an agent of the contracting carrier.  
2) Transhipment or Substitution according to Agreement 
If, according to agreement, the entire carriage or a designated part thereof shall be performed by a person 
other than the contracting carrier, the contracting carrier shall remain responsible according to the 
provisions of the convention as if he himself had performed the entire carriage. The person performing the 
carriage shall be considered an agent of the contracting carrier. However, the contracting carrier may 
exempt himself from liability for any loss or damage caused by events occurring while the goods are in the 
charge of such person.  
3) The Liability of the Person Performing the Carriage or a Part Thereof 
The person performing the carriage of a part thereof shall be responsible for the carriage performed by him 
according to the same rules as the contracting carrier. In cases where such person and the contracting 
carrier are both liable, their liability shall be joint and several. The aggregate amounts recoverable from 
them shall not exceed the limits provided for in the convention. 
(Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part II)” (1976) 7 JMLC 
327, at p. 342-343).  
537 Sweeney, ibid, at p. 343.  
538 “If the contract of carriage is performed by more than one carrier, the first carrier shall be responsible to 
the owner of the goods for performance of the contract of carriage. Any intermediate carrier shall be 
responsible for performance of that part of the contract of carriage undertaken by him.” (Ibid).  
539 It was supported by Australia, Brazil, Singapore, Tanzania, Nigeria, the United States and Argentina, 
but Poland, Japan, Belgium and the United Kingdom disapproved of the language in the provision. (Ibid).   
540 See the amended proposal by Norway and the subsequent proposal by the United States, ibid, at pp. 343 
– 345.  
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the United States, was avoiding the possibility of overly broad exculpatory clauses.541 
Conversely, several nations led by Norway, and supported by the CMI, expressed 
concern that carriers if made liable for the entire carriage would not want to issue bills of 
lading covering the entire transit.542 By the end of the working group sessions, the carrier 
was allowed to exonerate himself from liability subject to several conditions.543 During 
the sixth session, the working group considered the definition of the carrier. The 
definition, or definitions, was drafted in the context of having considered the problems of 
transhipment in the previous session.544 The delegates, in the previous session, had 
approved of the language that rendered the contracting carrier responsible for the entire 
carriage, and that responsibility was shared between the contracting carrier and the actual 
carrier, therefore it was necessary to carefully draft definitions.545 The following 
definition of carrier was proposed by France: “The carrier is the person or the enterprise 
which takes charge of particular goods and undertakes to move them in order to direct 
them to their ports of destination. It is that person or enterprise which issues in his or its 
name the title document which serves as a receipt against handing over of the goods.”546 
Norway and the U.K. objected to the provision on the basis that it was too cumulative and 
there could not be more than one carrier at the same exact time.547 One may beg to differ, 
that in modern carriage where the duties of a carrier are split, that there may certainly be 
more than one carrier at a time. Arguably, the rigid single carrier model exemplified in 
English jurisprudence was also being put forward in the working group negotiations. The 
United States responded to the U.K. and Norway by saying that “that was the exact 
nature of the problem of a single definition; one must not force the cargo interest to chase 
phantom “carriers” when there were in fact many participants in the movement of a 
                                                 
541 Ibid, at p. 344. Although, the U.S. opinion was shared by France, Tanzania, Australia, India, Singapore, 
Argentina, Brazil and Nigeria.  
542 “The CMI observer noted that if the carrier were made responsible for the entire transit on a through bill 
of lading the carriers would stop issuing such bills and would issue a bill of lading only for its own leg of 
the transit while new bills of lading would have to be issued at each transshipment port, thereby impeding 
international trade through greater amounts of paperwork.” (Ibid, at p. 345, footnote 127).  
543 Ibid, at pp. 345-346, providing the draft of Article E, which the U.S. had proposed, still containing the 
carrier’s ability to exonerate himself, but provided only where the actual carrier had been subject to legal or 
arbitral proceedings by cargo interests.    
544 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part IV)” (1976) 7 
JMLC 615, at p. 628.  
545 Ibid, at p. 629.  
546 Ibid. 
547 Ibid.  
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single shipment. Of course cargo was not entitled to double recovery, but the rights of the 
cargo interest must be made interchangeable so that the cargo owner was certain of 
recovery from either an actual carrier or the contracting carrier.”548 Another cumulative 
definition was suggested: “Carrier: includes but is not limited to anyone who enters into a 
contract of carriage with the shipper and anyone who undertakes to perform the contract 
of carriage.”549 It became apparent fairly soon that the transhipment problems would not 
be able to be solved through a single article, therefore the following article was proposed 
and approved: “1. “Carrier” or “contracting carrier” means any person who in his own 
name enters into a contract of carriage of goods by sea with the shipper. 2. “Actual 
carrier” means any person to whom the contracting carrier has entrusted the performance 
of all or part of the carriage of goods.”550 The various drafts of the above provisions were 
altered at the conference sessions, but generally, the aim remained the same. The 
Diplomatic Conference was held in Hamburg from 6 – 31 March 1978.551 The entire text 
of the new convention was voted on at midnight on March 30, 1978,552 and was signed 
on Friday, March 31, 1978,553 and therefore became the Hamburg Rules.554
 
 The Hamburg Rules appear at first glance to provide a solution to the 
complexities that have arisen as a result of Hague Rules definition of ‘carrier’. “The 
Hamburg Rules aim to address the problems posed by charterers’ bills of lading by 
expressly distinguishing the contracting carrier from the actual carrier where they are 
different parties.”555 Article 1(1) defines ‘carrier’ as “any person by whom or in whose 
name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a shipper.” Article 
1(2) defines “actual carrier” as “any person to whom the performance of the carriage of 
                                                 
548 Ibid, at p. 630.  
549 Ibid.  
550 Ibid.  
551 Herber, R. “The Hamburg Rules: Origin and Need for the New Liability System” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 40. 
552 Of the seventy eight states present, sixty eight voted in favor, none opposed and three abstained. 
553 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 529.  
554 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Hamburg, March 31,1978 (Hamburg 
Rules). 
555 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 27.  
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goods, or of part of the carriage, has been entrusted by the carrier, and includes any 
person to whom such performance has been entrusted.” At first glance the definition is 
evidently much more encompassing than the previous definition, and it has been noted 
that “by not referring specifically to ‘the owner or charter’, as in the Hague Rules, it is 
clear that the term may include a person such as a freight forwarder or an NVOCC (non-
vessel operating common carrier).”556 It has also been noted that “an independent 
contractor employed by the actual carrier may become an actual carrier…being another 
person to whom such performance has been (further) entrusted.”557 The definition of 
actual carrier however will not include servants or agents.558 One may question however, 
what becomes of a party such as the shipowner, where for example the demise charterer 
has issued the bill of lading and the time charterer has performed the actual carriage. In 
Hamburg, concepts such as “due diligence” and “seaworthiness” have been eliminated,559 
and therefore would the shipowner have any obligations that would enable him to be 
characterized as an actual carrier? Or in such instances would the shipowner fall outside 
the regime?560 One author has interpreted the provisions as follows: “The starting point is 
the contracting carrier; if he does not actually perform the contract, anyone involved in 
the contract as a shipowner or ship operator or as an “intermediary” will be included 
within the term “actual carrier”.”561 It has been concluded by some however that “[t]he 
                                                 
556 Force, R. “A Comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules: Much Ado About (?)” 
(1996) 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2051; Force, R. “A Comparison of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act – Present 
Text and Proposed Changes – and The Hamburg Rules” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. 
Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 375.   
557 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 28.  
558 Ping-fat, S.ibid, at p. 27-28, who supports this assertion with the argument “that joint and several 
liability [between carrier and actual carrier] can only exist as between independent contractors as opposed 
to master and servant or principal and agent.” 
559 Compare Article III and IV of the Hague Rules, specifically the obligation of seaworthiness found in 
III(1)(a), with Article 5 of the Hamburg Rules providing a general basis for liability.   
560 Arguably, this is a somewhat of an academic and rhetorical question given that in practice if the 
shipowner had not obligations or involvment with the carriage, it would be impossible to found suit against 
him as a defendant, evidently leaving the topic of an in rem action aside.  
561 Ramburg, J. “The Vanishing Bill of Lading & The Hamburg Rules Carrier” (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 
391, at p. 393. Ramburg illustrates his statement with the following example: “A shipowner has let the ship 
to a time charterer, who has entered into consecutive voyage charterers with a shipping line; this shipping 
line in turn has a standing arrangement with a with a general transport contractor who has accepted the 
cargo for shipment from a freight forwarder who, under the circumstances, is deemed to have entered into a 
contract of carriage. In these circumstances the freight forwarder becomes the “carrier” and all the other 
parties will be “actual carriers”. However, under art. 10(2) of the Convention, no responsibility will 
devolve  on any of these “actual carriers” unless the carriage has been performed by them.” 
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definitions in the Hamburg Rules have not yet completely eradicated the problem of 
identifying of identifying the carrier and leaves uncertain what is meant by “performance 
of the carriage”, but on the whole cargo owners should have an easier task determining 
from whom to recover losses.”562
 
Article 15(1) stipulates that “The bill of lading must include, inter alia, the 
following particulars:…(c) the name and principal place of business of the carrier.” The 
confusion with regard to contradictory statements on the face and on the reverse of the 
bill of lading is therefore resolved by ensuring the carrier is identified. Interestingly 
enough, though, the Rules do not appear to provide a sanction or penalty for the instance 
where 15(1)(c) is not complied with.563 Although it would appear that the aim of the 
provision is noble, there is thus uncertainty about its effects in practice. One commentator 
has argued that the Rules should have included a provision protecting the cargo interests 
where they are unable to identify the liable party to the contract.564 The suggestion is that 
“where the bill of lading or any other transport document does not clearly show the 
carrier’s name ad his principal place of business, the registered owner of the ship by 
which the contract of carriage by sea is performed ought to be presumed to be the carrier 
unless he discloses the carrier’s name and his principal place of business. Again, where 
the bill…is issued by an agent in a principal carrier’s name without clearly indentifying 
the principal…the agent should also be presumed to be the carrier unless he reveals the 
carrier’s name and principal place of business. Even if the carrier’s name and principal 
place of business are disclosed, the carrier and the registered shipowner or the agent 
ought to be made jointly and severally liable for all expenses incurred by the claimant 
due to unnecessary litigation brought against the registered shipowner or the agent, and 
                                                 
562 Kindred, H. et al. The Future of Canadian Carriage of Goods by Water Law (1982) Dalhousie Ocean 
Studies, Halifax, at p. 10. 562 Ramburg, J. “The Vanishing Bill of Lading & The Hamburg Rules Carrier” 
(1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 391, at p. 393, asks what does performance mean, and queries whether when 
the time charterer simply gives order with regards to employment to the shipowner’s master, is this 
performance? Ramburg also questions at p. 399, whether the freight forwarder performs, or whether he 
simply procures the performance of the contract? 
563 Nicoll, C. “Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a Shipper-Dominated Economy?” (1993) 24 JMLC 151, at p. 
168 notes that “no penalties are provided for omitting such information and no mention is made of the 
consequences of giving incorrect information.” 
564 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 414. 
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the period for suit should not run until the contracting carrier is identified.”565 
Nevertheless, the result of the provision is questionable, leading one author to mention 
that the lack of sanction is unfortunate as there is “no point in adding to the 
administration expenses of shipowners if no real benefits are likely to accrue to cargo.”566  
 
Liability of the carrier and the actual carrier is regulated by article 10. By virtue of 
10(1) the contracting carrier is liable for the entire carriage: “Where the performance of 
the carriage or part thereof has been entrusted to an actual carrier, whether or not in 
pursuance of a liberty under the contract of carriage by sea to do so, the carrier 
nevertheless remains responsible for the entire carriage according to the provisions of this 
Convention. The carrier is responsible, in relation to the carriage performed by the actual 
carrier, for the acts and omissions of the actual carrier and of his servants and agents 
acting within the scope of their employment.” This eliminates the need on the part of the 
claimant to institute proceedings against all parties involved in order to be certain of 
having taken suit against the proper defendant. Admittedly a prudent claimant would 
nevertheless commence proceedings against the actual carrier or carriers as well to guard 
against insolvency on the part of the contracting carrier or limited resources if the 
contracting carrier is a single ship company. Nevertheless this article is equitable, as it 
would be unfair for the plaintiff to bear the burden of sorting out all the parties to the 
carriage. In the context of a discussion on responsibility of the contracting carrier for 
others, Karan has argued “[w]hen the carrier contracts to carry goods in his custody, it is 
not important for cargo interests to find out whose service has been used to fulfill such 
undertaking. They prefer the contracting carrier to be held liable for breach of the 
contract by third parties. A rise in the number of people engaged for the performance of 
carriage increases the possibility of loss or damage to goods. It would not be fair to put 
all the risks arising therefrom on the aggrieved party’s shoulders.”567
 
                                                 
565 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 414 – 415.  
566 Nicoll, C. “Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a Shipper-Dominated Economy?” (1993) 24 JMLC 151, at p. 
168.  
567 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 86.  
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While the carrier is responsible for the entire carriage, despite the goods having 
been in the custody of the actual carrier, the converse is not true. By virtue of article 
10(2), “all the provisions of the Convention governing the responsibility of the carrier 
also apply to the responsibility of the actual carrier for the carriage performed by him.” 
The actual carrier, therefore, is only liable for portions of the carriage that he has actually 
performed. Where the responsibilities of the carrier and the actual carrier overlap, the 
claimant may recover from either party, as stipulated in article 10(5) “Where and to the 
extent that both the carrier and the actual carrier are liable, their liability is joint and 
several.”568 A practical example would be where “a forwarding agent has promised an 
unrealistic delivery or accepted dangerous goods for carriage, the shipowner as the actual 
carrier will be deemed to have knowledge of such undertaking and rendered liable 
towards the cargo-owner accordingly.”569 Although, the practical effect of the provision 
has been questioned; “it is indeed doubtful how the “joint and several” liability could be 
worked out if their respective responsibilities were not identical.”570 It would have been 
preferable for the Hamburg Rules to hold the carrier and actual carrier jointly and 
severally liable for the entire carriage, rather than this qualified joint and several liability. 
The ability of plaintiffs to determine which party had possession of the goods when the 
damage occurred when there are multiple performing parties, is limited. Regardless, some 
authors view the problem of multiple defendants as being solved under Hamburg. It was 
noted that under the Hague regime where there were several actual carriers “the 
consequent problems that may arise for an owner of damaged cargo can be immense [as 
the situation] may force the cargo owner to take suit against all the carriers and cargo 
handlers in numerous far flung jurisdictions if he is to recover compensation. Such 
multiplicity of litigation is a wasteful expense for all involved, but especially to the cargo 
owner. The Hamburg Rules offer simple, if sweeping remedy [in Article 10].”571 One 
author has commented with regard to multiple carriers that where “Hague ignores this 
                                                 
568 Despite multiple parties, by virtue of article 10(6) the claimant will not be able to exceed the limits of 
liability: “The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, the actual carrier and their servants 
and agents shall not exceed the limits of liability provided for in this Convention.”  
569 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 27.  
570 Ibid, at p. 29.  
571 Kindred, H. et al. The Future of Canadian Carriage of Goods by Water Law (1982) Dalhousie Ocean 
Studies, Halifax, at p. 59-60.  
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important area of modern ocean transport which is consequently left to divergent local 
case-law; Hamburg addresses these problems and provides uniform international 
rules.”572
 
 Article 10 has been characterized as having the effect of eliminating the benefit of 
the demise clause.573 This has been welcomed: “The use of a demise clause in a bill of 
lading is rendered ineffective introducing a much needed degree of international 
uniformity following the uneven approach adopted by national courts to demise clauses 
under the Hague and Hague/Visby Rules.”574 The regime in place in article 10 essentially 
eliminates confusion surrounding the notion of ‘who is the carrier’. “The claimant 
therefore does not now need to unravel the complicated contractual relations between the 
charterers and vessel owner before taking suit.”575 It has been noted however that Article 
11, governing through carriage, “would take away that which Article 10 gives, by 
seemingly allowing the carrier to avoid liability ‘while the goods are in the charge of the 
actual carrier’, provided the actual carrier was named in the contract.”576 Certain 
commentators have therefore been critical of the allowances in Article 11 with the 
reasoning that “[c]onsidering present day practice, particularly regarding containers in 
which minibridge and through services are used, disputes would be certain to arise, with 
significant injustices taking place when the carriers who would be responsible could hide 
behind an insolvent carrier.”577 Another author has termed the article a “porte de sortie” 
                                                 
572 Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness – Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 24 JMLC 
75, at p. 88.  
573 Chandler, G. “A Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules” (1984) 15 
JMLC 233, at p. 284. See also Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, 
at p. 843, noting that this article would solve the problem of the demise and the identity of the carrier 
clauses.  
574 Waldron, A. “The Hamburg Rules – A Boondoggle for Lawyers” (1991) Journal of Business Law 305, 
at p. 307.  
575 Tetley, W. “The Hamburg Rules – A Commentary” [1979] LMCLQ 1, at p. 6.  
576 Chandler, G. “A Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules” (1984) 15 
JMLC 233, at p. 284. Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules 
(2002) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, at p. 29, states “article 11 virtually exempts the contracting 
carrier from any liability…” 
577 Chandler, G. “A Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules” (1984) 15 
JMLC 233, at p. 284.  
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or escape hatch, by providing a dangerous exception to article 10.578 The UNCTAD 
secretariat in a 1976 report for this reason recommended that article 11 either be deleted 
or be clarified,579 a call echoed by certain authors.580 Interestingly enough, other 
commentary has suggested expanding the carrier’s powers of shifting responsibility to the 
actual carrier in Article 11(1), by allowing the carrier to inform the consignee at a later 
time of the name and place of business of the actual carrier.581 This extension would 
arguably render Article 10(1) ineffective, as it stands to reason that no carrier would 
decide to remain contractually liable for the entire carriage if at any time they transfer the 
goods to a third party they could simply avoid liability by calling, faxing or emailing the 
consignee the third party’s information. Nevertheless, one author argues that the issue of 
demise clauses is far from settled and suggests “that demise clauses will continue to be 
inserted into bills of lading (signed by the charterer or his agent as contracting carrier), 
and enforced, with a view to holding the shipowner or demise charterer (as actual carrier) 
solely responsible for the carriage.”582
 
Article 7 (1) addresses the problem that article IV bis 1 of the Visby Protocol 
attempted to solve. The article provides: “The defences and limits of liability provided for 
in the Convention apply in any action against the carrier in respect of loss or damage to 
the goods covered by the contract of carriage by sea, as well as of delay in delivery 
whether the action is founded in contract, in tort or otherwise.”583 While article 7(2) 
addresses himalaya clauses in a similar fashion to article IV bis 2, with a slight difference 
                                                 
578 Tetley, W. “The Hamburg Rules – A Commentary” [1979] LMCLQ 1, at p. 10, referring to article 10 as 
“an essential corner stone of the Hamburg Rules” and lamenting the fact that the article may provide no 
protection to cargo interests due to the exception found in article 11.  
579 Tetley, ibid.  
580 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 31, stating “in light of its repugnance to the provision of article 10, it is 
submitted that article 11 should be deleted in favour of cargo interests.” 
581 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 414, states: “Since the carrier might 
be unaware of the actual carrier’s name in the beginning, and wishing to escape from liability for an 
occurrence taking place while the goods are in the actual carrier’s charge, he ought to be allowed in Article 
11(1) of the Hamburg Rules to inform the consignee of the actual carrier’s name and principle place of 
business later as soon as the goods are taken over by the actual carrier. Unless the carrier provides such 
information, he should remain liable for the loss.”  
582 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 28.  
583 Article 7(1).  
 121
in wording. The Visby Protocol specifically excluded independent contractors, while the 
Hamburg Rules stipulate “servant or agent” but do not specifically exclude independent 
contractors. Arguably, this may prove to be an inconsequential difference given that one 
would presumably then interpreted the terms ‘agent’ and ‘servant’ to not include 
independent contractors.  
 
 The Hamburg Rules have been far from successful.584 The Rules came into force 
in November of 1992, fourteen years after it was agreed upon, once having reached the 
requite number of twenty ratifications. At the time Hamburg came into force, fifteen of 
the states that had ratified it were from the Continent of Africa,585 making sixteen with 
Cameroon joining shortly thereafter, and with a fair proportion of them being land 
locked.586 Subsequent ratifications have not improved the situation or the desirability of 
the Hague Rules.587 One commentator noted with regard to the countries willing to 
accept the Hamburg Rules, “[they are] hardly an imposing group of trading nations and 
not a list to get too excited about because they do not include the world’s major seafaring 
and industrial nations. In fact these nations control no more than 2% of the world 
shipping tonnage and most probably even less of the world’s trade.”588 In 1994, a 
conference entitled “The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC?” concluded with one 
observer remarking that “the general feeling of the speakers at this Symposium [was that] 
                                                 
584 Nicoll, C. “Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a Shipper-Dominated Economy?” (1993) 24 JMLC 151, at p. 
151, remarked: “Like a stranger in a remote village, the Hamburg Rules have undergone a long period of 
isolation and suspicion.” 
585 Botswana, Burkino Faso, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania. See also Delwaide, L. “The Hamburg Rules: A 
Choice for the EEC? Conclusion” in The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European 
Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 215.  
586 Such as Botswana, Lesoto, Uganda, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Malawi.  
587 According to UNCITRAL, as of September 30, 2005, the 30 parties to the Hamburg Rules are: Austria, 
Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Georgia, 
Guinea, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Senegal, Syrian Arab Republic, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of 
Tanzania, Zambia. Also accession has been given by Paraguay as of 19 July 2005, and it will enter force on 
1 August 2006. Available at: 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html.  
588 Kisteman, K. “The Hamburg Rules: A Marine Underwriter’s Viewpoint” Paper presented at the Seminar 
on The Hamburg Rules (Gold Reef City, South Africa, 20 September 1991), at p. 1.  
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the Hamburg Rules are not acceptable and not good enough as such.”589 The objections 
to the Hamburg Rules and the obstacles faced with regard to their implementation did not 
involve their attempt to solve the problem of multiple parties involved in the carriage of 
goods. Rather, the downfall of the Hamburg Rules, which were extensively criticized, 
resulted more from issues such as its alteration of the liability structure,590 concerns about 
increased litigation591 and the increased costs of insurance and freight.592 Nevertheless, 
                                                 
589 also Delwaide, L. “The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? Conclusion” in The Hamburg Rules: A 
Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 
215. 
590 The liability structure was viewed by many commentators as a one-sided alteration in favour of cargo 
interests. Opponents of Hamburg have argued that the supporters of the new liability structure fail to 
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591 Goldie, C. “Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners’ Liability Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 111, at 
p.  115, notes “the old certainties of the Hague Rules, certainties of interpretation and meaning which have 
been produced by decades of laborious litigation, will disappear as the commercial world has to start again 
and try to make sense of the Hamburg Rules.” Tetley, W. “Article 9 to 13 of the Hamburg Rules” in The 
Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 207, noted “the drafting is also vague and the 
meaning of many articles will not be known without litigation so that the delicate balance between carriers 
and shippers has been replaced by a new and confusing relationship.” Berlingieri, F. “The Period of 
Responsibility and the Basis of Liability of the Carrier” in The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? 
(1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 95, notes that with 
respect to the implications of the Hamburg Rules, “if the carrier were to be liable in respect of loss or 
damage to the goods carried arising out of faults in the navigation of the vessel, litigation would increase 
enormously without any real advantage for anybody.” 
592 Several opponents of the Hamburg Rules have argued that with increased liability for the carrier under 
the Hamburg Rules the cost of P&I insurance will increase, and therefore the freight rates will increase 
correspondingly. See Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN 
System – Key Issues” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 11; Kimball, J. 
“Shipowner’s Liability and the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules” (1975) 7 JMLC 217, at p. 250; 
Williams, B.K. “The Consequences of the Hamburg Rules on Insurance” in The Hamburg Rules on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Chameleon Press, London, at p. 259. See also Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United Nations 
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, 
London. Honour, the General Manager for the West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance 
Association, argued at pp. 240 and 249 that alterations in the law such as the Hamburg Rules that increase 
the liability of the shipowner, “are bound to increase the cost of insuring the risk, and such increase may be 
fairly substantial…One is led to the conclusion that the new Convention will, to what extent it is impossible 
to say, increase the cost of goods to the consumer arising from the increase in freights which will be 
inevitable as a result of the increase in the cost of P&I Insurance to the shipowner.” For a comprehensive 
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the fact that so few decisions exist under the Hamburg Rules,593 is unfortunate from the 
perspective of multi-carrier liability. The fact that the scheme for carriers and actual 
carriers is in practice untested almost three decades after its creation, has not allowed us 
to evaluate whether it had in essence solved the problems that arose under the Hague 
regime.  
                                                                                                                                                 
treatment of the various arguments put forward with regard to the potential increase in insurance, see also 
Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments About 
Hague, Visby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum of Empirical Evidence” (1993) 24 JMLC 119. Sturley, at p. 148-
149, argues that although advocates on both sides of the Hamburg debates have ‘predicted’ what the effect 
of the change in liability scheme will be, there is no empirical evidence to support such assertions and 
concludes that without such empirical evidence, “making an argument about what will happen in real-world 
transactions if certain changes take place in the legal rules governing those transactions” is a futile 
endeavor. Nevertheless, the insurance arguments made, whether rooted in evidence or not, contributed to 
the downfall of the Hamburg Rules. 
593 Karan, in this text of 2004, notes really only two decisions of significance, in the 14 years after 
Hamburg came into force. (Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: 
The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, a p. 401).  
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 11. NATIONAL SOLUTIONS: LEGISLATION 
 By the 1980’s and 1990’s, and particularly after it was evident that the Hamburg 
Rules were not a success, many nations found themselves with wholly outdated carriage 
regimes and began to turn to domestic solutions. Much of the resulting domestic 
legislation proved to be inspired by both the Hague Visby and the Hamburg Rules. In 
particular however, many states took the opportunity to address the issue of ‘the carrier’ 
that had plagued jurists and commentators for decades.  
 
11.1. Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China 
 Over the past 30 years, China has rapidly become a heavy player in the shipping 
industry. By 1990, well over ninety percent of China’s import and export goods were 
transported by sea,594 and her fleet was rapidly expanding.595 China, however, is not a 
party to any of the international conventions,596 nor did it have a domestic maritime law 
and therefore the law as applied to maritime matters prior to the Maritime Code were 
simply the principles of China’s civil law.597 The legislators approved the Maritime Code 
on November 7th, 1992, and on July 1st, 2003, the Chinese Maritime Code came into 
force.598  The Maritime Code “appears to have been the first major effort to draw from 
both the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules.”599
 
 China drew heavily from the Hamburg Rules when drafting the articles 
concerning the parties involved in carriage. Article 42(1) of the Maritime Code defines 
“carrier” and is drawn verbatim from the Hamburg Rules.600 Article 42(2) defining 
                                                 
594 Zhang, L. “Shipping Law and Practice in China” (1990) 14 Tul. Mar. L.J. 209, at p. 209.  
595 In 1974, China’s fleet was ranked twenty-third in size in the world, but by the end of 1984, China 
ranked ninth (Zhang, ibid, at p. 210.).  
596 Chen, X.  “Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l 
Trade L. J. 89, at p. 90; Li, L. “The Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China” [1993] LMLCQ 
204, at p. 205-206, noting that China has never ratified the main shipping treaties, including the Hague 
Rules and Hague-Visby Rules.   
597 Li, L. “The Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China”, supra note , at p. 204.  
598 Ibid, at p. 204-205.   
599 Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, at 
p. 561.  
600 Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, Article 42(1): “Carrier” means the person by whom 
or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a shipper.” There is a 
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“actual carrier” is almost identical to Hamburg in language, although it specifies that it 
“means the person to whom the performance of carriage of goods, or part thereof, has 
been entrusted by the carrier, and includes any other person to whom such performance 
has been entrusted under a sub-contract.”[Emphasis added]. One may presume that the 
use of the word “includes” would mean that actual carrier includes those entrusted with 
the goods under a sub-contract or by assignment from the carrier, but it not limited to 
such a situation. Given the difficulties faced when interpreting “includes” under the 
Hague Rules definition of carrier, that presumption however may be dangerous. The 
effect may possibly be therefore that where the time charter is found to be the carrier 
under the Maritime Code, the shipowner would not be the actual carrier as the goods are 
not entrusted to him under a sub-contract, and thus we find ourselves again in the 
situation where the shipowner is exposed. Although there appears to be no commentary 
on this textual difference, in practice there does not appear to be a problem considering 
the shipowner to be an actual carrier. In a 2003 judgment, a Chinese court determined 
that the charterer of the vessel was the contractual carrier, while the ship owner and the 
ship operator were actual carriers.601 As in the Hamburg Rules article 10(1), the Maritime 
Code article 60 stipulates that the carrier shall be responsible for the entire carriage.602 
Similar to the Hamburg Rules as well, the Chinese Maritime Code in Art. 73(2), 
                                                                                                                                                 
slight difference between the language of the Chinese provision and the Hamburg Rules provision in that in 
the Maritime Code stipulates “the person” where as the Rules provide “any person”. Arguably, the textual 
difference is inconsequential and would have no effect in practice.  
601 People’s Insurance Co. of China Property v. Shanghai Pujiang Transport (2003) Summarized in Li, K. 
“Chinese Maritime Law 2003-2004” [2005] LMCLQ 383, at p. 390. In this instance the court held that all 
three defendants, the charterer, the shipowner, and ship operator were jointly liable for damage to the 
cargo.  
602 Although article 60 provides that where there is an express term in the contract of carriage, the carrier 
may be relieved of liability with respect to damage done by the actual carrier, if the said carrier was named 
in the contract. Maritime Code article 60 reads:  
“Where the performance of the carriage or part thereof has been entrusted to an actual carrier, the carrier 
shall nevertheless remain responsible for the entire carriage according to the provisions of this Chapter. The 
carrier shall be responsible, in relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, for the act or 
omission of the actual carrier and of his servant or agent acting within the scope of his employment or 
agency.  
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, where a contract of carriage by sea provides 
explicitly that a specified part of the carriage covered by the said contract is to be performed by a named 
actual carrier other than the carrier, the contract may nevertheless provide that the carrier shall not be liable 
for loss, damage or delay in delivery arising from an occurrence which takes place while the goods are in 
the charge of the actual carrier during such part of the carriage.” 
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stipulates that the carrier must be identified in the contract of carriage, thus ensuring that 
the claimant has a concrete answer with regard to the enquiry as to who is the carrier. 
 
 With regard to the joint and several liability of the parties involved in carriage, 
article 63 of the Maritime Code provides: “Where both the carrier and the actual carrier 
are liable for compensation, they shall jointly and severally be liable within the scope of 
such liability.” It has been noted therefore the where a voyage or time charter is involved, 
“[g]enerally speaking, both the shipowner and the charterer shall be liable under the bill 
of lading. In other words, the shipper may sue either the shipowner or charterer and both 
are liable jointly and severally.”603 This is exemplified by A Holland Insurance v. An 
English Liner Co. & China Chartering Agency where suit was taken against both the 
charterer and the vessel owner.604 Although the wording of article 63, ‘where both the 
carrier and the actual carrier’, implies two parties only, this provision has been given a 
much wider application in practice. In People’s Insurance Co. v. Shanghai Pujiang 
Transport, the court found two actual carriers and one contractual carrier and then 
proceeded to hold all three defendants jointly liable for the damage to the cargo.605  
 
 Article 58 of the Maritime Code addresses the problem of suit taken in tort, with a 
similar provision to Article IV bis 1 of Hague-Visby, but with an important distinction: 
“The defence and limitation of liability provided for in this Chapter shall apply to any 
legal action brought against the carrier with regard to the loss of or damage to or delay in 
delivery of the goods covered by the contract of carriage of goods by sea, whether the 
claimant is a party to the contract or whether the action is founded in contract or tort.”606 
Essentially, the Maritime Code stipulates that the claimant need not be a party to the 
                                                 
603 Chen, X.  “Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l 
Trade L. J. 89, at p. 94.  
604 Holland Insurance v. An English Liner Co. & China Chartering Agency (1995) Summarized in Chen, X.  
“Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L. J. 89, at 
p. 94. 
605 People’s Insurance Co. of China Property v. Shanghai Pujiang Transport (2003) Summarized in Li, K. 
“Chinese Maritime Law 2003-2004” [2005] LMCLQ 383, at p. 390. 
606 Article 58, second paragraph, stipulates “The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply if the 
action referred to in the preceding paragraph is brought against the carrier’s servant or agent, and the 
carrier’s servant or agent proves that his act was within the scope of his employment or agency.” Cargo 
claimants may therefore not circumvent the rules by action in tort against servants or agents of the carrier.  
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contract, thus avoiding the difficulties faced in English law as a result of The Captain 
Gregos.607 The fact that article 58 does not address whether the carrier must be a party to 
the contract or not, is not problematic given the existence in the Maritime Code of the 
notion of an actual carrier, not a party to the bill of lading contract.  Article 61 specifically 
provides that “the provisions with respect to responsibility of the carrier contained in this 
Chapter shall be applicable to the actual carrier,”608 which include the benefit of the 
defences in the event of an action in tort. This is found to be the case in practice when 
Chinese courts apply the Maritime Code.609
 
 Although the available translated and summarized Chinese jurisprudence is not 
terribly extensive, it would appear from what is available that the difficulties faced with 
respect to parties not viewed to be ‘the carrier’ have been overcome. As well, paired with 
the fact that the ability of claimants to successfully pursue actions outside the carriage 
regime, has been negated, one may surmise that the Chinese Maritime Code exemplifies 
a successful solution with respect to the problem of the legal characterization of parties 
involved in the carriage of goods.  
 
11.2. Korean Commercial Code 
 The Korean Commercial Code, enacted in 1962, contained a section on Korean 
Maritime Law, which was recently revised and came into force on January 1, 1993.610 
Similar to China, trade and maritime commerce in Korea has expanded rapidly in the past 
several decades, with international trade having “increased more than 1000 fold, from 
about $30 million in 1962 to about $115 billion in 1989, and the tonnage of Korean-
owned vessel has increased more than 80 times in this period from about 100,000 G/T in 
1962 to about 8.3 million G/T in 1989.”611 With these developments, a substantial 
                                                 
607 See section 8.5 supra for further discussion.  
608 Article 61, second paragraph, stipulates “Where an action is brought against the servant or agent of the 
actual carrier, the provisions contained contained in paragraph 2 of Article 58 and paragraph 2 of Article 59 
of this Code shall apply.” 
609 See People’s Insurance Co. of China Property v. Shanghai Pujiang Transport (2003) Summarized in Li, 
K. “Chinese Maritime Law 2003-2004” [2005] LMCLQ 383, at p. 390. 
610 Yu, R. & Peck, J. “The Revised Maritime Section of the Korean Commercial Code” [1993] LMCLQ 
403, at p. 403.   
611 Ibid.  
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revision and modernization of the maritime section of the Commercial Code was 
undertaken to bring the Code into line with modern shipping practices. In particular, with 
regard to difficulties concerning the carrier or carriers, Korean law had in the past 
sanctioned tort actions against the carrier. “[T]he Supreme Court precedents seem to 
stand for the proposition that, unless a limitation clause appears in the bill of lading, 
liability may not be limited in a tort case.”612 The revised Commercial Code rectifies the 
situation by ensuring that limitations are applicable in tort-based actions, with Article 
789-3(1) providing: “The provisions regarding the liability of the carrier in this chapter 
shall be applicable also to the carrier’s liability for damages arising out of the carrier’s 
tortious act.”613 Article 746 provides: “Shipowner may limit its liability…regardless of 
the basis upon which the claim is brought.”614 It is notable that the Korean provisions are 
in no way as extensive as the Chinese provisions, and although the problem of 
circumventing the limits in the Rules through tort actions has been addressed, it is 
regrettable that more was not done given the models that were available when Korean 
legislators decided to revise the code. 
  
11.3. Nordic Maritime Codes  
 Several nations following the failure of the Hamburg Rules opted to modernize 
their carriage law by drawing from the preferred elements of Hamburg and while 
maintaining many of the general elements found in Hague Visby Rules. The Nordic 
countries are the prime example as they have incorporated large portions of Hamburg 
into their maritime codes, but the have retained a few favoured elements of the Hague-
Visby Rules.615 The Nordic countries are considered to be Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
                                                 
612 Ibid, at p. 410.  
613 Ibid.  
614 Ibid. This article however, is with respect to tonnage limitation, therefore a carrier seeking to limit his 
liability to a specific package limit or assert a time bar in cases of cargo damage would utilize article 789 – 
3(1).  
615 For example, the Nordic Codes adopted the format of the Hamburg Rules liability scheme with 
presumed fault, yet retained the two enumerated defences if Hague-Visby, which are fire and nautical fault 
which can be found in the Swedish and the Finnish Maritime Codes, at Chapter 13, Section 26.1, whereas 
in the Norwegian and Danish Codes it is found at section 276.1. A translation of The Finnish Maritime 
Code, Chapter 13: Carriage of Goods by Sea, can be found as Appendix 1 in New Carriage of Goods by 
Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 421. Note that although 
the codes are in substance the same, the numbering system differs. See Honka, H. “New Carriage of Goods 
by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of 
 129
Norway and Sweden, however in the context of the Maritime Codes, Iceland is not 
included.616 The Nordic countries have a history of cooperation with respect to 
legislation,617 and on October 1st, 1994, the Nordic countries respectively adopted four 
maritime codes.618 The codes can collectively be referred to as the Nordic Maritime 
Code, given that in substance the codes are identical.619   
 
With respect to the identity of carrier issue, the Nordic Maritime Code addresses 
the issue in a similar fashion to the Hamburg Rules. Although, it should be noted the 
notion of a contracting carrier and an actual carrier was pre-existing in Nordic law. “As a 
matter of fact, the Nordic countries had introduced similar principles on a national basis 
already in previous reform in the early 1970’s together with the implementation of the 
[Hague-Visby Rules]. The joint and several liability of the carrier and actual carrier as 
introduced in the Hamburg Rules in 1978 was nothing other than repetition of existing 
Nordic law.”620 The liability of the contracting carrier and actual carrier had therefore 
been previously addressed in s. 123 of the 1893 Maritime Code, in a fashion similar to 
Hamburg.621 Nevertheless, the current regime with regard to the identity of the carrier in 
the Nordic Maritime Code is heavily modelled on the Hamburg Regime.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at pp. 23-24; Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, in Preface. 
616 Honka, H. “New Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. 
(1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 15. 
617 Honka, ibid, who notes that Nordic cooperation in legislation exists for many reasons including 
historical, cultural and political similarities, for example, the languages spoken in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, all have a common ground.  This common ground results in a long history of cooperation, for 
example “a Maritime Code was introduced in Sweden-Finland in 1667 and it contained stipulations, among 
others on the bill of lading, which are easily readable and understandable to a large extent even at the end 
of the 20th century.” (Ibid, at p. 16).   
618 The four Maritime Codes, were presented to their respective governments in 1993-1994, and all four 
entered into force on October 1, 1994. (Honka, ibid, at p. 17).  
619 They differ slightly in structure however. “The structure of the Finnish and Swedish versions of the 
Code are identical, with the provisions divided into chapters and sections. The carriage of goods by sea is 
treated in Chapter 13, ss. 1 – 61. The Danish and Norwegian versions of the Code are identical, with the 
provisions divided into sections. The carriage of goods by sea is treated at ss. 251-311 inclusive.” (Tetley, 
W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 845, footnote 193).  
620 Honka, H. “New Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. 
(1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 22. Honka notes that with 
respect to the carrier and actual carrier approach as found in the Hamburg Rules, it was in fact the Nordic 
countries that had exercised influence in order to procure that formulation. (Ibid, at pp. 22-23).  
621 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, at p. 263.  
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The Nordic Maritime Code stipulates that “1) carrier means any person who 
concludes a contract with a shipper for the carriage of goods by sea, 2) actual carrier 
means any person who has been entrusted by the carrier to perform the carriage or part of 
it.”622 The carrier, thus the contracting carrier, must be identified on the bill of lading, 
including providing his principal place of business.623 The Nordic Maritime Code then 
proceeds to regulate the responsibilities and liabilities with respect to carriage as between 
the carriers. The contracting carrier’s liability does not cease despite the fact that the 
goods may be in control of the actual carrier, therefore the contractual carrier remains 
liable for the entire carriage.624 The converse is not true however. “The rules contained in 
s. 285 and 286 (13:35 and 13:36) cause the contracting carrier X to become liable for the 
actual carrier Y, but not vice versa. For example, cargo is damaged while in the custody 
of contracting carrier X and is further damaged while being reloaded to Y’s ship. In this 
situation, X will be solely liable for the initial damage, while both X and Y will be liable 
for the latter incident.”625 Where both carriers are liable, their liability will be joint and 
several but only such that the combined liability does not exceed the limitation amount as 
proscribed in the Nordic Maritime Code.626 This scheme does solve the previous 
                                                 
622 Quoted from Chapter 13, section 1 of the Finnish Maritime Code. Translation of The Finnish Maritime 
Code, Chapter 13: Carriage of Goods by Sea, found in Appendix 1 in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. 
(1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 421. Although the Codes are 
in substance the same, translations and perhaps wording does differ slightly. The Norwegian Maritime 
Code in Section 251 provides: “Carrier, the person who enters into a contract with a sender for the carriage 
of general cargo by sea; sub-carrier, the person who, pursuant to an assignment by the carrier, performs the 
carriage of part of it.” The English translation of the Norwegian Maritime Code is available online at 
http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/NMC.pdf. The Norwegian Maritime Code can also be accessed online 
through www.lovdata.no/info/lawdata.html. The above article defining carrier/actual carrier and 
carrier/sub-carrier, would be found in Chapter 13, section 1 of the Swedish Maritime Code, and in section 
251 of the Danish Maritime Code.  
623 Chapter 13, section 46 of the Finnish and Swedish Maritime Code. Section 296 of the Norwegian 
Maritime Code: “A bill of lading shall contain statements on: …3) the name and principal place of business 
of the carrier.” 
624 Chapter 13, section 35 of the Finnish and Swedish Maritime Code. Section 285 of the Norwegian 
Maritime Code: “Liability of the Carrier for the Sub-Carrier: If the Carriage performed wholly or in part by 
a sub-carrier, the carrier remains liable according to the provisions of this Chapter as if the carrier had 
performed the entire carriage him- or herself.” 
625 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, at p. 338.  Chapter 13, section 36 of the Finnish and Swedish Maritime Code. Section 286 of the 
Norwegian Maritime Code provides: “A sub-carrier is liable for such part of the carriage as he or she 
performs, pursuant to the same rules as the carrier.” 
626 The carrier and actual carrier are jointly and severally liable by virtue of Ch. 13, section 37, paragraph 1, 
while the limitation amounts can be found in Ch.13, section 30 of the Finnish and Swedish Maritime Code. 
Section 287 of the Norwegian Maritime Code provides: “If both the carrier and sub-carrier are liable, they 
shall be jointly and severally liable.” Section 280 provides the limits of liability: “The carrier’s liability 
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difficulties in Nordic law determining which party is bound by the bill of lading, and thus 
who is the carrier. In 1903 the Norwegian Supreme Court determined that the contract of 
carriage, the bill of lading, bound the actual carrier.627 The Norwegian Supreme Court in 
1955628 and the Swedish Supreme Court in 1960629 addressed the question of “who is 
bound by a bill of lading signed by the performing ship’s master?”630 Both Supreme 
Courts determined that that the master’s employee, the shipowner, is the only one bound 
by the bill of lading,631 which is a difficult principle in practice given generally the 
existence of a charterer or a liner service that the cargo claimant believes to be his 
contracting party. In contrast to the Norwegian and Swedish courts, the Denmark 
Commercial Court in the 1960s was more open to allowing the claimant to pursue the 
charterer or the liner.632 It has been noted that both the Norwegian Supreme Court and 
the Swedish Supreme Court decisions would be decided differently under the Nordic 
Maritime Code.633 Under the current regime, the employer of the master is not 
necessarily the party bound by the bill of lading, as the Nordic Maritime Code provides 
that a bill of lading signed by master is deemed to be signed on behalf of the carrier, 
meaning the contracting carrier.634 In many instances the contractual carrier may very 
well be a time or a voyage charterer who issues the bill of lading.635 Where parties, such 
as shipowners or demise charterers are not the contractual carriers, they would likely be 
                                                                                                                                                 
shall not exceed 667 SDR for each package or other unit of the goods or 2 SDR for each kilogram of the 
gross weight of the goods lost, damaged or delayed. The limit of liability which results in the highest 
liability shall be applied.” 
627 ND 1903.331 NSC (Gerdt Meyer case) summarized in Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: 
the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 338.  
628 ND 1955.81 NSC LYSAKER, summarized in Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 338. 
629 ND 1960.349 SSC LULU, summarized in Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 338. 
630 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, at p. 337.  
631 Ibid.  
632 So-og Handelsretstidende 1965.246 DCC (The Dominion Line), and ND 1966.170 DCC Ara, as cited in 
Falkanger, ibid, at p. 337. 
633 Honka, H. “Who is the Carrier? Old Question, New Solutions” in 8th Aaxel Axson Johnson Colloquium 
on Maritime Law (1998) Swedish Maritime Law Association, Stockholm, at p. 78, as referenced in Tetley, 
W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 846, footnote 200.    
634 Ch. 13, section 45 of the Finnish and Swedish Maritime Code. Section 295 of the Norwegian Maritime 
Code entitled “Master’s Bill of Lading” provides: “A bill of lading signed by the master of the ship 
carrying the goods shall be deemed to have been signed on behalf of the carrier.” See also Tetley, W. “The 
Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 846, and Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian 
Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 337.  
635 Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 846.  
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characterized as actual carriers, given that some involvement must exist in order to found 
suit. Carriers and actual carriers, and their employees and agents, are protected under the 
Nordic Maritime Code even if the action is brought in tort and are thus able to benefit 
from all the limitations and protections available to the carrier under contract.636
 
The Nordic Maritime Code, therefore has provided a workable solution to the 
who is the carrier, or who are the carriers, dilemma. The only drawback perhaps, is the 
fact that the liability of the actual carrier is only engaged where it can be demonstrated 
that the damage occurred while in his care. This may not be a large hurdle in practice 
where there is the straight forward contracting carrier and then a sub-charterer performs 
the entire carriage leg, however, where there is a series of sea legs and transshipments, 
and therefore multiple carriers, this may prove to onerous for the cargo claimant.  
 
11.4. Civil Code of the Netherlands – Book 8 
 In the late eighties and early nineties, the Netherlands was in the process of re-
codifying their civil law, much of which dated primarily from Napoleonic times.637 Book 
8, entitled “Means of Traffic and Transport”, entered into force on April 1, 1991, as part 
of the Civil Code of the Netherlands, or Burgerlijk Wetboek.638 The new Code deals with 
the issue of who is the carrier in a fairly effective and novel manner. Arguably, the issues 
that arise as a result of the narrow and restrictive interpretation given to the Hague Rules 
‘carrier’, have been resolved in the Civil Code. 
 
                                                 
636 Ch. 13, section 32 and section 36 of the Finnish and Swedish Maritime Code. Section 282 of the 
Norwegian Maritime Code entitled “Liability not Based on the Contract of Carriage” provides: “The 
provisions relating to the carrier’s defences and the limits of the carrier’s liability shall apply even if the 
claim against the carrier is not based on the contract of carriage. 
The provisions relating to the carrier’s defences and the limits of the carrier’s liability apply 
correspondingly if the claim is brought against anyone for whom the carrier is responsible, and that person 
shows that he or she acted in the performance of his or her duties in the servie or to fulfill the assignment. 
The total liability which can be imposed on the carrier and the persons for whom the carrier is responsible 
shall not exceed that limits of liability according to Section 280.” 
Section 286 of the Norwegian Maritime Code provides: “A sub-carrier is liable for such part of the carriage 
as he or she performs, pursuant to the same rules as the carrier. The provisions of Sections 282 and 283 
shall apply correspondingly.” 
637 Japikse, R. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading – The Netherlands” in 
Ocean Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), 
Kluwer Law Intl, The Hague, at p. 229.  
638 Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 843, footnote 189.  
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 It has been noted that with regard to the issues of who is the carrier, demise and 
identity of carrier clauses, the complex structure of carriage arrangements, and bills of 
lading without headings and indistinguishable signatures, “[t]he Dutch legislature has 
now done away with such kinds of much criticized practices (or rather the consequences 
thereof) in a fairly drastic manner.”639 As well, one of the most notable and problematic 
issues addressed is the notion of the single carrier. The system devised for multiple 
carrier liability is found in Article 461:  
“(1) Without prejudice to the remaining paragraphs of this article, the person who 
signed the bill of lading, the person for whom another person signed, as well as 
the person whose form was used for the bill of lading are deemed to be carriers 
under the bill of lading. 
(2) If the captain signed the bill of lading or another person for him, that time- or 
voyage-charterer who is the carrier in the last contract in the chain of contracts of 
operation referred to in Section 1 Title 5, is deemed to be the carrier under the bill 
of lading in addition to the persons mentioned in the first paragraph. If the vessel 
has been leased under a bare-boat charter, the last bare-boat charterer too is 
deemed to be the carrier under the bill of lading, in addition to this possible time- 
or voyage-charterer. If the vessel has not been leased under a bare-boat charter, 
the shipowner too is deemed to be the carrier under the bill of lading, in addition 
to this possible time- or voyage-charterer.”640
 
 The Article encompasses and addresses all entities including those who have 
signed the bill of lading, on whose behalf it was signed, whose form has been used, the 
last bare-boat charterer, the shipowner, the time and voyage charterer. It would appear 
therefore that the Dutch notion of “carriers under the bill of lading” ensures that the 
parties to the carriage endeavor fall under the legal carriage regime. There is in the article 
                                                 
639 Japikse, R. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading – The Netherlands” in 
Ocean Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), 
Kluwer Law Intl, The Hague, at p. 232. 
640 The English version of the text of the provision may be found in Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier 
Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 403, 
footnote 69; Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 844; or in 
Haanappel P. & Mackaay, E. New Netherlands Civil Code, Book 8: Means of Traffic and Transport (1995) 
Kluwer, the Hague.   
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a distinction between charterers on the basis of the notion of “chain of contracts”. This 
has been explained as “the succession of contracts with regard to the operation of a vessel 
and the carriage of goods by it; the chain ranges from the owner up to and including the 
shipper of the goods. Schematically, and in a more extensive form, one could have a 
chain running like: owner → (bareboat charterer) → bareboat charterer → (time 
charterer) → time charterer → (voyage charterer) → voyage charterer → (bill of lading 
or other contract of carriage) → shipper.”641 In this example, the charterer classifying as 
a carrier under the last contract of carriage in the chain of contracts would be the last 
voyage charterer.642 Not only the voyage charter would be a carrier, as it would also 
include the party on whose form the bill of lading was, and on whose behalf it was 
signed, as well in addition to those parties, the last bareboat charterer would also be a 
carrier. One author likens this solution to the Hamburg Rules notion of “carrier” and 
“actual carrier”,643 although one may argue that the Dutch solution is far more 
comprehensive. The bareboat charterer, for example, may be found to be a carrier, 
despite the fact that bills of lading were issued on the first time charterer’s form 
indicating his name and place of business, signed by the master under the authority of the 
first charterer for the second time charterer who issued the bills, and the vessel was 
voyage chartered. Under such an example, the bareboat charterer would not be the 
‘carrier’ nor the ‘actual carrier’ under Hamburg, yet would be a Dutch ‘carrier’. Where 
the Dutch regime is similar to Hamburg, is in Article 442 the Code provides for joint and 
several liability between the carriers.644 It should be noted that by virtue of article 461(3), 
if the owners or the bareboat charterers present themselves as being the exclusive carrier, 
or the sole carrier, in the bill of lading, then the other parties to the carriage endeavor will 
be absolved from their status as carriers.645 Finally, the Dutch system in 461 and 462 are 
                                                 
641 Japikse, R. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading – The Netherlands” in 
Ocean Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), 
Kluwer Law Intl, The Hague, at p. 233.  
642 Japikese, ibid. 
643 Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 844.  
644 Japikse, R. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading – The Netherlands” in 
Ocean Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), 
Kluwer Law Intl, The Hague, at p. 233.  
645 Japikse, ibid. Should the bareboat charterer wish to be the exclusive carrier, his precise identity must be 
added otherwise the stipulation will have no effect (Ibid).   
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compulsory, and any stipulations providing otherwise are by virtue of article 461(5) 
considered null and void.646  
  
11.5. Commercial Code of Belgium 
 The Commercial Code, Book II, Title II, governs the carriage of goods by sea 
under bills of lading. The Commercial Code originally incorporated the Hague Rules in 
1928, but has since been amended several times, with the last amendment taking place in 
1989.647 The Commercial Code has in certain respects ameliorated the situation with 
regard to who is the carrier. This is facilitated by the Belgium courts who have a 
tendency to hold the charter and owner jointly and severally liable vis-à-vis the 
consignee.648 When interpreting Article 91 of the Commercial Code, which governs the 
liability of the carrier, the Courts have in effect invalidated both the demise and the 
identity of carrier clauses. The notion of joint and several liability between shipowners 
and charterer is not new to Belgian law, as in the 1970’s the Belgian Court of Appeal had 
found that the charter remained jointly and solidarily liable with the owner despite an 
identity of carrier clause.649 The result is that under the Commercial Code, demise 
clauses and identity of carrier clauses are invalid as the charterer and shipowner will be 
held jointly and severally liable despite assertions to the contrary in the bill of lading.650 
This is however the case only with regard to the shipowner, or demise charterer, and the 
party found to be the ‘carrier’. The law with regard to parties to the carriage endeavor in 
Belgium is therefore not as expansive as other nations, such as the Netherlands. 
Nevertheless, the regular practice of ensuring that the carrier party to the bill of lading 
                                                 
646 Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 844; Japikse, R. 
“Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading – The Netherlands” in Ocean Bills of 
Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer Law Intl, 
The Hague, at p. 234.  
647 Bernauw, K. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading - Belguim” in Ocean Bills 
of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer Law 
Intl, The Hague, at p. 87.  
648 Bernauw, ibid, at p. 108.  
649 Hof Van Beroep te Brussel, Mar. 13, 1970; [1970] E.T.L. 398, Hof Van Beroep te Brussel Mar. 3, 1972; 
[1972] E.T.L. 992, as cited in Tetley, W. “Identity of the Carrier – The Hague Rules, Visby Rules, 
UNCITRAL” [1977] LMCLQ 519, at p. 528.  
650 Bernauw, K. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading - Belguim” in Ocean Bills 
of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer Law 
Intl, The Hague, at p. 108.  
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and the shipowner, or demise charter, are jointly and severally liable is a vast 
improvement over the more restrictive interpretation of the Hague Rules carrier.  
 
11.6. U.S. COGSA 1999 
 In the United States, there has been long standing frustration at the out-moded 
carriage regime still in force.651 In the 1980’s Congress was unwilling to act, as 
underwriters, carriers and the Maritime Law Association (MLA) favoured Visby, while 
the cargo interests favoured Hamburg.652 As the government was unwilling to be caught 
in the middle of the dispute between the various commercial interests, other bodies 
attempted to resolve the deadlock.653 The American Bar Association, with the support of 
the MLA, proposed in 1987 that the Visby protocol be ratified, but that further changes 
should also be implemented, for example, the elimination of the nautical fault defence.654  
The proposal failed when major cargo interests declined to support it.655 These failures, 
coupled with the failure of the Hamburg Rules to provide an acceptable international 
regime, resulted in calls in the early 1990’s for a domestic solution to the problem.656 In 
1992, the MLA convened an Ad Hoc Liability Study Group “to attempt to reach a 
commercial compromise that could be presented to Congress with consensus support 
from the industry.”657 The process took four years.658 The study group’s final proposal 
was submitted to the MLA in 1996, and was presented as a bill before the Senate’s Sub-
                                                 
651 Which is COGSA 1936, based on the Hague Rules, given that the United States never ratified the Visby 
Protocol.   
652 Force, R. “A Comparison of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act – Present Text and Proposed 
Changes – and The Hamburg Rules” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of 
Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 373, noting that the state of affairs was such that “neither the 
carrier interests who favoured Visby amendments nor the shipper interests which favored Hamburg had 
enough support to prevail.” Congress would have admittedly enacted any changes that the major interests 
agreed on, but it was a stalemate between the two sides.  
653 Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, at 
p. 569.  
654 Sturley, ibid, at p. 569; Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” 
(1996) 18 Hous. J. Int’l L. 609, at p. 614-615.  
655 Mendelsohn, A. “Why the U.S. Did not Ratify the Visby Amendments” (1992) 23 JMLC 29, at p. 52. 
656 One U.S. commentator, Chandler, in response to the question “Is there a way out of this impasse?” 
replied: “The answer is yes, if we follow what we did for the Harter Act; when faced with an unsatisfactory 
international situation, seek a commercial solution among U.S. commercial interests.” (Chandler, G. “After 
Reaching a Century of the Harter Act: Where Should We Go From Here?” (1993) 24 JMLC 43, at p. 46). 
657 Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” (1996) 18 Hous. J. Int’l L. 
609, at p. 616.  
658 For a detailed discussion on the process of drafting the proposal see Sturley, ibid, at pp. 616-621.  
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Committee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine on April 21st, 1998.659 The 
Senate Sub-committee, while consulting the U.S. MLA Carriage of Goods Sub-
committee, drafted a new text, altering several provisions and the numbering, thus 
producing COGSA 99.660  
 
 The draft COGSA 99 adopts an entirely new approach with regard to identifying 
the carrier, and governing the parties involved in the carriage endeavour. The draft 
provides for three types of ‘carrier’, in essence encompassing all parties to the carriage 
contract. There is the familiar “contracting carrier”, however the draft introduces two new 
variations, the “performing carrier” and the “ocean carrier”.661 The draft defines 
performing carrier in the following manner: “The term ‘performing carrier’ – (A) means 
a party (including a contracting carrier) who performs, or undertakes to perform, any of a 
contracting carrier’s responsibilities under a contract of carriage, including any party that 
performs, or undertakes to perform or procures to be performed any incidental services to 
facilitate the carriage of goods, regardless of whether it is a party to, identified in, or has 
legal responsibility under the contract…; and (B) includes (but is not limited to) ocean 
carriers, inland carriers, stevedores, terminal operators, consolidators, packers, 
warehousers, and their servants, agents, contractors and subcontractors.”662 While the 
term “ocean carrier” means “a performing carrier that owns, operates, or charters a ship 
used in the carriage of goods by sea.”663 The definition of carrier under the draft is 
therefore the most encompassing to date. Arguably, all conceivable parties involved in 
the carriage endeavour are covered, although with certain exceptions for inland 
                                                 
659 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 49-50.  
660 Tetley, W. “The Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform 
International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 30 JMLC 595, at p. 597.  
661 Articles 2(a)(2), 2(a)(3), and 2(a)(4) respectively. See Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” (1996) 18 Hous. J. Int’l L. 609; Tetley, W. “The Proposed New United 
States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 
30 JMLC 595; and Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” [1999] 
LMCLQ 126. 
662 Article 2(a)(3).  
663 Article 2(a)(4).   
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transport,664 but nevertheless, the draft would appear to solve the problems addressed in 
earlier sections with regard to the Hague Rules ‘carrier’. The definition of carrier, 
particularly with respect to the performing carrier, has been described as “extremely 
wide”.665 One author, in separate publications, has argued that the definition “is arguably 
too wide”666 and too complicated.667 Although, no justifications or reasoning was given 
for this criticism, aside from pointing out that the definition differs from the ‘two carrier’ 
solution found in the Hamburg Rules and in the Nordic Maritime Codes.668 Admittedly, 
the definition is extremely wide and differs from other regimes. In consideration of this, 
arguably from a judicial and litigious perspective the definition will inevitably be 
inconvenient as prior case law will be inapplicable and it will require a period of 
uncertainty before the boundaries and meanings will have been tested and interpreted by 
the courts. This however is the natural by-product of any new wording or novel 
provisions in legislation or conventions, and arguably does not found a basis for an 
objection to the proposed provision or instrument.669 The definition at first glance also 
appears to simply the law in this area, for example, the demise clause would evidently be 
irrelevant. As well, it has been noted that “the himalaya clause of a bill of lading would 
no longer be necessary with the proposed changes to COGSA.”670 For the most part this 
statement is correct, however, given the fact that inland rail and road carriers are not 
governed by the regime, such a clause may still prove to be useful.671 The draft also 
                                                 
664 Interstate motor and rail carriers are not governed by the draft regime by virtue of s. 3(b), unless where 
such carriers are also “the contracting carrier in an intermodal contract involving sea carriers” (Asariotis, R. 
& Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” [1999] LMCLQ 126, at p. 128).  
665 Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” [1999] LMCLQ 126, at 
p. 128. 
666 Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 846, footnote 205.  
667 Tetley, W. “The Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform 
International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 30 JMLC 595, at p. 598. 
668 Ibid. 
669 With regard to the opposition of the Hamburg Rules on the basis of the new wording found in many of 
the provisions, one author commented: ““[t]o argue against the Hamburg Rules on the principle ground that 
they will herald a period of uncertainty and confusion is, with respect to those who advance this argument, 
a little like refusing to update computer software because it takes a certain investment in to learn the new 
program and derive the full benefits from the innovation.” (Nicoll, C. “Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a 
Shipper-Dominated Economy?” (1993) 24 JMLC 151, at p. 179) 
670 Taylor, L. “Proposed Changes to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: How Will They Affect the United 
States Maritime Industry at the Global Level” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 32, at p. 35.  
671 See section 6 above discussing the judgment in Kirby, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
Himalaya clause in an ocean bill of lading that should be extended to cover a railroad who had 
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resolves the problem of actions outside the regime. By virtue of section 3(c) and (d) “the 
draft legislation provides exclusively for rights, liabilities and remedies in any action 
against any carriers and ships involved in performing the contract, without regard to the 
form of the action. Apart from contractual claims, this includes cargo claims in tort/delict 
against a performing unimodal carrier, as well as actions in rem.”672 There is however a 
problematic area of the draft with regard to carrier liability. The issue of joint and several 
liability of the carriers appears to be unclear. It has been noted that unlike the Hamburg 
Rules and the Nordic Maritime Code, the draft does not declare the carriers to be jointly 
and severally liable,673 and some commentators have observed that “whether different 
‘performing’ carriers would be liable jointly or alternatively is not entirely clear.”674 
Under the draft, the contracting carrier is liable from the time they receive the goods until 
the time of delivery,675 while the performing carriers “bear the same responsibility from 
the time they receive or take the goods in charge until the time they ‘relinquish control’, 
but also ‘at any other time to the extent that they participate in any of the activities 
contemplated by the contract’.”676 The question therefore arises, is the performing carrier 
jointly and severally liable with the contracting carrier, and where there are several 
performing carriers participating concurrently are they jointly and severally liable? Upon 
review of the draft, it has been questioned, “[w]hat happens if in the course of an 
intermodal contract goods are damaged during discharge by stevedores engaged by a sub-
contracting ‘performing’ sea carrier? Can only the stevedore be sued or is the shipowner 
also responsible? Similar questions arise where a vessel…operates under a charterparty 
and the charterer bears some contractual responsibility for loading or discharge 
                                                                                                                                                 
subsequently damaged the goods. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby Pty, 2004 AMC 2705 
(U.S. S.C. 2004) 
672 Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” [1999] LMCLQ 126, at 
p. 128. See also Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” (1996) 18 Hous. 
J. Int’l L. 609, at footnote 78, quoting the draft legislation: “the defences and limitation of liability provided 
for in this Act and the responsibilities imposed by the Act shall apply with the force of law in any action 
against a carrier or a ship without regard for the form or theory of the action or the court or other tribunal in 
which it is brought.” The draft therefore specifically provides for instances where the claim is being 
arbitrated.  
673 Tetley, W. “The Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform 
International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 30 JMLC 595, at p. 599.  
674 Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” [1999] LMCLQ 126, at 
p. 129.  
675 Section 5(a)(b). 
676 Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” [1999] LMCLQ 126, at 
p. 129. Responsibilities and liabilities of the performing carrier are found in section 5(a)(c).  
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operations. Both shipowner and charterer are ‘performing’ carriers and would seem to be 
responsible for their services.”677 The draft is unclear on this point, however, if past 
treatment of parties involved in the carriage endeavour is an indicator, the courts appear 
to be quite receptive to the notion of joint and several liability for carriers found 
responsible. In practice therefore this may not have been problematic, for the judiciary 
would have likely read into the draft joint and several liability where the draft is silent in 
the issue.  
 
In early 2000, it appeared that the proposed legislation would be put through 
Congress as it has the requisite support. “Senator Hutchinson [had] indicated to the press 
that she was firmly behind the U.S. COGSA proposal by the United States Maritime Law 
Association, and that she was prepared to see it through. Furthermore, the proposal [had] 
obtained significant support from such organizations as NITleague and the American 
Institute of Marine Underwriters.”678 It had been anticipated that Senator Hutchinson 
would have been able to push the proposed legislation through Congress during the 106th 
Session, in 2000, however, she was reassigned from Chairman of the Surface 
Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee to chair another committee.679 “The 
Senator was a supporter of U.S. COGSA reform, well-versed in maritime cargo shipping 
concerns and not easily replaceable in such matters.”680 The Senator’s departure slowed 
the progress of the reform, and by 2002 “the COGSA reform effort was focused on 
negotiating the elements of the International Cargo Liability Convention drafted by the 
[CMI] at the request of [UNCITRAL].”681 It has now been agreed that “it seems unlikely 
                                                 
677 Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” [1999] LMCLQ 126, at 
p. 129, footnote 28.  
678 De Orchis, “Speech to the Maritime Administrative Bar Association Regarding Status of Cargo Liability 
Regimes” January 26, 2001. Available at: www.marinelex.com/marinelex/statuscargo.cfm. Note that the 
NITleague, is the National Industrial Transportation league, which is a group of shippers and associations 
of shippers that conduct industrial and commercial enterprises of all size throughout the United States 
(Taylor, L. “Proposed Changes to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: How Will They Affect the United 
States Maritime Industry at the Global Level” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 32, at p. 37).  
679 Papavizas, C. & Kiern, L. “1999-2000 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments” (2001) 32 JMLC 349, 
at p. 368. 
680 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 50.  
681 Papavizas, C. & Kiern, L. “2001-2002 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments” (2003) 34 JMLC 451, 
at p. 477. For a discussion on the new UNICTRAL draft convention see section 12 infra. 
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that this bill will be of congressional priority in the near future,”682 or even at all.683 With 
regard to solving the dilemma associated with parties to the carriage endeavour, this turn 
of events is unfortunate. The notion of the ‘carrier’ under the draft would arguably have 
solved the vast majority of problems, despite the uncertainty concerning the issue of joint 
and several liability. Given the U.S. courts propensity in the past to hold carriers jointly 
and severally liable, it would have been arguably likely, that in the face of uncertainty in 
the legislation the parties would be found jointly and severally liable. It is notable 
however, that in consideration of other issues, such as international uniformity, the failure 
of the draft was undoubtedly welcomed in many circles.684
 
11.7. German Commercial Code (HGB) 
 In Germany, the 5th Book, ss. 476 seq., of the Commercial Code 
“Handelsgesetzbuch” (HGB)685 deals with maritime matters.686 Prior to the adoption of 
the Hague Rules, “the carrier was not defined in the Commercial Code and the charterer 
was usually considered [to be] the carrier.”687 The Commercial Code was amended in 
line with the Hague Rules in 1937,688 and therefore the notion of “the carrier as a separate 
                                                 
682 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 50. 
683 Papavizas, C. & Kiern, L. “2001-2002 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments” (2003) 34 JMLC 451, 
at p. 478, noting that “[a]lthough many in the maritime industry consider that COGSA’s sixty-seven years 
puts it past retirement age, COGSA will likely live to celebrate more birth-days beyond the 108th Congress 
if COGSA reform is to wait for the UN convention.” 
684 For strong objections to the United States unilateral efforts in draft COGSA see Tetley, W. “The 
Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 30 JMLC 595. See also Taylor, L. “Proposed Changes to the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act: How Will They Affect the United States Maritime Industry at the Global Level” (1999) 8 
Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 32, who devotes several pages to noting where support for the new draft lay, and 
where opposition was found. Particularly BIMCO, the Baltic and International Maritime Council, was a 
vocal opponent. (ibid).  
685 The HGB entered into force on January 1st, 1900, and was based almost entirely on its forerunner, the 
“Allgemeine Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch” of 1861. (Herber, R. “German Law on the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial 
Law, Abo, at p. 343). 
686 Herber, R. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading - Germany” in Ocean Bills 
of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer Law 
Intl, The Hague, at p. 161, notes that the statutory regulations that govern the carriage of goods by sea are 
contained in s. 556 to 663 HGB, and the bill of lading is governed by the provisions 642 to 662 HGB.  
687 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 392. This approach was based on article 510(1) of the HGB which the 
courts applied by analogy to apply to time charterers. (Ibid).  
688 Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading (1962) Louisiana State University Press, 
Louisianna., at p. 51.  
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party was introduced.”689 In 1986, when it became clear that the German law on carriage 
was in serious need of modernization, the debate ensued as to whether to adopt the 
Hamburg or the Visby Protocol.690  It became evident that the Hamburg Rules were 
unlikely to be adopted by the major maritime states, as well, German shipowners were 
strongly opposed to them, therefore amendments based on the Visby Protocol were made 
to the Commercial Code, or HGB.691 It is unfortunate that when Germany modernized, to 
a certain extent, her law on carriage, that steps were not taken to rectify the difficulties 
surrounding the notion of who is the carrier under German law. The HGB does contain 
provisions that are aimed at the problem, although they are at best minimal improvements 
over the general Hague-Visby system. Article 643 HGB addresses the contents of the bill 
of lading, stipulating that it should contain “the name of the carrier”.692 The compliance 
with the article in this respect however is not compulsory, and thus the absence of the 
name of the carrier does not affect the validity of the bill of lading.693 This is regrettable, 
and arguably renders the stipulation in article 643 irrelevant. This ineffective provision 
stands in contract to the mandatory requirement for carrier identification in article 
15(1)(c) of the Hamburg Rules, and it is thus surprising that Germany would not have 
rendered the article mandatory. Article 644 HGB does however aid with the identification 
of the carrier in practice, in that it provides that “if a bill of lading is signed by the master 
or shipowner’s agent does not contain the carrier’s name, it shall be presumed that the 
carrier is the shipowner.”694 Articles 643 and 644 are not unique to Germany, as the 
                                                 
689 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 392.  
690 Herber, R. “German Law on the Carriage of Goods by Sea” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) 
H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 346. 
691 Herber, ibid. The amendments were brought in by The Law to Amend the Commercial Code and Other 
Law (Second Maritime Law Amendment Act) of 25 July 1986 (Ashton, R. “A Comparative Analysis of the 
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their delivery to the consignee (Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading (1962) 
Louisiana State University Press, Louisianna., at p. 51).  
692 Herber, R. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading - Germany” in Ocean Bills 
of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer Law 
Intl, The Hague, at p. 162.  
693 Herber, ibid, at p. 163.  
694 Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification of 
Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 392. Although, this provision is rendered inapplicable where the bill of 
 143
Greek Code of Private Maritime Law contains almost identical provisions, with the same 
effect.695 German courts have also aided claimants with the respect to the identity of 
carrier issue by failing to recognize the validity of identity of carrier clauses when the 
charterer’s name is printed in the heading of the bill of lading.696 The state of the law 
with respect to parties involved in the carriage endeavor in Germany was not particularly 
exemplary with regard to solving the ‘identity of the carrier’ problem, however, this was 
rectified with an amendment to article 437, which now stipulates that the acting carrier 
shall be liable as the carrier for loss or damage to the goods during carriage, he will 
benefit from all defences and will be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier.697  
 
11.8. Other Nations 
 Japan, Australia and New Zealand all amended and to a certain extent modernized 
their carriage acts in the 1990’s without altering the definition of carrier or attempting to 
                                                                                                                                                 
lading is not signed by the master or another agent of the shipowner, therefore in such instances where the 
bill is signed by an agent of the charterer or where it is the charterer who sign the bill for the master. (Ibid).  
695 The Greek Code of Private Maritime Law in article 125(2)(a) stipulates that the carrier should be 
identified on the bill of lading, but although required by the Code, it is not mandatory. (Kiantou-Pampouki, 
A. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading - Greece” in Ocean Bills of Lading: 
Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer Law Intl, The 
Hague, at p. 209). ). If the carrier is not identified on the bill of lading, article 105(3) presumes by law that 
the ship is being operated by the shipowner, unless there has been a declaration of assignment of the ship’s 
operation entered into the ship’s registry, in which case the carrier will be the ship’s operator (Ibid). Article 
105(3) however is only a presumption and “is rebuttable and can be overturned by anybody having a legal 
interest. In any case, the carrier shall be the one who actually undertakes obligations and responsibilities of 
the contract for sea carriage.” (Ibid). The notion that the carrier is the party who actually undertakes the 
obligations was upheld in Decision 2422/1990, issued by the One-Member District Court of Piraeus, END 
1991 61 (63). (Ibid). Arguably, Greek law, similarly to German law, does little beyond what is found in the 
Hague and Hague-Visby Rules to clarify the law with respect to parties to the carriage endeavor. This is 
unfortunate as Greece recently, in 1992, ratified the Hague Rules and Visby Protocols, and therefore was 
presented with an opportunity to overhaul the existing law. Rather, the legislators simply provided in the 
enacting law that the Maritime Code provisions “which are irrelevant to the ratified texts, to be exact, the 
provisions of articles 168-173 shall not be affected by the application of the texts ratified by this law.” 
(Ibid).  
696 BGH (Feb 4, 1991), 26 Eur. Transport L. 512 (1991); BGH (Nov. 20, 1990), [1991] TranspR 65, as 
cited in Pejovic, C. “The Identity of Carrier Problem Under Time Charters: Diversity Despite Unification 
of Law” (2000) 31 JMLC 379, at p. 393.  
697 Article 437 of the Commercial Code provides: “Acting Carrier (1) Where a shipment is carried ot totally 
or partially by a third party (acting carrier), this carrier shall be liable as the carrier for the damage arising 
out of loss or damage to the goods or exceeding the term for delivery during the shipment carried out by 
him. Contractual agreements between the shipper or the consignee by which the carrier expands his liability 
shall be effective against the acting carrier only to the extent that he had consented to these in writing. (2) 
The acting carrier may assert all the defences which the carrier could assert based on the freight agreement. 
(3) Carrier and acting carrier shall be jointly and severally liable.” (as quoted by Lord Hobhouse in 
Homburg Houtimport v. Agrosin Private Ltd (The Starsin) [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571 (H.L.), at p. 604).  
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resolve identity of carrier or demise clause issues. These nations would be examples of 
arguably what was a missed opportunity.  
 
In 1994, New Zealand enacted a new Maritime Transport Act, which is 
predominantly Hague-Visby, but has been modified to cover sea waybills.698 It does little 
to solve identity of carrier issues, in fact by repealing the old Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 
it will be, according to one New Zealand commentator, “ensuring that the legal status and 
effect of demise and identity of carrier clauses will once again become live issues in 
respect of international carriage.”699 Interestingly enough though, identity of carrier 
clauses are not problematic in the context of domestic carriage in New Zealand. By virtue 
of sections 11 and 29 of the Carriage of Goods Act 1979, claims may be brought against 
the actual carrier or carriers where the contracting carrier is insolvent or cannot be found 
by exercising reasonable diligence.700 Notably, section 15 governing the limitation of 
carrier liability provides for the joint liability of actual carriers.701 It is regrettable that 
New Zealand has adopted a multicarrier regime including joint liability for domestic 
purposes, while retaining a single carrier model for its international regime.  
 
In 1991, the Australian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,702 which provided for the 
implementation of the Hague-Visby Rules, came into force. The Act contained a 
provision that brought the Hamburg Rules into force in late 1994, unless steps were taken 
to delay their entry.703 Australian cargo interests supported the Hamburg Rules, while the 
carriers supported the existing regime, and thus the Australian government in search of 
alternative regimes, consulted with members of the shipping community prior to the 1994 
                                                 
698 Maritime Transport Act 1994, Public Act 1994 No. 104 (New Zealand). 
699 Myburg, P. “Current Developments Concerning the Form of Bills of Lading – New Zealand” in Ocean 
Bills of Lading: Traditional Forms, Substitutes and EDI Systems (1995) A.N. Yiannopouos (Ed.), Kluwer 
Law Intl, The Hague, at p. 252.  
700 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1979, Public Act 1979 No. 43 (New Zealand), available online at: 
www.maritimelaw.orcon.net.nz/carriag.html.  
701 Section 15(c) governing joint liability for actual carriers, and (d) concerning joint and several liability of 
successive carriers.  
702 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, No. 160 of 1991, in force Oct. 31, 1991.  
703 Hetherington, S. “Australian Hybrid Cargo Liability Regime” [1999] LMCLQ 12, at p. 12. 
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deadline.704 The trigger was delayed for another three years in 1994,705 and the Minister 
then directed that discussions should be held “with a view to developing a [cargo 
liability] regime which provides fair and reasonable protection for both shippers and 
carriers.”706  The Department of Transport gathered experts from carriers, cargo interests, 
marine insurance, and legal advisors, and by 1995 a report was released, and then 
indorsed by industry.707 The Ministry of Transport sought further industry comments on 
the suggested changes to Australia’s carriage regime in 1996.708 In order to buy time, in 
1997 the Carriage of Goods by Sea Amendment Act, repealed the trigger mechanism thus 
ensuring that the Hamburg Rules would not come into force.709 Amendments to the 
carriage regime were made, and on July 1st, 1998 the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Regulations 1998, came into force.710 One can only lament that given the extent of the 
amendments and the fact that Australia was terribly close to implementing the Hamburg 
Rules, that it is surprising issues relating to the carrier were not dealt with. The period of 
responsibility of the carrier has been extended, deck cargo is included, as is liability for 
delay in certain circumstances, and the amendments cover EDIs and sea waybills by 
including a new definition of “contract of carriage”.711  
 
Perhaps Japan is the worst of the three culprits. Japan amended its carriage of 
goods regime and ratified the Hague-Visby Rules in 1992, bringing the new legislation 
                                                 
704  Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 51.  
705 Hetherington, S. “Australian Hybrid Cargo Liability Regime” [1999] LMCLQ 12, at p. 12. 
706 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 51. 
707 Davies, M. “Australian Maritime Law Decisions 1997” [1998] LMLCQ 394, at p. 394-395; Thornton, 
ibid, at p. 52; Hetherington, ibid, at p. 12.  
708 Hetherington, ibid, at p. 13.  
709 Tetley, W. “The Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform 
International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 30 JMLC 595, at p. 611; Hetherington, ibid, at p. 13; 
At the time, it was thought unlikely that the Hamburg Rules would ever be implemented in Australia in 
their entirety, and the piece meal nature of their implementation had been noted:  “on the Hamburg Rules 
[Ian Davis] said it is still a very long way from achieving international recognition as its adoption has so far 
been piecemeal and tentative.” (“Halfway to Hamburg: Australia to amend COGSA” [1997] Fairplay 10th 
July, at p. 22.). 
710 A copy of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Regulations 1998 with the old provisions and the new 
amendments can be found online at the Australian Government Federal Register of Legislative Instruments 
(FRLI) website: http://frli.law.gov.au, with the Regulations listed as FRLI number 1998B00160.   
711 Hetherington, S. “Australian Hybrid Cargo Liability Regime” [1999] LMCLQ 12, at p. 13-14.  
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into force in June 1993.712 Japan made several significant changes and thus the 
legislation includes liability for delay, and extended period of responsibility, and applies 
to both inbound and outbound shipments.713 Japanese COGSA also adopts a new 
definition of carrier in article 2(2): “In this law the term ‘carrier’ means a shipowner, a 
lessee of a ship, or a charterer carrying goods according to the previous Article.”714 That 
Japan bothered to amend the provision without rendering the term carrier plural is 
disappointing. Article 7 entitled “Issuing a Bill of Lading” is helpful: “1. The bill of 
lading must state the following particulars…(6) The carrier’s full name or trade name.”715 
Article 7(1), has in fact been helpful with regard to the identification of the carrier. In The 
Camfair, the Tokyo District court suit was taken against the shipowner and the time 
charterer for the loss of cargo.716 The charterer argued that he was not the carrier as the 
time charterer’s signature “for the master” rendered the shipowner responsible.717 The 
Tokyo court examined the bill of lading finding that the shipowner’s name was not on the 
bill of lading as per article 7(1) which was determined to mean “a specific individual’s 
full name or trade name”.718 The Tokyo court therefore determined that as the shipowner 
was not represented, the stipulation “for the master” had no legal effect.719  
 
11.9. Conclusion 
 Having canvassed the relevant national legislation and codes on the issue, it 
becomes evident that there is a general recognition that the state of affairs with regard to 
the identity of the carrier, or carriers, as dealt with in international uniform law is 
                                                 
712 Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability for the Carriage of Goods by Water” (2004) 
Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, Doc. TP 14307E, at 
p. 5. Available online from the Canadian Maritime Law Association website at: 
www.cmla.org/papers/2004/TransportReport-Oct.4,%202004.pdf. 
713 Transport Canada, ibid, at p. 5. 
714 Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 489, at p. 493, footnote 17, provides an 
English translation for article 2, Japanese COGSA.  
715 Ibid, at p. 493, footnote 18, provides an English translation for article 7, Japanese COGSA. 
716 Anuk Fire and Marine v. Shinwa Kaiun Kaisha (The Camfair) (30 September 1997) Tokyo District 
Court, summarized and discussed extensively in Satori, K. “The Demise Clause in Japan” [1998] LMCLQ 
489.  
717 Ibid, at p. 493.  
718 Ibid, at p. 495.  
719 Ibid. The shipowner and the time charterer were subsequently held jointly liable for the loss as “carriers” 
as the court found that the time charterer’s right to receive freight meant that he was a carrier, while the 
demise clause on the back of the bill of lading evidenced the shipowner assuming obligations and therefore 
was liable as well as the charterer (Ibid, at p. 495-496).  
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unsatisfactory. Some national legislatures have adopted approaches much more in line 
with the realities of the modern shipping industry. Arguably, it is not a coincidence that 
those nations who have most embraced the notion of multiple carriers and joint and 
several liability are those with civilian traditions, while nations such as Britain and 
Canada have remain steeped in a single carrier ethos. Despite the failure of the Hamburg 
Rules, and therefore the lost opportunity to test those articles in practice, the principles 
adopted in the Rules have now found testing grounds in Codes such as the Nordic 
Maritime Codes and the Chinese Maritime Code. This allows one to measure the success 
of those provisions with respect to solving and addressing the issues relating to multiple 
parties involved in the carriage endeavor. Such domestic solutions will be of great 
importance for both future uniform law, as discussed below, and the provision of 
potential models for nations seeking to update or amend outmoded carriage regimes. 
Nevertheless, domestic legislation in this regard does offer a piece meal solution to what 
is a larger issue. One commentator has argued that the solution is not a national one, but 
rather an international one: “the question of liability or non-liability of non-carriers is too 
important, from the view point of public policy, to be abandoned to the contractual 
drafting of interested parties…In the age of global business the question is not even for 
Congress. It is clearly an international issue that requires an international solution.”720
 
                                                 
720 Sweeney, J. “Crossing the Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport” (2005) 36 JMLC 155, 
at p. 199.  
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 12. UNCITRAL DRAFT INSTRUMENT 
 The uniform carriage of goods regime created by the Hague Rules, had become 
fragmented with many carriage regimes in place, from Hague, to both versions of Hague-
Visby, to Hamburg, to the growing both of domestic legislation being implemented. 
Despite the widespread applicability of the Hague and Hague-Visby system, it was 
recognized that they failed to meet “the world’s needs for a modern, uniform law on the 
subject.”721 In other words, they were outdated. Evidently Hamburg had failed to unify 
the carriage regime,722 as well, twenty years of consultations on the reform of the Hague-
Visby Rules were unproductive,723 and therefore a new process began. 
 
12.1. The Modernization of Carriage Law: The Involvement of CMI 
 There was a general recognition in the 1990s that the uniform system of carriage 
of goods had begun to fracture to the point where action needed to be taken. In May 
1994, the Executive Council of the CMI decided that carriage of goods by sea required 
the further attention of the CMI and appointed a working group to consider the 
problem.724 The working group sent out questionnaires to the national associations to 
compile their views on the necessary direction to take.725 In response to the question as to 
whether the CMI should push for adoption of the Hamburg regime, all but one 
association, Spain, replied in no uncertain terms, no.726 Rather, the option most 
favourable was to amend the Hague-Visby regime,727 and interestingly enough the 
                                                 
721 Sturley, M. “The United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law’s Transport Law Project: An 
Interim View of a Work in Progress” (2003) 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 65, at p. 67. See also Sturley, M. 
“Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, examining the 
diverse legal regimes in place and advocating the need for uniform law on carriage of goods. 
722 See section 10 supra. 
723 Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.” (2003) 28 
Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 15, noting that after twenty years of consultations and negotiations with pressure 
groups, CMI’s consideration of reforming the Hague-Visby Rules, was finally abandoned in 1998 without 
so much as a vote or a final text. 
724 Comite Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1995, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 
107.   
725 CMI Yearbook 1995, ibid.. There were twenty eight national maritime associations that replied to the 
questionnaire, as did the International Chamber of Shipping. (Ibid, at p. 115). The Questionnaire comprised 
seven questions  primarily related to assessing which regimes the associations preferred and what 
amendments might be suggested to improve the various regimes. (Ibid, at p. 111).   
726 Ibid, at pp. 123-138.  
727 Ibid, at pp. 158-170.  
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majority of respondents were opposed to a new convention.728 Question 5 enquired as to 
whether steps should be taken to modernize the Hague-Visby Rules, and if so, what 
changes should be made.729 The majority of respondents who suggested improvements to 
the existing rules suggested amendments dealing with the identity of the carrier problem, 
or dealing with responsibility of the carrier and the actual carrier.730 It was therefore 
viewed as a pressing area in need of reform. After receiving the replies from the various 
national associations, in May 1995 an International Sub-Committee on the Uniformity of 
the Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea was established,731 with the aim of studying “the 
most relevant issues with proposals as to the best manner in which they should be solved 
with a view to obtaining international uniformity.”732 The International Sub-Committee 
identified 19 issues, including definitions, identity of the carrier, and liability of the 
performing or actual carrier.733 Over the course of two years, the International Sub-
Committee met four times during which these issues were discussed.734 In the first and 
third session the definition of carrier and actual carrier was debated.735 The identity of the 
                                                 
728 Ibid, at pp. 170-173. Ireland and Indonesia were in favour of a new convention, while the United States 
and Switzerland gave positive responses that were qualified.  
729 Ibid, at p. 111.  
730 Ibid, at pp. 158-169. See particularly Canada, who specifies the solving the carrier/actual carrier 
problem; Australia and New Zealand, who suggest adopting the U.S. MLA proposals for a new COGSA, 
which deal with the identity of the carrier and performing carriers; Finland suggests Hamburg style 
improvements; France would add provisions on actual carriage; Ireland would include the notion of actual 
carrier and extend cover of the rules while the goods are in his care; Italy suggest Art. 1 should be amended 
in the style of Hamburg; Korea stipulates finding a solution to the actual carriers problem; South Africa 
suggest solving the identity of carrier problem; U.K. suggested dealing with the identity of carrier and 
problems of actual and performing carriers; Venezuela suggested a model based on the Nordic Maritime 
Codes and the Chinese Maritime Code. 
731 Ibid, at p. 107.  
732 Comite Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1997, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 
288. 
733 See the “Report on Consideration of Certain Issues Relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea”, in 
Comite Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1996, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 346. 
It was viewed the a new definition of ‘carrier’ was required, including a definition of actual carrier (Ibid, at 
p. 346). Identity of the carrier referred to the problem of actually identifying the carrier where his name is 
not properly on the transportation document (Ibid, at p. 348). It was felt that the liability on the part of the 
actual or the performing carrier should be the same as the contracting carrier, but limited to the parts of the 
carriage performed by him (Ibid, at p. 350).   
734. Report of the First Session in CMI Yearbook 1995, at p. 229; Report of the Second Session in Comite 
Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1996, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 360; Report 
of the Third Session in CMI Yearbook 1996, ibid, at p. 384; Report of the Fourth Session in CMI Yearbook 
1996, ibid, at p. 403.  
735 In the first session the majority of the participants favoured adopting the Hamburg solution or a 
variation thereof, however Ireland felt there were some problems with the Hamburg definition, but 
acknowledged that a definition of ‘carrier’ must include an actual carrier. (CMI Yearbook 1995, at p. 231). 
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carrier was discussed in the first three sessions.736Finally, the liability of the performing 
or actual carrier was discussed in the first and the third session.737 The third issue was 
actually the least contentious, and it was agreed unanimously after little debate that while 
the performing carrier would be subject to the rights, liabilities and responsibilities found 
in the Rules, his liability would be joint and several with the contracting carrier.738  
In 1997, the International Sub-Committee released a report detailing the discussions on 
the various aspects of carriage.739  
 
 During the time that the CMI was studying carriage reform, UNCITRAL decided 
it was also time to modernize the law of carriage. At the twenty-ninth session of the 
Commission in 1996, “it was proposed that the Commission should include in its work 
programme a review of current practices and laws in the area of the international carriage 
                                                                                                                                                 
In the third session, certain participants, such as the three United States representatives, suggested having 
the term contracting and performing in the definition of the carrier, while the two Chinese representatives 
disliked contracting and preferred actual to performing. (CMI Yearbook 1996, at p. 385). Berlingieri, 
requested an informal vote on the term performing vs. actual, with the result that 5 preferred the word 
actual while 5 preferred the term performing.  
736 It was noted that the Hamburg Rules were ineffective on this point as there is no sanction, and under the 
Rules virtually anyone may sign the bill of lading (CMI Yearbook 1995, at p. 237-238). A majority of the 
delegates were in favour of having a presumption that the contracting carrier was liable, while certain 
others such as Portugal and Ireland suggested a rebuttable presumption that the shipowner is liable (Ibid). 
During the session it was felt by Prof. Berlingieri that the identity issue posed a significant problem (CMI 
Yearbook 1996, at p. 375) The discussion extended the implications of identifying the carrier to issues of 
joint and several liability, and parties not responsible with identity of carrier clauses (Ibid). The majority 
view in the identify clauses should be abolished or held invalid as a basis of liability, and the contracting 
carrier should be jointly and severally liable with the performing carrier (Ibid). During the third session it 
was strongly recommended by the U.S. that the work should conform to UCP 500 terminology. (Ibid, at p. 
391). Many solutions were suggested including; allowing cargo to proceeds against the contracting or the 
actual carrier, a presumption that the registered shipowner was the carrier, imposing penalties for 
contracting carriers not named in the bill of lading, and even a suggestion by Sturley of the U.S. that the 
contracting carrier should be rebuttably presumed to be the shipper (because he accepted a deficient bill of 
lading). (Ibid, 393). In an informal vote, the most popular option with seven votes was a presumption that 
the registered shipowner is the contracting carrier, unless having proved that another perform performed the 
carriage, and the second most popular solution with 6 votes was simply that the shipowner is responsible. 
(Ibid, at p. 393-394).  
737 In the first session is was suggested that the contracting carrier be liable where the performing carrier is 
not named, amended by another suggest that this should be a presumption paired with the joint and several 
liability of the performing and the contracting carrier (CMI Yearbook 1995, at p. 242). During the third 
session several delegates favoured joint and several liability of the contracting and the performing carriers 
(CMI Yearbook 1996, at p. 396). Although it was considered that the contractual provisions of the bill of 
lading should not extend to the performing carrier, although the rules or regime should. (Ibid). It was 
agreed by consensus that all the provisions of the rules – rights, liabilities, and responsibilities – should 
apply to the performing carrier and that the contracting carrier and the performing carrier should be jointly 
and severally liable…there were no objections (Ibid).  
738 CMI Yearbook 1996, at p. 396. See above footnote for further discussion.  
739 CMI Yearbook 1997, at p. 288, with the report found at pp. 291-356.  
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of goods by sea, with a view to establishing the need for uniform rules in the areas where 
no such rules existed and with a view to achieving greater uniformity of laws than has so 
far been achieved.”740 This has been credited as the starting point for UNCITRAL’s work 
on the draft instrument on transport law.741 In the proposal, UNCITRAL noted that with 
regard to information gathering CMI, amoung other organizations, should be 
consulted.742 In 1998, CMI welcomed the invitation to cooperate with the Secretariat,743 
and set up a structure to organize the project and carry out a study on the issues, 744 
nevertheless they incorporated the pre-existing International Sub-Committee on the 
Uniformity of the Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea.745 In 1999, the CMI working groups 
sent out questionnaires to all the CMI member organizations with a view to collecting 
information that would be used to harmonize the law of carriage of goods.746 Originally, 
when the CMI considered the project in 1998 issues of liability were not included, 
however in 1999 CMI recommended that the project be extended to draft provisions 
relating to liability.747 The previous work by the CMI on carrier liability was therefore 
                                                 
740 “Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Twenty-
Ninth Session 28 May-14 June 1996”, reprinted in CMI Yearbook 1996, at p. 354-355.   
741 UNECE “Comments to the UNICTRAL draft Instrument on Transport Law”(2002) Document 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21/Add.1, at p. 3.  
742 “Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Twenty-
Ninth Session 28 May-14 June 1996”, reprinted in CMI Yearbook 1996, at p. 355.  
743 At the thirty-first session, in 1998, CMI made a statement to the effect that it welcomed the invitation to 
cooperate in soliciting views and preparing an analysis of the information, and that the analysis would 
allow the Commission to make an informed decision (UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary draft 
instrument on the carriage of goods by sea” 8 January, 2002, Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, at p. 4).  
744 Comite Maritime International, “Issues of Transport Law: Report of the CMI Steering Committee” in 
CMI Yearbook 1998, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 109-110. A Steering Committee was 
established to oversee the various Working Groups and International Sub-Committees and dialogue with 
other international organizations involved. A Working Group and International Sub-Committee on the 
Uniformity of the Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea (liability aspects), a Working Group on Issues of 
Transport Law, and a Working Group on EDI were convened (Ibid).  
745 Ibid.. 
746 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary draft instrument on the carriage of goods by sea” 8 January, 
2002, Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, at p. 5. 
747 Comite Maritime International, “Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]”, 
available at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html; Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – The 
UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.” (2003) 28 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 4. “The report of the 29th 
session [of UNCITRAL] makes clear that a review of the liability regime was not the main objective of the 
project and within the CMI it was at that time the subject of the work being undertaken by the International 
Sub-Committee on the Uniformity of the Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea (“the Uniformity Sub-
Committee) chaired by Professor Francesco Berlingieri…However, it became clear form consultation with 
the international organizations…that there was a strong desire that liability issues should be developed and 
that Professors Berlingieri’s report on the work of the Uniformity Sub-Committee should not be put to one 
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incorporated into the project.748 The CMI’s International Sub-Committee’s terms of 
reference were: “To consider in what areas of transport law, not at present governed by 
international liability regimes, greater international uniformity may be achieved; to 
prepare the outline of an instrument designed to bring about uniformity of transport law; 
and thereafter to draft provisions to be incorporated in the proposed instrument including 
those relating to liability.”749 After four meetings in 2000, the International Sub-
Committee had prepared a draft Outline Instrument by the end of the year.750 The draft 
contained a definition of carrier,751 contracting carrier752 and performing carrier.753 The 
drafting of “performing carrier” happened at an early stage in the drafting due to the fact 
that as one commentator noted “the delegations are fully aware that the concept of a 
single ‘carrier’ entity, carrying out all the traditional liner carrier responsibilities, has 
ceased to exist.”754 The explanatory note by the drafters of the ‘performing carrier’ 
definition note that the definition is similar to Hamburg’s ‘actual carrier’ but it is clearer 
and “includes not only the contracting carrier’s sub contractor, but an entire line of 
subsidiary persons who perform the contract.”755 The draft Outline Instrument also 
provided for the liability of contracting and performing carriers, allowing the performing 
carrier to benefit from the limits of liability and defences but rendering him subject to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
side.” (Beare, S. “Liability Regimes: Where we are, how we go there, and where we are going.” [2002] 
LMCLQ 306, at p. 307).  
748 See quotation from Beare, ibid.  
749 Comite Maritime International, “Issues of Transport Law” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters 
Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 112.   
750 Comite Maritime International, “Draft Outline Instrument” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters 
Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at pp. 122 
751 Article “1.2 Carrier means a contracting carrier or a performing carrier.” Comite Maritime International, 
“Draft Outline Instrument” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 
1222 
752 Article “1.3 Contracting Carrier means the person who enters into a contract of carriage with the 
contracting shipper.” Ibid.  
753 Article “1.4. Performing Carrier means a person who performs, or undertakes to perform, or procures to 
be performed any of a contracting carrier’s responsibilities under a contract of carriage, to the extent that 
the person acts, either directly or indirectly, at the request of, or under the supervision or control of, the 
contracting carrier, regardless of whether that person is a party to, or identified in, or has legal 
responsibility under the contract of carriage. The term “performing carrier” does not include any person 
(other than the contracting carrier) who is retained by a shipper or consignee, or is an employee, servant, 
agent, contractor, or subcontractor of a person (other than the contracting carrier) who is retained by a 
shipper or consignee.” Ibid, at p. 123.  
754 Sweeney, J. “Crossing the Himalayas: Exculpatory Clauses in Global Transport” (2005) 36 JMLC 155, 
at p. 198.  
755 “Draft Outline Instrument” in CMI Yearbook 2000, at p. 123.  
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responsibilities, as well providing for the joint and several liability of the carriers.756 The 
contracting carrier is also liable for the entire carriage, and actions against both the 
contracting and the performing carriers are governed by the instrument and cannot be 
brought in tort.757 The provision was based both on the CMI discussions above and on 
the proposed amendments to the U.S. COGSA.758 The draft Outline Instrument also 
created a presumption that where the transport document is ambiguous as to who the 
contracting carrier is, the registered owner of the vessel that the goods were loaded on 
shall be presumed to be the contracting carrier.759
 
The draft Outline Instrument was discussed at the CMI Conference in Singapore 
in February 2001.760 During the Conference, the delegates considered the definition of 
“performing carrier”, and were asked to consider whether the definition should include 
only the person engaged to carry or whether it should be supplemented with a Himalaya 
provisions to protect other sub-contractors.761 “Some speakers argued forcibly tat the 
concept of performing carrier should be excluded altogether from the draft instrument, 
                                                 
756 Article “5.3 Liability of Contracting and Performing Carriers.  
5.3.1. A performing carrier is subject to the responsibilities and liabilities under this Instrument, and is 
entitled to the rights and immunities provided by in this Instrument (a) during the period it has custody of 
the goods; and (b) at any other time to the extent that it is participating in the performance of any of the 
activities contemplated by the contract of carriage.  
5.3.2 Subject to 5.3.4 a carrier shall be responsible for the acts and omissions of any performing carrier 
who performs, undertakes to perform, or procures to be performed any of that carriers responsibilities under 
the contract of carriage as if such acts or omissions were its own.  
5.3.3 Responsibility is imposed on a carrier under 5.3.2. only when the performing carrier’s act or omission 
is within the scope of its contract, employment or agency, as the case may be.  
5.3.4 If an action is brought against a performing carrier who proves that it acted within the scope of its 
contract, employment or agency, as the case may be, the performing carrier is entitled to the benefit of the 
defences and the limitations of liability available to the contracting carrier under this Instrument.  
5.3.5 To the extent that both the contracting carrier and performing carrier are liable, their liability is joint 
and several but only up to the limits provided for in [5.4], 5.6 and 5.7. 
5.3.6. Without prejudice to the provisions of 5.8, the aggregate liability of the contracting carrier and 
performing carriers will not exceed the overall limits of liability under this Instrument.  
(“Draft Outline Instrument” in CMI Yearbook 2000, at p. 134 –135).  
757 Ibid. See also explanatory note under the provision.  
758 Ibid, at p. 134.  
759 Article 7.4.2, ibid, at p. 151-152. Nevertheless, the article provides that the owner may defeat the 
presumption by proving that the ship was under bareboat charter at the time, to a charterer who accepts the 
contractual responsibility for the carriage of goods. The explanatory note to this provision noted that the 
issue remained controversial.  
760 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary draft instrument on the carriage of goods by sea” 8 January, 
2002, Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, introductory discussion at p. 7.  
761 Girvin, S. “The 37th Comite Maritime International Conference: a report” [2001] LMCLQ 406, at p. 
415. 
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while others expressed doubts about the drafting of the definition.”762 The majority 
however preferred to narrow the definition of performing carrier for the purpose of 
performer’s liability, and have a Himalaya provision to protect a wider class of parties.763 
The issue of the presumption regarding the contracting carrier in an ambiguous transport 
document remained controversial, with some proposing that the owner of the vessel 
named in the document should be subject to the presumption rather than the owner of the 
vessel that performs the carriage, and others even questioning if a presumption should 
affect the registered owner.764 The International Sub-Committee pursuant to the 
discussion at the Conference continued work and revision on the draft instrument, 
including circulating a draft for comment to all the national associations and amending 
the draft on the basis of replies and comments.765 The definition of “performing carrier” 
was changed considerably, and that party was renamed the “performing party”.766 This 
was a contentious issue, with some advocating an extremely broad provision 
encompassing any party that performs any portion of the carrier’s responsibilities, thus 
any person who could possibly be a defendant in a tort, bailment or other non-contractual 
action for cargo loss.767 Conversely, some viewed that performing party should be 
excluded entirely,768 resulting in the compromise seen in the draft provision wherein the 
language covers “those that are involved in the carrier’s core responsibilities – carriage, 
handling, custody, or storage of the goods. Thus ocean carriers, inland carriers, 
                                                 
762 Ibid. 
763 Ibid.  
764 Ibid.  
765 Comite Maritime International, “Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]”, 
available at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html.  
766 1.17 Performing party means a person other than the carrier that physically performs [or fails to perform 
in whole or in part] any of the carrier’s responsibilities under a contract of carriage for the carriage, 
handling, custody, or storage of the goods, to the extent that that person acts, either directly or indirectly, at 
the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s supervision or control, regardless of whether that person is a 
party to, identified in, or has legal responsibilities under the contract of carriage. The term “performing 
party” does not include any person who is retained by the shipper or consignee, or is an employee, agent or 
contractor, or subcontractor of a person (other than the carrier) who is retained by a shipper or consignee.” 
(CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law, December 10, 2001 [2002] LMLCQ 418-441, at p. 419). 
767 See explanatory note to the provision 1.17. 
768 Explanatory note, ibid. See also Sturley, M. “The United Nations Commissions on International Trade 
Law’s Transport Law Project: An Interim View of a Work in Progress” (2003) 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 65, at p. 
81, noting that at the CMI’s sub-committee meetings FIATA proposed that no liability should be placed on 
performing parties. The World Shipping Council representing liners serving the U.S. market, and the 
National Industrial Transportation League argued that the contracting carrier along should be liable for loss 
or damage to cargo. (Sturley, ibid). 
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stevedores, and terminal operators…In contrast a security company that guards a 
container yard…would not be included.”769 As well, the ‘contracting carrier’ was 
renamed as ‘carrier’, and the format of the liability section was revised.770 The final 
revision took place in November 2001, with the finished document adopted by the CMI 
Executive on December 10, 2001, after three and a half years of intensive work.771  
 
The CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law772 was in essence a template. “[I]t is 
important to emphasize that the Draft Instrument is not a final draft in the traditional 
sense. There are two reasons for this. First, the CMI no longer has the role of preparing 
draft Conventions for consideration at a diplomatic conference…Secondly, UNCITRAL 
did not ask for a final draft.”773 Rather, UNCITRAL wanted a preliminary working 
document,774 and the terms of reference of the International Sub-Committee were simply 
“to prepare the outline of an instrument…[and] drafts provisions.”775 Nevertheless, in 
under a month, the CMI draft Instrument on Transport Law had been converted by 
UNCITRAL into its working instrument.   
 
12.2. The Next Phase: The UNCTRAL Draft Instrument 
 In 2003, the president of the CMI, Patrick Griggs, commented that the 
UNICITRAL draft convention “seems to be the best, and probably the last, chance of 
restoring international uniformity in th[e] area [of carriage of goods].”776 After the CMI 
                                                 
769 Ibid. 
770 See 1.1 for ‘Carrier’, and article 6.3 governing liability of performing parties, although in essence the 
provision is the same. As well, the presumption that the registered owner of the performing vessel remains 
although it is now located in article 8.4.2. (Ibid, at p. 418, 425, and 432). 
771 Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.”, at p. 4-5; 
Comite Maritime International, “Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]”, 
available at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html; Beare, S. “Liability Regimes: Where we are, how 
we go there, and where we are going.” [2002] LMCLQ 306, at p. 308.  
772 CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law, December 10, 2001 [2002] LMLCQ 418-441; Comite 
Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 2001, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 532; 
Available online at: www.comitemaritime.org. It should be noted that the version published in Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly contains only the provisions of the draft instrument, while the 
versions in the CMI Yearbook and online contain explanatory notes on each provision.  
773 Beare, S. “Liability Regimes: Where we are, how we go there, and where we are going.” [2002] 
LMCLQ 306, at p. 308. 
774 Ibid, at p. 309.  
775 Comite Maritime International, “Issues of Transport Law” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters 
Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 112. 
776 Griggs, P. “Obstacles to Uniformity of Maritime Law” (2003) 34 JMLC 191, at p. 195.  
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draft instrument was delivered to UNCITRAL in December of 2001, the draft, with only 
minor changes was converted into the UNICITRAL Preliminary Draft Instrument on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, dated January 8, 2002.777 UNCITAL then established a 
working group, Working Group III (Transport Law), to whom the draft was referred.778 
In April 2002, the Working Group, during the 9th Session considered certain elements of 
the draft instrument.779 The definition of ‘carrier’ was considered, and it was mentioned 
that the position of freight forwarders was unclear, as they were arguably carriers.780 
Again the issue of ‘performing party’ was contentious, with the suggestion that the entire 
definition be deleted to channel liability to the contracting carrier.781 Nevertheless, wide 
support was expressed for retaining the provision as narrowed to include those who 
“physically perform”, with the Himalaya style protection of those parties being viewed as 
essential.782 In the 10th Session, held September 2002, the issue of the liability of 
performing parties arose, and there was disagreement as to whether performing parties 
would or would not be liable in tort.783 The entire instrument was re-drafted and released 
in September of 2003.784 Several provisions had been altered, and the draft has been 
renumbered and reorganized, nevertheless, the definition of performing party, now article 
1(e), remains essentially the same, as does the performing party liability provisions.785 
What has transpired in the past two years that concerns the liability of carriers, is the 
introduction of the notion of maritime and non-maritime performing parties by the United 
                                                 
777 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea”, January 
8, 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21. Available online from UNCITRAL website: 
www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.  
778 Comite Maritime International, “Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]”, 
available at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html; 
779 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its ninth session (New 
York, 15-26 April 2002)”, 7 May 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/510. Available online from UNCITRAL website: 
www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.  
780 Ibid, at p. 26.  
781 Ibid, at p. 32. 
782 Ibid.  
783 UNCITAL, “Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its tenth session (Vienna, 
16-20 September 2002)”, 7 October 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/525. Available online from UNCITRAL 
website: www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm, at p. 21. It was argued that tortious liability on the part of the 
performing party was a matter of national law to which the draft instrument did not extend.  
784 UNCITRAL, “Draft instrument on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 4 September 2003, 
UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.32. Available online from UNCITRAL website: www.uncitral.org/en-
index.htm.  
785 Ibid, at p. 8. The words “fails to perform in whole or part” are shown as deleted with a line through them 
in the new draft. The liability provisions are now at Article 15 (Ibid, at p. 26).  
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States.786 The suggestion was discussed at the 12th Session in October 2003, with the 
Working Group in almost unanimous support of the exclusion of non-maritime 
performing parties from the liability regime, and thus definitions of “maritime performing 
party” and “non-maritime performing party” were suggested.787 In early 2004, the 
definitions were re-drafted slightly, with “maritime performing party” now defined as: “a 
performing party who performs any of the carrier’s responsibilities during the period 
between arrival of the goods at the port of loading [or, in the case of trans-shipment, at 
the first port of loading] and their departure from the port of discharge [or final port of 
discharge as the case may be]. The performing parties that perform any of the carrier’s 
responsibilities inland during the period between the departure of the goods from a port 
and their arrival at another port of loading shall be deemed not to be maritime performing 
parties.”788 The essential element of the definition of “performing party” as “a person 
other than the carrier that physically performs any of the carrier’s responsibilities under a 
contract of carriage for the carriage, handling, custody, or storage of the goods, to the 
extent that that person acts, either directly or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under 
the carrier’s supervision or control,” was retained.789 The Working Group in the 13th 
Session in May 2004, debated the liability of performing parties.790 Concerns were raised 
that “the common law concept of “joint and several” liability’ might not be interpreted as 
strictly equivalent to such civil law concepts as “responsabilité solidaire” or 
“responsabilidad solidaria” which, in turn, differed from such notions as “responsabilité 
conjointe” or “responsabilidad mancomunada”.”791 In October 2004, the provision was 
re-drafted and therefore the joint and several liability of the carrier and maritime 
                                                 
786 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preparation of a draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by sea]: 
Proposal by the United States of America”, 7 August 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.34. Available 
online from UNCITRAL website: www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm., at pp. 3-4. Thus the United States did 
not want the instrument to create liability for parties such as a trucker or a railroad, and proposed that that 
should be left to existing law.  
787 UNCITRAL, “Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session (Vienna, 
6-17 October 2003)”, 16 December 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/544. Available online from UNCITRAL 
website: www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm, at pp. 7-11. 
788 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Provisional redraft of the articles of the draft instrument considered in the 
Report of Working Group III on the work of its twelfth session”, 23 March 2004, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WGIII/WP.36, at p. 3.  
789 The definition of performing party was altered accordingly to stipulate that it includes maritime and 
non-maritime performing parties. (Ibid, at p. 3).  
790 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its thirteenth session 
(New York, 3-14 May 2004)” 24 May 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/552, at p. 4-6.  
791 Ibid, at p. 5.  
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performing parties reads “Article 15 bis: 1. If the carrier and one or more maritime 
performing party(ies) are liable for the loss of, damage to, or delay in the delivery of the 
goods, their liability is joint and several [, such that each such party shall be liable for 
compensating the entire amount of such loss, damage or delay, without prejudice to any 
right of recourse it may take against other liable parties,] but only up to the limits 
provided 16, 24 and 18. 2. Without prejudice to article 19, the aggregate liability of all 
such persons shall not exceed the overall limits of liability under this instrument.”792 In 
September of 2005, the most recent version of the draft instrument was released.793 The 
draft has maintained the definitions of performing party, maritime performing party and 
non-maritime performing party.794 The liability of maritime performing parties is found 
in article 20,795 while article 21 governs joint and several liability.796 It should also be 
noted that the new draft instrument also governs non-contractual claims, thus ensuring 
that the defences and limits provided for in the instrument apply in any action against the 
carrier or a maritime performing party whether the action is founded in contract, in tort, 
or otherwise.797
                                                 
792 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Provisional redraft of the articles of the draft instrument considered in the 
Report of Working Group III on the work of its thirteenth session”, 4 October 2004, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WGIII/WP.39, at pp. 3-4.  
793 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 8 September 
2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.56. Available online from UNCITRAL website: www.uncitral.org/en-
index.htm.  
794 Ibid, at p. 7-8: article 1(e), 1(f), 1(g). There are slight variations from the provisions drafted in 2004. 
Notably “maritime performing party” now stipules that “in the event of a transshipment, he performing 
parties that perform any of the carrier’s responsibilities inland during the period between the departure of 
the goods from a port and their arrival at another port of loading are not maritime performing parties.” 
Where as previously they were deemed not to be maritime performing parties. 
795 Ibid, at p. 22. Article 20: “1. A maritime performing party is subject to the responsibilities and liabilities 
imposed on the carrier under this Convention, and entitled to the carrier’s rights and immunities provided 
by this Convention, if the occurrence that caused the loss, damage or delay took place (a) during the period 
in which it has custody of the goods; or (b) at any other time to the extent that it is participating in the 
performance of any of the activities contemplated by the contract of carriage.” Articles 20(2)-20(4), govern 
a voluntary increase in liability by contract, the maritime performing party’s liability for acts or omissions 
of any person whom it has delegated the carrier’s responsibilities, and that the maritime performing party is 
entitled to the limits and defences if it acted within the scope of its contract, employment or agency.  
796 Ibid, at pp. 23-24. The provision is identical to Article 15 bis as quoted above with the exception of the 
article numbers referred to.  
797 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 8 September 
2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.56. Available online from UNCITRAL website: www.uncitral.org/en-
index.htm, at p. 12: “Article 4. Applicability of defences and limitation. 1. The defences and limiations of 
liability provided for in this Convention and the responsibilities imposed by this Convention apply in any 
action against the carrier or maritime performing party for loss of, or damage to, the goods covered by a 
contract of carriage and delay in delivery of such goods, or for the breach of any other obligation under this 
Convention, whether the action is founded in contract, tort, or otherwise.”  Previously, Article 15, in 
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  The issue of performing parties and their liability is a complex and contentious 
one as demonstrated above by both the work of the CMI and UNICTRAL. Sturley has 
referred to the drafting of a performing party definition as “one of the most controversial 
aspects of the project.”798 The debate surrounding performing parties is intimately tied 
with the on-going debate on the scope of the instrument, as door-to-door or a network 
system, or limited network system,799 which is beyond the scope of the discussion at 
hand. The above discussion, therefore, is in no way a complete picture of all the 
complexities involved with regard to performing parties, mutlimodal transportation and 
scope of the coverage of the instrument, rather the aim was to highlight issues that bore 
directly on the issue of liability of shipowners, charterers and other parties discussed in 
previous sections who might otherwise be “the carrier”.  In the context of the discussion 
at hand, it would appear that despite arguments by some groups in the shipping industry 
for narrower provisions,800 the definition and liability provisions as they exist at present 
are expansive enough in scope to resolve the problem of the single carrier definition of 
the Hague Regime. The debate of whether the shipowner, time charterer, or voyage 
charterer is ‘the carrier’ should no longer arise under the new draft instrument as it 
stands, thus rendered useless by the notion of performing parties and maritime 
performing parties. As well, the issue of circumvention of the regime via an action 
outside contract in tort or bailment is also resolved. What is arguably an improvement is 
that the carrier and maritime performing parties are more likely to be held jointly and 
severally liable under Article 21, as opposed to the joint and several liability as found in 
Hamburg and the domestic legislation of several nations. This would arise from the more 
                                                                                                                                                 
UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Provisional redraft of the articles of the draft instrument considered in the 
Report of Working Group III on the work of its thirteenth session”, 4 October 2004, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WGIII/WP.39, at p. 11, with a few alterations.   
798 Sturley, M. “Scope of Coverage under the UNCITRAL Draft Instrument” (2004) 10 JIML 138, at p. 
149.  
799 For a discussion on the various national proposals with regard to the scope of the instrument, and their 
affects on the liability of performing parties generally, see Sturley, M. “Scope of Coverage under the 
UNCITRAL Draft Instrument” (2004) 10 JIML 138, at pp. 148-154. See also Sturley, M. “The United 
Nations Commissions on International Trade Law’s Transport Law Project: An Interim View of a Work in 
Progress” (2003) 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 65, at pp. 76-90.  
800 See footnote 786 above, on the arguments by FIATA, WSC, and NITL with regard to reduced or 
eliminated liability on the part of performing parties.  
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expanded definition of the maritime performing party’s liability.801 Interestingly enough, 
the underlying notion of joint and several liability based on performing the carrier’s 
obligations or sharing the responsibilities of the carrier found the new draft instrument is 
in accordance with Professor Tetley’s “joint venture” argument and the U.S. “practical 
approach” or “multi-carrier approach”. It would appear therefore that the drafters of the 
new draft instrument have recognized the validity, simplicity, and fairness of such an 
approach. Performing parties and their liability was not discussed in the 15th Session held 
in April 2005,802 nor is it on the provisional agenda of topics to consider for the 16th 
Session in December 2005.803 Issues relating to maritime performing parties are however 
on the plan for future work of the 17th Session to be held in April 2006.804 It will 
therefore remain to be seen whether the approach adopted in the last draft will be present 
in the final instrument due out in 2007.805 Finally, with regard to parties such as freight 
forwarders, they are much more contentious under the new instrument given that they 
may very well fall within the non-maritime performing party definition.806 Given the 
complex and hotly debated issue of liability for non-maritime performing parties and 
                                                 
801 Where in Hamburg Rules 10(2), the actual carrier is liable for “carriage performed by him”, in the new 
draft instrument 20(1) covers the time that he had custody of the goods, as well as any other time that he is 
participating in the performance of any of the activities contemplated in the contract of carriage. An 
argument can be made that inherently the wording of the new provision is broader in scope and can be used 
to bring all parties involved within such a definition. It would be hard to imagine a potential defendant not 
falling within the liability provision.  
802 UNCITRAL, “Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fifteenth session (New 
York, 18-28 April 2005)”, 13 May 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/576. Available online from UNCITRAL 
website: www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm.  
803 UNCITRAL, “Annotated Provisional Agenda: Sixteenth Session”, 22 August 2005, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.48. Available online from UNCITRAL website: www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm, at p. 
8, para 25.  
804 See “Schedule of next meeting: 17th session, 3-13 April 2006, New York” at 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3Transport.html.  
805 UNCITRAL, “Annotated Provisional Agenda: Sixteenth Session”, 22 August 2005, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.48. Available online from UNCITRAL website: www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm, at p. 
7, describing that at the 38th session of the Commission, it was agreed that 2007 would be a desirable goal 
for the completion of the project, but the issue of establishing a deadline for its completion would be 
revisited during the 39th session in 2006.  It has been argued however, that the draft is too long and complex 
to be adopted anytime soon, and thus a “fast track” approach should be taken for issues that need solving 
right away such as the “actual and performing carrier” issue (Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – 
The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.” (2003) 28 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 7).  
806 ‘Non-maritime performing party’ means a performing party who performs any of the carriers 
responsibilities prior to the arrival of the goods at the port of loading or after the departure of the goods 
from the port of discharge.” (UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Provisional redraft of the articles of the draft 
instrument considered in the Report of Working Group III on the work of its twelfth session”, 23 March 
2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WGIII/WP.36, at p. 4).  
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inland parties, a discussion of the issue of freight forwarders as carriers with regard to the 
new draft instrument is beyond the scope of the discussion at hand.807  
 
                                                 
807 For a discussion involving through contracts and freight forwarders see Nikaki, T. “The UNCITRAL 
Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]: The Treatment of Through 
Transport Contracts” (2004) 31 Transp. L. J. 193, who discusses the necessity for due diligence obligations 
under the new draft instrument for parties acting as freight forwarders, and suggests, at p. 212 a redrafting 
of article 9 of the draft instrument governing mixed contracts of freight forwarding and carriage. See also  
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13. CONCLUSION 
 “Maritime Law should be the child of commerce rather than the father.”808 It 
would be trite to comment that this area of the law is outdated and in need of reform, for 
that point is known to all. What remains incomprehensible however, is how the 
judiciaries of several nations have allowed such a narrow interpretation of the Hague 
Rules to be perpetuated when it is so evidently out of touch with the commercial realities 
of the modern shipping industry. One also marvels at how an interpretation of the Rules, 
so at odds with its aims and so heavily influenced by domestic legal constructs, can be 
perpetuated for so long. The interpretive mandate in the Vienna Convention on the 
Interpretation of Treaties has evidently been ignored in this instance.809 What is equally 
incomprehensible, is where legislatures have amended and revised outmoded laws or 
have implemented new carriage acts, and have failed to resolve the issue, or even to 
partially address it. In instances where the legislatures have not intervened to rectify the 
situation, a judicial solution is required in this instance. The fact that over eight decades 
after the drafting of the Hague Rules cases such as The Starsin are being pleaded to the 
House of Lords, where the uniform law is being circumvented through actions in tort 
against a shipowner and certain claimants find themselves without a cause of action for 
lack of title in the goods at the time of the loss, is an affront to the whole purpose of 
establishing uniform carriage law. Parties to the carriage endeavor, either parties with 
interest in the goods or parties who perform aspects of the carriage, must be found to fall 
within the regime. Many of the difficulties, if not most, would be resolved if courts 
adopted the view that parties performing carriage by sea are ‘carriers’, thus holding them 
jointly and severally liable. This has been accomplished to a certain degree in 
jurisdictions more open to the concept, such as the United States, but for the most part, 
the judiciary of the commonwealth nations have neglected to adopt this approach, and in 
certain cases even outright rejected it. Even after a detailed examination of this issue, one 
remains left with the question: Why is there such resistance to the notion of “carriers” 
                                                 
808 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part IV)” (1976) 7 
JMLC 615, at p. 615.  
809 Article 31(1) of Vienna Convention on the Interpretation of Treaties, 1969, reads: “A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”  
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and joint and several liability for parties involved in the carriage of goods? The above 
discussion reveals that adopting this approach would; a) simplify the law in this area 
immeasurably, b) ensure that the mandatory uniform carriage regime is being imposed on 
parties whose relations it was arguably created to regulate, c) bring the law in line with 
the modern commercial practice of shipping, and d) have the effect of harmonizing the 
law of certain nations with those who have legislated in order to address the issue. 
Despite a detailed examination of the topic, this author fails to comprehend the judicial 
resistance to this solution given all the factors weighing in its favour, and thus the 
question must unfortunately remain unanswered. Unless a paradigm shift on this issue is 
experienced within the judiciary, it is almost certain that the solution will be a legislative 
one, either domestically or through the adoption of a new international instrument. Until 
that time, one is left with parties operating in a modernized industry who are burdened 
with categories created two centuries ago.   
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